Garcia vs. Molina Case Digest

Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina

G.R. No. 165223. January 11, 2016

Doctrines:

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis.

Gloria vs. CA has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.

Facts:

For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his capacity as the President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), had charged the respondent, an Attorney V in the Litigation Department of the Legal Service Group of the GSIS, with grave misconduct and preventively suspended him for 60 days.

In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion came to point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively investigated for grave misconduct. After the investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated September 1, 2003 to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act.

Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt.

The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and requested the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of the GSIS to impose disciplinary action on the respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987; that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave misconduct was not arbitrary because the latter had intentionally passed on or caused the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby transgressing "some established and definite rule of action" that sufficiently established a prima facie case for an administrative charge; that the respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty to defend and assist the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral or social duty" to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation of the letter. He submits that the respondent's preventive suspension was done in accordance with the Civil Service Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on record.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had sufficient basis to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct and impose preventive suspension as a consequence.
2. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is applicable.

Rulings:

1. To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of handing over the letter to Caretero constituted grave misconduct. The CA concluded that the act of the respondent of handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct because the act did not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.

The Court concurs with the CA.

Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Moreover, it is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” It becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.”

The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The passing of the letter to Caretero did not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was handed only to a single individual who just happened to be curious about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other employees or passengers were on board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of the letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with the letter, to wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the widespread dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred.

To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a direct connection to the performance of his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis. The formal charge against the respondent was for grave misconduct, an administrative offense that justifies the imposition of the preventive suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal basis, he was not entitled to backwages.

2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the option either of filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive suspension order by the disciplining authority, or of elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 days from the receipt thereof.

We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. His failure to file the motion for reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain exceptional circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration. Among the exceptional circumstances are the following, namely: when the issue involved is purely a legal question.

Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the filing of the formal charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending investigation — was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing the motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated on April 29, 2004 and the resolution promulgated on September 6, 2004 insofar as the Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge for grave misconduct against respondent Mario I. Molina, but REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they nullified the respondent's preventive suspension and awarded backwages to him corresponding to the period of his preventive suspension; and MAKES NO PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.

MCIAA vs. Heirs of Ijordan, et al.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al.

G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.

Facts:

On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its name.

After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; and that the tax declaration had no probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.

In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner.
2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve prescription.

Rulings:

1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.

Ladines vs. People Case Digest

Pedro Ladines vs. People of the Philippines and Edwin De Ramon

G.R. No. 167333. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

Facts:

While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed by them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he succumbed.

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested that the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of two distinct weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like a sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed instrument like a knife.

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they did not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their way home from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his having lodged a complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno and Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School, together with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching the dance, a quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved.

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman Licup with homicide.

On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, sans any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that the CA committed reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.

Issues:

1. Whether the res gestae statement of Licup constitutes newly-discovered evidence that would create a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
2. Whether the RTC imposed the proper penalty.
3. Whether the lower court's limitation of the civil liability to civil indemnity of only P50,000.00 is correct.

Rulings:

1. No, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court.

Furthermore, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. (Emphasis is mine).

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.

2. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

3. The limitation was a plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs. The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO LADINES is 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.

People vs. Samson Berk Bayogan Case Digest

People of the Philippines vs. Samson Berk Bayogan

G.R. No. 204896. December 7, 2016

Facts

Appellant and his co-accused Jeneto Serencio were charged before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39 with murder as follows:

That on or about 10:45 o'clock in the morning of December 16. 2007, in Poblacion East, Sual, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other with treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and shot Clarita Disu several times, inflicting upon her several gunshot wounds which [caused] her instantaneous death, to at:he damage and prejudice of her heirs.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7659 as amended.

