People vs. Elizalde & Placente Case Digest

People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Elizalde y Sumagdon and Allan Placente y Busio

G.R. No. 210434. December 5, 2016

Facts

On June, 2005, an Information was filed against accused Arcel Lucban y Lindero, Allan Dela Pefia, Alden Diaz, alias Erwin, charging chem with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portion of said Information reads:

That on or about 6:30 in the evening of June 17, 2003 on Dr. A. Santos St., Sucat Road, Paranaque City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding and abetting one another, with the use of firearms, employing force, threat, and intimidation did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, carry away, kidnap and deprive Letty Tan y Co of her liberty against her will by shoving her inside a red Toyota Lite Ace van with plate number ULK 341 at gunpoint and thereafter transferred her to a Mazda XLT jitney bearing plate number CRV-299 where said victim was later found with gunshot wounds which caused her death engaging in armed encounter with police operatives in Tarlac City. The abduction of Letty Tan y Co was for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Letty Tan y Co in whatever amount may be awarded them under the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Contrary to law.

Only appellants Elizalde and Placente as well as Dela Pena were arrested while the rest remain at-large. Upon arraignment, they all pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, during trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim's husband, Antonio Tan, an eyewitness, Mario Ramos, and several police officers.

Antonio testified that at around 6:30 p.m. on June 17, 2003, while he was closing their concrete products store, Nysan Concrete Products, along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Sucat, Parafiaque City, Letty went inside their vehicle that was parked at the right side of the road facing their store. Suddenly, a red Toyota Lite Ace van with plate number ULK 341 arrived. He then saw about seven (7) armed men alight therefrom, three (3) of which pointed their guns at him and told him not to move, while two (2) of the other four (4) dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they sped away. Antonio immediately called his children and his brother, Nick. Through Antonio's cellular phone, they would bargain with the kidnappers, telling them that they did not have the amount, to which the kidnappers replied that they will not see Letty again without it. At noon of the next day, the PACER team informed Antonio and his family about a shootout in Tarlac where three (3) persons were killed. They proceeded to the Tarlac Provincial Hall where they saw Letty's lifeless body with a gunshot below her chin. Antonio identified the other bodies as those who kidnapped his wife and later learned that the others, appellants included, were able to escape.

Sometime in April 2004, however, Antonio saw a news report on TV which showed a picture of a wounded person involved in a shooting incident in Navotas. He instantly recognized said person as appellant Elizalde and called a PACER agent to inform him thereof. Consequently, together with the PACER team, he went to V. Luna Hospital where Elizalde was confined and identified him as one of the men who dragged his wife into the red van.

A few years after, when appellant Placente was arrested in 2007, Antonio identified him as one of the armed persons who poked a gun at him while the others dragged his wife. This was through the cartographic sketches that the PACER team drew at the time of the incident.

Appellant Elizalde denied the charges against him, claiming that he did not know Antonio, Letty or any of his co-accused. According to him, he went to Manila for the first time on April 15, 2003 from Samar, where he was working in a bakery, to look for his mother. He lived with his cousin in Sta. Cruz, Manila. On the day of the alleged kidnapping on June 17, 2003, Elizalde testified that he was in Blumentritt, Manila, selling boiled peanuts in a pushcart from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Afterwards, he went straight home for fear of getting lost, being in Manila for the first time.

In addition, appellant Placente next testified and also denied knowing any of his co-accused as well as the accusations against him. According to Placente, he came to Manila in 1982 from Samar. On the alleged day and time of the kidnapping, he was merely working, driving a tricycle owned by his neighbor on his way to the market in Pasig City. His job normally ends at 8:00 p.m., and on that day, he claimed that he did not go anywhere other than his daily route. Thereafter, he parked the tricycle in front of his neighbor's house and returned the key, as he normally did. In August 2003, he began driving a taxi. In 2005, however, he went back to Samar with his pregnant wife and his son so that his wife can give birth there. He worked as a laborer and a farmer until he was arrested on May 9, 2007.

