Sunday, August 26, 2018

Figuera vs. Ang (2016)


JENNEFER FIGUERA, as substituted by ENHANCE VISA SERVICES, INC vs. MARIA REMEDIOS ANG

G.R. No. 204264, June 29, 2016



BRION, J.:



Facts: Petitioner Ang is the owner of a business named "Enhance Immigration and Documentation Consultants" (EIDC). In 2004, Ang executed a Deed transferring all of her business rights over the EIDC to Figuera for ₱150,000.00 and that Ang shall pay the bills for electricity, telephone, office rentals, and the employees’ salaries up to the month of December 2004. Without Ang’s consent, Figuera paid all the utility bills amounting to ₱107,903.21. In 2005, Figuera tendered only the amount of ₱42,096.79 to Ang, after deducting the amount of ₱107,903.21 from the ₱150,000.00. Ang refused to accept the payment.



Thus, Figuera filed a complaint for specific performance before the RTC of Cebu City against Ang. Figuera consigned the amount of ₱42,096.79 to the RTC. Ang maintained that the amount due pursuant to the Deed is ₱150,000.00 and not just ₱42,096.79.



On May 19, 2005, Figuera conveyed all her rights and causes of action over EIDC in favor of the Enhance Visa Services, Inc. (EVSI).



The RTC and CA ruled that for the tender of payment and consignation to be valid, Figuera must tender the full amount of ₱150,000.00 rather than just ₱42,096.79. Ang is not obliged to accept an amount less than what is agreed upon in the Deed.



Issues: 1) Whether or not legal subrogation took place despite the absence of Ang’s consent to Figuera’s payment of the EIDC bills.



2) Whether or not there was a valid tender of payment and consignation.



Rulings: 1) Yes, there was legal subrogation. There is legal subrogation when a person interested in the fulfilment of the obligation pays, even without the knowledge of the debtor. There is compensation when (1) each one of the debtors is bound principally, and that the debtor is at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) both debts consist of a sum of money, or if the things due be consumable, they be of the same kind and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) both debts are due; (4) both debts are liquidated and demandable; and (5) there be no retention or controversy over both debts commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.18 When all these elements are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law and extinguishes both debts to the corresponding amount, even though both parties are without knowledge of the compensation.



All the elements of legal compensation are present in this case.



First, in the assignment of business rights, Figuera stood as Ang’s debtor for the consideration amounting to ₱150,000.00. Figuera, on the other hand, became Ang’s creditor for the amount of ₱107, 903.21 through Figuera’s subrogation to the rights of Ang’s creditors against the latter.



Second, both debts consist of a sum of money, which are both due, liquidated, and demandable.



Finally, neither party alleged that there was any claim raised by third persons against said obligation. In effect, even without the knowledge and consent of Ang or Figuera, their obligation as to the amount of ₱107,903.21 had already been extinguished. Consequently, Figuera owes Ang the remaining due amount of ₱42,096.79.



2. Yes, the tender of payment and consignation were valid. To be valid, the tender of payment must be absolute and must cover the amount due. In this case, the remaining amount due in Figuera's obligation is P42,096.79. Due to the creditor's refusal, without any just cause, to the valid tender of payment, the debtor is released from her obligation by the consignation of the thing or sum due.



Ration Decidendi: The consent or approval of the debtor is required only if a third person who is not interested in the fulfilment of the obligation pays such. On the other hand, no such requirement exists in cases of payment by a person interested in the fulfilment of the obligation.



Gist: The Court resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Figuera assailing the June 29, 2012 Decision and the September 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals of Cebu City.