During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Serencio remains at large. The prosecution presented eyewitnesses Marbie S. Disu (Marbie) and Loreto Inocencio (Loreto), respectively the daughter and grandson of the victim. Their testimonies established that in the morning of 16 December 2007, the victim Clarita Disu and her daughter Marbie were tending their neighbourhood variety store in Sual, Pangasinan with Loreto, when two (2) men on board a motorcycle arrived. One dismounted the vehicle and bought a cigarette from Marbie while the other stayed on the vehicle. The man who bought the cigarette suddenly pulled a gun and pointed it to Clarita and shot her four ( 4) times. Marbie shouted for help and ran to the fallen victim to help and embrace her. The assailant, who had been wearing a yellow t-shirt, then boarded the motorcycle and headed east. Marbie noted the motorcycle plate number as AR 3273.

On 29 January 2008, police authorities invited Marbie and Loreto to the police station to identify whether the gunman had been among those whom they arrested. Of three (3) persons in the prison cell, both Marbie and Loreto pointed to appellant. Both also identified appellant in open court as the victim's assailant.

Appellant asserted that he had been away on a fishing boat off Pangasinan on the date and time of the incident. He also countered that he had been arrested for alleged illegal possession of a gun. While he was in prison, Marbie came and was allegedly apprised by the police that it was appellant who had killed her mother.

After trial, the RTC gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Marbie and Loreto of appellant's liability in the killing of the victim. On 19 July 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed decision finding the accused SAMSON BERK GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery.

The Court of Appeals found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling. The appellate court also found the eyewitness accounts credible, straightforward and reliable and upheld their positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator.

Issue

Whether the accused is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling

Now before the Court for final review, we affirm appellant's conviction. Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial co on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.

That Judge Robert P. Fangayen was not the one who heard the evidence and had no opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses is of no moment so long as he based his ruling on the records before him the way appellate courts review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. Absent any showing that the trial court's findings of facts were tainted with arbitrariness or that it overlooked or misapplied some facts or circumstances of significance and value, or its calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment.

In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and ( 4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.

Our review of the records convinces us that these elements were clearly met. The prosecution eyewitnesses positively identified appellant as the person responsible for killing the victim through valid out-of-court and in-court identifications. The Court finds no reason to disbelieve these credible and straightforward testimonies.

The prosecution ably established the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The shooting of the unsuspecting victim was sudden and unexpected which effectively deprived her of the chance to defend herself or to repel the aggression, insuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04573, finding Samson Berky Bayogan guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. L-8391 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Clarita Disu as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages

He is FURTHER ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

De Guzman, et al. vs. Chico Case Digest

Angelina De Guzman, et al. vs. Gloria A. Chico

G.R. No. 195445. December 7, 2016

Facts

The subject of this case is a property situated at 7-A 32 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City, previously registered under the name of petitioners, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 164900.

On May 24, 2006, the property was sold at a public auction of tax delinquent properties conducted by the City Government of Makati City. Respondent was the winning bidder at the public auction, and the City Government of Makati executed a Certificate of Sale in her favor on even date. Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year period. Thus, on July 12, 2007, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati City an application for new certificate of title (LRC Case No. M-4992). On December 28, 2007, after hearing, the RTC ordered that the title over the property be consolidated and transferred in the name of respondent. The Register of Deeds of Makati consequently cancelled TCT No. 164900 and issued a new order, TCT No. T-224923, in favor of respondent. Afterwards, in the same court, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of possession. The motion was, however, denied by the court for failure to set the motion for hearing.

On January 14, 2009, respondent filed (for the same property), an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession (LRC Case No. M-5188) with the RTC of Makati City. This ex parte petition was raffled to Branch 59 (court a quo ).

On April 1, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order granting respondent's ex parte petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. The writ was subsequently issued on August 7, 2009. On August 28, 2009, petitioners filed an urgent motion to cite respondent in contempt, and to nullify the proceedings on the ground that LRC Case No. M-5188 contained a defective/false verification/certification of non-forum shopping.

On September 11, 2009, respondent filed her comment/opposition. She alleged that petitioner's objection to the certification against forum shopping was deemed waived for failure to timely object thereto. She also claimed that forum shopping does not exist.

RTC Ruling

Denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by respondent in LRC Case No. M-5188, although denominated as a petition, is not an initiatory pleading, and, thus, does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping.

CA Ruling

The CA ruled that there is no forum shopping. Prior to the filing of the ex parte petition in LRC Case No. M-5188, RTC Branch 62 has already denied respondent's motion for issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. M-4992. The CA added that there can be no forum shopping because the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function and is summary in nature, thus, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title.