On March 4, 2011, the RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The RTC gave credence not only to the fact that the prosecution witnesses testified in a positive, categorical, unequivocal and straightforward manner, but also to the inherent weakness of appellants' defenses of denial and alibi. Aside from this, the trial court further noted that the appellants' defense of denial was not even corroborated by any credible witness.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the R TC Decision, but reduced the moral damages to Pl00,000.00. In this regard, the CA agreed with the RTC as to the existence of conspiracy among appellants and their cohorts. Their community of criminal design could be inferred from their arrival at Antonio's store already armed with weapons, Placente and companions pointing their guns at Antonio, while Elizalde and companions dragged Letty into their van. Moreover, they demanded P20M for Letty's freedom which never materialized as she was killed during captivity by the kidnappers before evading arrest.

Issues:

1. Whether the prosecution's witnesses' are credible.
2. Whether the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial prosper.
3. Whether Antonio's positive identification of Elizalde should be given credence due to the fact that Antonio only recognized Elizalde on television.
4. Whether the failure of the police officers to inform appellants of their constitutional rights is fatal.

Rulings

1. Yes. The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is conclusive, binding, and entitled to great weight, unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling, as affirmed by the appellate court, finding the prosecution witnesses' testimonies credible. According to the lower courts, the prosecution witnesses testified in a categorical and straightforward manner, positively identifying appellants as part of the group who kidnapped the victim. Particularly, Antonio unmistakably and convincingly narrated, in detail, the series of events that transpired on the day of the incident from the moment he saw appellants alight from their red van, who thereafter split up into two (2) groups, one, pointing guns at him, and the other, dragging his wife to their van, up until the time when they successfully boarded said vehicle before speeding away.

In n addition, such testimony was duly corroborated and further strengthened by other prosecution witnesses, such as P/Insp. Nelmida, who was personally engaged in the shootout and whose buttocks were even shot by appellant Elizalde, as well as Mario Ramos, who personally saw appellants alight from the jeepney where he eventually saw the lifeless body of the victim. The Court cannot, therefore, tum a blind eye to the probative value of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, consistent with each other, given in the absence of any showing of ill motive.

2. No. As noted by the trial court, the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial were not even corroborated by any credible witness. Well settled is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. In the instant case, it seems as if appellants urge Us to accept -hook, line, and sinker -their self-serving statements that Elizalde was merely selling peanuts while Placente was simply driving his neighbor's tricycle without even attempting to corroborate the same with any supporting evidence. As aptly pointed out by the RTC, Elizalde's cousin or Placente's neighbor could have been presented to substantiate their stories. Regrettably, appellants failed to convince.

3. Yes. Antonio actually identified Elizalde as his wife's abductor twice prior to confirming his identity in the hospital. The day after the incident, Antonio recognized Elizalde from four ( 4) cartographic sketches based on the descriptions given by Antonio. Thus, appellants' claim that there was no cartographic sketch of Elizalde made after the crime has no basis. Thereafter, Antonio again recognized Elizalde on television prompting him to immediately call the PACER agents. Verily, the Court cannot give credence to appellants' assertion that Elizalde' s identification at the hospital was marked by suggestiveness for as clearly narrated, it was Antonio who first recognized Elizalde on television and who instantly contacted the PACER agents, not the other way around.

With respect to the contention that Antonio's testimony contains inconsistencies, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the so-called inconsistencies are inconsequential for they merely refer to minor details which actually serve to strengthen rather than weaken his credibility as they erase suspicion of being rehearsed. This is so because what really prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the appellants.

4. No. As for the alleged nullity of the proceedings due to the absence of any showing that the police officers informed appellants of their constitutional rights, the Court sustains the CA' s ruling that even assuming said failure to inform, the same is immaterial considering that no admission or confession was elicited from them. As previously discussed, their guilt was established by the strength of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the findings of the trial court, as positively affirmed by the appellate court, insofar as the existence of conspiracy is concerned. Accordingly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests. As aptly held by the CA, the community of criminal design by the appellants and their cohorts is evident as they each played a role in the commission of the crime. While appellant Placente and companions pointed their guns at Antonio, Elizalde and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they demanded ransom money as a condition for her release, which, however, never materialized due to a shootout that sadly led to her death. Consequently, therefore, appellants are equally liable for the crime charged herein.

On this score, the Court finds no reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts for they aptly convicted appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. Accordingly, the Court affirms the lower court's imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, which should have been death, had it not been for the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines" prohibiting the imposition thereof.

There is, however, a need to modify the amounts of damages awarded. Verily, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,45 the amount of damages are increased to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages, and that an interest be imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.