Saturday, August 11, 2018

People vs. Ohayas, et.al (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMBROSIO OHAYAS, ET. AL
G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017 
TIJAM, J.:
Facts: Appellant, together with his companions, walked towards the place where the victim was conversing with his friends. Lou noticed appellant had in his hands a shotgun while his companions were carrying torches. Appellant suddenly, and without any warning, shot Armando Jr. who was hit in his right abdomen. Not contented, appellant continued to fire at the victims. Sany was hit on his right finger, while Lou, although not directly hit, nevertheless suffered injuries when the bullets ricocheted.
Appellant claimed that he was mauled at Sitio Bonbon by a certain "Toper" prior to the shooting incident, and because of that, his cousins wanted to avenge him. Appellant, however, prevented them from doing so. On the day of the shooting, appellant claimed that he was fishing at sea. At around 8 o'clock in the evening, he heard gunshots coming from Sitio Bonbon. He felt afraid, so he stopped fishing and went home. On the way home, he was told by SP03 Bancog that someone died in the shooting incident, and that appellant was the one to be blamed.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of murder.
Ruling: The elements of the crime of murder are: (I) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) Armando, Jr. was shot and killed; (2) the accused-appellant was the person who killed him; (3) Armando, Jr.'s killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery; and (4) the killing of Armando, Jr. was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. In this case, suffice it to state that the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the accused-appellant to have perpetrated the offense.
Ratio Decidendi: Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder.

People vs. Deniega (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO DENIEGA
G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: In an Amended Information, accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape, as follows: that the accused feloniously, have carnal knowledge with a minor (16 years old) AAA, whose mental age is only six (6) years old. Said carnal knowledge with the said AAA is detrimental to her normal growth and development and that accused knew fully well that the said AAA is suffering from mental disability and/or disorder.
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution and also raised the defense of alibi. He contended that between the hours of 8 o'clock in the morning and 12 o'clock midnight of May 2, 2007, he busied himself by painting the house of a neighbor, then he went to GMA Cavite to have his electric fan repaired and, subsequently, had a drinking session with his friend at the latter's house. He also admitted that he and the victim were residing at the same place and, at the time of the incident, he has known the victim for one month.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266- A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC.
Ruling: Yes. It is a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. In People v. Quintas, the Supreme Court held that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph l(b), Article 266-A of the RPC.
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission of the crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution was able to establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, Clinical Abstract prepared by a medical doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health, as well as the testimonies of the said doctor29 and the victim's mother, BBB.
Ratio Decidendi: In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.
Gist: This is an ordinary appeal filed assailing the Decision of the CA, which affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC of San Pedro, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape.

People vs. Jesalva (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESALVA
G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017 
JARDELEZA, J.:
 Facts: An Information was filed charging accused-appellant, Ryan Menieva and Junie Ilaw  alleging that accused, conspiring together, feloniously with intent to kill with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of Amel Ortigosa, by then and there stabbing him with a sharp bladed instrument hitting him on the chest, causing his untimely death.
Accused-appellant denied any participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting, he saw and heard people running and shouting which caused him to leave the place.
RTC and CA held that appellant is liable for murder as he conspired with the other accused.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of murder.
Ruling: No. To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of accusedappellant before, during and after the stabbing incident.
In this case, no evidence showing that appellant was purposely waiting for Ortigosa at the time and place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw were on standby, awaiting for accused-appellant's signal. Surely, appellant could not have anticipated that on September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa and his group would pass by and go to the store to buy cigarettes. Appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his coaccused to cause the death of Ortigosa. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy.
Ratio Decidendi: The presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.
Gist: This appeal seeks to reverse and set aside the CA’s Decision, which upheld the Decision of the RTC, which found appellant Roberto Esperanza Jesalva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

People vs. Delos Reyes (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCEDITAS MATHEUS DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 198795, June 7, 2017 
TIJAM, J.:
Facts: Appellant was charged with six counts of Estafa in an Information which alleges that accused conspiring together with other unidentified accused, feloniously defraud the complainants on different occasions, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ the complainants for employment abroad, and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereto, and succeeded in inducing said complainants to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the sum of money, which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants.
For her part, appellant admitted that she was the Overseas Marketing Director of All Care Travel & Consultancy, with All Care Travel & Consultancy as its affiliate. She claimed that she did not know Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Gloria. She likewise claimed that she neither signed nor issued any receipt using the name "Manzie delos Reyes" in favor of the complainants. She further claimed that she was not engaged in any recruitment and placement activities. During the pre-trial, she admitted that she had no license to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty for the crime of estafa.
Ruling: Yes. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, appellant deceived private complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private complainants parted with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which accused-appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her receipt of the payments.
Ratio Decidendi: A person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Joint Decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of Estafa and one count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment.