Issues

1. Whether a certificate against forum shopping is required in a petition or motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
2. Whether the issuance of a writ of position is warranted.

SC Rulings

No certificate against forum shopping

is required in a petition or motion for

issuance of a writ of possession.

We affirm the ruling of the CA that a certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident or consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum shopping certification is dispelled.

We also cannot subscribe to petitioners' narrow view that only cases covered by foreclosure sales under Act No. 3135 are excused from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping.

Based on jurisprudence, a writ of possession may be issued in the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration Act; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; ( c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales.

We note that there is no law or jurisprudence which provides that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession depends on the nature of the proceeding in which it is filed. Thus, we find no logical reason for petitioners' contention that only cases covered by Act No. 3135 are exempt from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping. As explained in the previous paragraphs, by its very nature, a writ of possession is a mere incident in the transfer of title. It is an incident of ownership, and not a separate judgment. It would thus be absurd to require that a petition for the issuance of this writ to be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The issuance of a writ of possession is

warranted.

Contrary therefore, to petitioners' contentions, the CA did not err in upholding the writ of possession in this case. In St. Raphael Montessori School, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, an action involving the application of Act No. 3135, this Court recognized that the writ of possession was warranted not merely on the basis of the law, but ultimately on the right to possess as an incident of ownership. The right to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession. Precisely, the basis for the grant of the writ of possession in this case is respondent's ownership of the property by virtue of a tax delinquency sale in her favor, and by virtue of her absolute right of ownership arising from the expiration of the period within which to redeem the property.

More, respondent's ownership over the property is affirmed by the final and executory judgment in LRC Case No. M-4992. To be clear, a writ of possession is defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land, commanding the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114103 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Pryce Properties Corporation vs. Spouses Octobre Case Digest

Pryce Properties Corporation vs. Sps. Sotero Octobre, Jr., et al.

G.R. No. 186976. December 7, 2016

Facts

Octobre (Spouses Octobre) signed a Reservation Agreement with petitioner Pryce Properties Corporation (Pryce) for the purchase of two lots with a total of 742 square meters located in Puerto Heights Village, Puerto Heights, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties subsequently executed a Contract to Sell over the lot for the price of P2,897,510.00 on January 7, 1998. On February 4, 2004, Pryce issued a certification that Spouses Octobre had fully paid the purchase price and amortization interests, as well as the transfer fees and other charges in relation to the property, amounting to a total of P4,292,297.92. But Pryce had yet to deliver the certificates of title, which prompted Spouses Octobre to formally demand its delivery. Despite repeated demands, Pryce failed to comply. Thus, on May 18, 2004, Spouses Octobre filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for specific performance, revocation of certificate of registration, refund of payments, damages and attorney's fees.

Pryce was unable to deliver the titles to Spouses Octobre because it had previously transferred custody of the titles, along with others pertaining to the same development project, to China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as part of the Deed of Assignment executed on June 27, 1996 under which Pryce obligated itself to deliver to China Bank the "contracts to sell and the corresponding owner's duplicate copies of the transfer certificates of title, tax declaration, real estate tax receipts and all other documents and papers relating to the assigned receivables until such receivables are paid or repurchased by Pryce. The titles to the lots purchased by Spouses Octobre were among those held in custody by China Bank. When Pryce defaulted in its loan obligations to China Bank sometime in May 2002, China Bank refused to return the titles to Pryce.

The HLURB Arbiter ordered Pryce to refund the payments made by the spouses with legal interest and to pay the latter compensatory damages amounting to P30,000.00, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

On appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners modified the Decision by ordering Pryce to pay the redemption value to China Bank so that the latter may release the titles covering the lots purchased by Spouses Octobre. In default thereof, Pryce shall refund the payments with legal interest. The HLURB Board upheld the grant of compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs to Spouses Octobre. Pryce moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

Thereafter, Pryce appealed the case to the Office of the President, which affirmed in full the HLURB Board's Decision. Undeterred, Pryce elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which denied the petition for review and affirmed the Office of the President's Decision.