People vs. Bentayo (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY BENTAYO
G.R. No. 216938, June 5, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: In the evening of November 6, 2007, appellant raped AAA again at their kubo in the farm. While AAA was sleeping, she felt appellant, who was armed with a bolo, touch her face, her breast and then her vagina. Appellant proceeded to undress her, kissed her private parts, and then threatened to kill her if she shouted. Appellant then mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, appellant further threatened AAA that he will kill her, her mother and her siblings if she told anyone what happened. Cordero, a neighbor of AAA, on November 29, 2007, heard the latter crying, thus, she immediately went to AAA's house to peep inside and saw appellant beating AAA.
Appellant denied the charge against him and insisted that during the time of the alleged incidents, he was in Barangay Lagao, Lambayong, Sultan Kudarat making charcoal; and that he was alone at that time.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape.
Ruling: Yes. Under paragraph 1 (a) of Art. 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation.
In this case, the clear and straightforward testimony of AAA, as corroborated by the medical findings show beyond reasonable doubt that AAA was raped. When the victim's testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.
Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. For alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of commission
Ratio Decidendi: When the offender is the victim's father, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.
Gist: This is an appeal of the Decision CA affirming the Judgment of the RTC, convicting the same appellant of the crime of incestuous rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs. Domingo (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDY DOMINGO
G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017 
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts: An Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape in this wise: That accused, motivated by lust and with lewd designs, and by means of force, feloniously, abduct and take away one AAA, against her will, and thereafter, by means of force, violence and intimidation, with the use of a bladed weapon and actuated by lust and lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of said victim.
Appellant claimed that he and AAA eloped and went to the house of his brother-in-law. They spent the night there and agreed that they will go to her Aunt's house and get her things and will proceed to Bicol. When they reached her aunt's house, AAA went inside while he waited. After a few minutes, a man came out and chased him with a bolo which prompted him to run. At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at his sister's house when the policemen arrived and informed him that there was a complaint filed against him.
The RTC and CA convicted appellant for forcible abduction with rape.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
Ruling: The appellant should be convicted only of rape. Under Article 342 of the RPC, the elements of forcible abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, his forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape.
Gist: The accused appeals the affirmance by the CA of RTC’s Decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for forcible abduction with rape.

People vs. Ali, et. al (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 222965, December 6, 2017 
MARTIRES, J.:
Facts: In an Information, Ali, together with other accused were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention alleging that accused being then armed with high powered firearm, conspiring with one another, by means of force and intimidation feloniously, KIDNAP the person of CHRISTIA OLIZ y EUCOGCO, a young woman, 19 years old, particularly on the occasion when she was together with her employer named Antonio Yu Lim Bo and the latter's wife and daughter, on board a Blue Nissan Vehicle then driven by one Rene Igno, and thereafter through intimidation, commandeered and drove said vehicle towards the area of Pitogo beach with the clear intention on the part of the accused to extort ransom money from said victim or other person.
Appellant claimed that before the alleged incident, Hassan pushed Ali inside the motor vehicle while he was holding a gun and told him to follow or he would be in trouble. When all occupants arrived at the beach and alighted therefrom, Ali decided to walk away and proceed to the main road to catch a ride. Ali argues that he could not be guilty of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention because the alleged deprivation of liberty did not last for more than three (3) days as the incident only lasted for about an hour or two
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of serious illegal detention.
Ruling: Yes. Deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if, among others, the victim is a minor, female or public officer.
In the case at bar, the elements of serious illegal detention were duly proven by the prosecution. First, Ali and his cohorts were clearly private individuals. Second, they deprived Oliz of her liberty. This was manifested by the fact that they forcibly boarded the vehicle and placed Igno and Antonio in handcuffs. Third, Oliz was a female victim. In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that Ali was identified with moral certainty. Oliz was able to distinguish and identify accused considering their proximity inside the vehicle and the duration of the captivity.
Ratio Decidendi: The essence of serious illegal detention is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with the indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect such deprivation-it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. 

People vs. Baladjay (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSARIO BALADJAY
G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts: In an Information, appellant Baladjay and her nine co-accused were indicted with the crime of Syndicated Estafa as follows: that accused, being officers, employees, and/or agents of Multitel, an association operating on funds solicited from the public, conspiring one another, feloniously defraud complainants by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts to the effect that they have the business, property and power to solicit and accept investments and deposits from the general public and capacity to pay the complainants guaranteed monthly interest on investment from 5% to 6% and lucrative commissions, and succeeded in inducing the complainants to invest, deposit, give and deliver as in fact the latter gave the accused the total amount of P7,810,000.00 as investment or deposit, accused misappropriated and converted the same to their own personal benefits to the damage and prejudice of said complainants.
Baladjay, as the sole witness, denied transacting with the private complainants. However, Baladjay admitted that she was also known as the president of Multitel.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of syndicated estafa.
Ruling: Yes. The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) it committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
Here, using Multitel as their conduit, Baladjay and her more than five (5) counselors employed deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments from the general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. Baladjay's counselors actively solicited investments from the public, promising very high interest returns. Convinced of Baladjay's and her counselors' promise of lucrative income, the private complainants were then enticed to invest in Multitel. Eventually, Baladjay and her cohorts ran away with the private complainants' money causing them damage and prejudice.
Ratio Decidendi: The gravamen of syndicated estafa is the employment of fraud or deceit to the damage or prejudice of another.
Gist: This an appeal from the Decision CA, which affirmed the guilty verdict meted by the RTC finding appellant of the crime of Syndicated Estafa.

People vs. Brusola (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABENIR BRUSOLA
G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.:
Facts: In the Information, appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia Brusola as follows, that accused, being the husband of DELIA BRUSOLA, with intent to kill and with the use of ball hammer, feloniously hit his said wife, with the said ball hammer on her head, thereby causing fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her death.
For his defense, appellant claimed that on the night of the incident, Abenir came home. While he was preparing things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting for somebody. After taking a bath, she fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was going somewhere, she said it was none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom for his personal effects. While inside, he heard people talking outside and looked out through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified the woman as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya." The man embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso, went outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward Abenir. He asserted that he planned to attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but accidentally hit Delia instead.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of parricide.
Ruling: Yes. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide.
Here, there was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim. As for the act of killing, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused.
Ratio Decidendi: Well settled is the rule that it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free.
Gist: This resolves the appeal of the CA’s Decision, affirming the Decision of the RTC, which found Abenir Brusola guilty of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs. Gamba (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK GAMBA
G.R. No. 215332, July 24, 2017 
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: At around 1:00 a.m. of June 2, 2006, appellant and three unidentified men boarded a public utility jeepney. When the vehicle was traversing along Tejeron comer Paco Roman Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila, they announced a "hold-up". Appellant and one of his companions pulled out their guns and divested Esteban Sandagan of his cash and possessions in the amount of l,100.00. John Mark Cerbito, the passenger who was seated beside the driver, refused to give his cellphone, hence appellant kicked him three to four times. As a result, Cerbito fell off the jeepney whereupon appellant shot him twice, hitting him in his chest and abdomen. Thereafter, appellant and his three companions ran away with their loot. Cerbito died due to his gunshot wounds.
Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed to have been engaged in a drinking session with a friend in a videoke bar and restaurant at the comer of Callejon and Tejeron Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila during the June 2, 2006 robbery-homicide incident.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide.
Ruling: Yes. The elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide was committed.
In this case, appellant, together with his three companions, boarded the public utility jeepney and declared a "hold-up". The passengers, including Sandagan, were forced at gunpoint to turnover their cash and possessions. When Cerbito refused to be divested of his cellphone, appellant kicked him three or four times with such force that he fell off the jeepney. Still dissatisfied with the violence he vented on Cerbito, appellant fired at him twice, hitting him in his chest and abdomen resulting in his untimely death. Appellant and his three cohort then fled together with their loot. Appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it occurred.
Ratio Decidendi: In robbery with homicide, the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
Gist: On appeal is the Decision of the CA, which affirmed with modification Decision of the RTC of Manila, finding appellant Mark Gamba y Nissorada guilty of robbery with homicide.

People vs. Mendoza (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO MENDOZA
G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Ricote, together with the CI, met the appellant in a sari-sari store and the CI introduced P02 Ricote as a buyer of marijuana. Appellant then told PO2 Ricote that the price per teabag of marijuana was 50.00 to which the latter agreed to buy 4 teabags. Appellant then took out from his right pocket the four teabags of suspected dried marijuana leaves and handed them to PO2 Ricote who, in tum, gave the marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills to the former. PO2 Ricote then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal, and PO3 Parena, who was inside a parked vehicle which was three meters away from the sari-sari store, immediately run to help in arresting appellant.
Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he, together with friends, were along the road, repairing a pedicab. When they all went to a sari-sari store to rest, they were joined by a certain Andy Makabenta. He then saw the arrival of a white vehicle and a motorcycle with two people riding on it. A person alighted from the motorcycle and held the wrist of Makabenta, while another police officer alighted from the vehicle and pointed to him saying "you also apprehend that.”
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale of marijuana.
Ruling: Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and. the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.34 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In this case, PO2 Ricote, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the seller of the four teabags of suspected marijuana and to whom he handed the marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills as payment therefor. The substance sold by appellant to PO2 Ricote was sent for analysis and upon the examination, it showed that the four teabags yielded a positive result for marijuana, a dangerous drug. The marijuana was presented to the court and was identified by PO2 Ricote to be the marijuana he bought from appellant based on the markings he made thereon.
Ratio Decidendi: The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prevail over appellant's defense of denial.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding appellant guilty of selling marijuana.

People vs. Cabanada (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBELYN CABANADA
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, the Information alleges that the accused, being then employed as housemaid of complainant Catherine Victoria, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of the trust reposed upon her with intent to gain, feloniously take, steal and carry away some valuable items and money in cash in the aggregate amount of 154,000.00 belonging to the complainant, without her knowledge and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
The defense narrated that at around 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's house to work as a stay-out housemaid, and left around 9:00 p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9:00 a.m. and left at 3:00 p.m. On the next day, Cabanada returned to the house to resume her work. She was washing clothes when Catherine called her and asked about the missing items. She denied any knowledge of the same.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of qualified theft.
Ruling: Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner's consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
The following circumstances are established during the trial: Cabanada worked as Victoria's housemaid for several years and has unrestricted access to all parts of the house; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone at the house; the plantsadora, who only reported for work every Sunday, had no access to the house and the car; Cabanada was alone from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. after the plantsadora left at 3:00 p.m.; Cabanada admitted to the police in the presence of Catherine at the latter’s residence that she stole the money and led them to her room where they recovered the l6,0000.00 cash.
Ratio Decidendi: When accused admitted the crime while at the residence of her employer, she was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom.
Gist: Before Us for review is the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.

People vs. Fabro (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDO FABRO
G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017 
TIJAM, J.:
Facts: In an Information, appellant was charged with Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the RPC, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, alleging that  accused, ZENAIDA FABRO feloniously and by force take AAA 9 years old, minor, while the latter is in front of the school whom the said accused detained and kept in the house of Brgy. Capt. Fabro, brother of the accused for a period of four days under restraint and against her will.
Denying the charge, appellant claimed that she brought AAA to Nueva Ecija with the consent of AAA's mother and teacher. She explained that she had intended to bring AAA along to the Barangay Captain to prove that her husband had taken her luggage and some documents, given that AAA used to clean their room. The Barangay Captain was not around so they proceeded to Nueva Ecija after AAA requested to join her. After two days in Nueva Ecija, she brought AAA to her brother's house where she was arrested.
Issue: Whether appellant is liable for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
Ruling: Yes. The elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in this case, the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
There is no dispute that accused-appellant is a private individual and that she took AAA from her school on March 2, 2006, brought her to Nueva Ecija and kept her there until she was arrested on March 5, 2006. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.
Ratio Decidendi: The curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person.15 For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of  the CA, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, which found accused-appellant Zenaida Fabro guilty of Serious Illegal Detention.

People vs. Labra (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINADOR LABRA
G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts: When AAA was around 5 years old, she and her siblings were left at home with appellant. AAA was awakened when she felt appellant, forced his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull movements, causing her pain. Appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Thereafter, accused-appellant repeatedly molested her, each time bringing his bolo with him.
Years later, AAA - who was already twelve (12) years old at the time - was surprised when she saw accused-appellant in their kitchen. To her shock, appellant squeezed her vagina and told her that they were going to visit his house. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the incident. She also told DDD about the first rape incident and the subsequent ones committed by accused-appellant. Eventually, AAA told her mother about her traumatic experiences in the hands of accused-appellant when she was five (5) years old.
RTC and CA convicted accused-appellant of Rape and Unjust Vexation.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling: As to the crime of rape, appellant indeed committed the crime of Rape against then five (5)-year-old AAA. AAA was a credible witness whose testimony must be given great weight. The trial judge's evaluation, which the CA sustained, now binds the Court, leaving to the accused-appellant the burden to bring to the fore facts or circumstances of weight, which were otherwise overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted that would materially affect the disposition of the case differently if duly considered.
However, the Court disagrees with the CA's affirmance of the RTC's finding that accused-appellant can only be held guilty of Unjust Vexation. The Court finds that he should instead be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, as charged in the information, in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 [Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse]. The prosecution was able to prove AAA's minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth.
Ratio Decidendi: It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in the most unlikely places.
Gist: On appeal is the Decision rendered by the CA, which affirmed the Joint Decision of RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, finding accused-appellant Dominador Ladra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape and Unjust Vexation.

People vs. Pulgo (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCIAL D. PULGO
G.R. No. 218205, July 5, 2017 
TIJAM, J.:
Facts: In an Information, appellant was charged with murder committed as follows:  that in Lorega, San Miguel, Cebu City, the accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, feloniously attack and stab one ROMEO S. LAMBO, with the use of a bladed weapon, hitting the latter on his abdomen, which caused his death thereafter.
Accused-appellant denied any involvement in the stabbing claiming that he was with his mother, Violeta Pulgo, in Moalboal, Cebu at about 4:00 p.m. of July 21, 2007, to buy a goat from his aunt for their fiesta, and at around 5:30 p.m., he was surprised to receive a call from his brother, Rosvil Pulgo in Lorega, informing him that Romeo had been stabbed and that he was the prime suspect. His alibi was corroborated in its material points by Violeta and Rosvil. He stayed in Moalboal for about a year before returning in Lorega to clear his name. He was, however, arrested upon reaching Lorega.
Issue: Whether or not appellant liable for murder.
Ruling: Yes. To convict an accused for murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
The prosecution's evidence has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant killed Romeo. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the killing constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide. And contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the killing was qualified by treachery.
Romeo had approached Aurelio in Lorega to ask to be accompanied to a certain place, and they were standing side by side when accused-appellant approached them and suddenly pulled out a knife and stabbed Romeo. The suddenness of accused-appellant's attack and the circumstances under which it was committed made it impossible for the unsuspecting Romeo to put up a defense, ensuring accused-appellant's execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Ratio Decidendi: Positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed accused-appellant Marcial D. Pulgo’s conviction for Murder as rendered by the RTC of Cebu City.

People vs. Belmonte, et, al (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON BELMONTE, ET.AL
G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017 
TIJAM, J.: 
Facts: Appellant and his co-accused, Marvin Belmonte, Enrile Gabay, and Noel Baac were charged with Robbery with Rape in an Information which alleges that the above accused, armed with a gun, conspiring with one Noel Baac and all of them mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, feloniously take, steal, and divest from complainants some valuable items and on the occasion thereof said Noel Baac, by means of force, threats and intimidation and with the use of a gun, willfully, have carnal knowledge with AAA, against her will and consent, which is aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Accused-appellant and Marvin, on the other hand, proffered alibi and claimed that they were sleeping in their house when the alleged crime was committed.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: Yes. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.
Here, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellant as one of the malefactors in the robbery defeats accused-appellant's lone defense of alibi. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the witnesses, a categorical, consistent, and positive identification of the accused-appellant shall prevail over the latter's alibi and denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, alibi and denial are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.
The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte of the special complex crime of robbery with rape even if he did not rape AAA, as accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte had the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop accused Noel Baac from raping AAA.
Ratio Decidendi: Whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.
Gist: Accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte assails the Decision of the, affirming his conviction for Robbery with Rape.