Pryce went to the Supreme Court primarily arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of compensatory damages because Spouses Octobre failed to present competent proof of the actual amount of loss.

Issue

Whether a breach of contract automatically triggers the award of actual or compensatory damages.

Ruling

No. To be entitled to compensatory damages, the amount of loss must therefore be capable of proof and must be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage suffered is imposed on the party claiming the same, who should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof.

It is clear that the amount paid by Spouses Octobre to Pryce as purchase price for the lots has been adequately proved. There is no dispute that Spouses Octobre are entitled to such amount with legal interest. The issue being raised by Pryce is only with respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as compensatory damages.

The records of this case are bereft of any evidentiary basis for the award of P30,000.00 as compensatory damages. When the HLURB Arbiter initially awarded the amount, it merely mentioned that “[Spouses Octobre] are entitled to compensatory damages, which is just and equitable in the circumstances, even against an obligor in good faith since said damages are the natural and probable consequences of the contractual breach committed.” On the other hand, the Court of Appeals justified the award of compensatory damages by stating that "it is undisputed that petitioner Pryce committed breach of contract in failing to deliver the titles 'to respondents [Spouses] Octobre which necessitated the award of compensatory damages.

In the absence of adequate proof, compensatory damages should not have been awarded. Nonetheless, we find that nominal damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, are proper in this case. Under Article 2221, nominal damages may be awarded in order that the plaintiffs right, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. xxx xxx. So long as there is a violation of the right of the plaintiff-whether based on law, contract, or other sources of obligations-an award of nominal damages is proper. Proof of bad faith is not required. The BLURB Arbiter and the Court of Appeals appear to have confused nominal damages with compensatory damages, since their justifications more closely fit the former.

It is undisputed that Pryce failed to deliver the titles to the lots subject of the Contract to Sell even as Spouses Octobre had already fully settled the purchase price. Its inability to deliver the titles despite repeated demands undoubtedly constitutes a violation of Spouses Octobre's right under their contract. That Pryce had transferred custody of the titles to China Bank pursuant to a Deed of Assignment is irrelevant, considering that Spouses Octobre were not privy to such agreement.

In fine, contractual breach is sufficient to justify an award for nominal damages but not compensatory damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103615 are MODIFIED in that nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 are awarded in lieu of compensatory damages.

Tabasondra vs. Spouses Constantino Case Digest

Arsenio Tabasondra, et al. vs. Sps. Conrado Constantino, et al.

G.R. No. 196403. December 7, 2016

Facts

The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two marriages. The respondents Tarcila Tabasondra-Constantino and the late Sebastian Tabasondra were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina; the petitioners, namely: Arsenio Tabasondra, Fernando Tabasondra, Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Mirasol Tabasondra-Mariano, Fausta Tabasondra-Tapacio, Myrasol Tabasondra-Romero, Marlene Tabasondra-Maniquil, and Guillermo Tabasondra, were children of Cornelio by his second wife, Sotera.

Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City, identified as Lot No. 2536, containing an area of seventy-seven thousand one hundred and forty-seven (77,147) sq. m.; Lot No. 3155, with an area of thirteen thousand six hundred fifty-nine (13,659) sq. m.; and, Lot No. 3159, with an area of nine thousand five hundred forty-six (9,546) sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 106012.

Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998, respectively. They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

On August 22, 2002, the Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants-Appellant claiming that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and the Defendants-Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence, they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same should be made only with respect to Cornelio' s share. They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their favor on August 18, 1982.

The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintifft, ordering [the] partition of the three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No. 16012 among the compulsory and legal heirs of Cornelio, Valentina[,] and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra.

On November 30, 2010, the CA promulgated the decision affirming the RTC with modification in that the partition and the accounting is ordered to be made only with respect to a thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

Issue

Whether the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to only 33,450.66 square meters of the property registered under TCT No. 10612.

Ruling

Yes. There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana was 100,352 square meters; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-third of such total area. It was established that Valentina and Valeriana executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they specifically disposed of their shares in the property registered under TCT No. 10612 in favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and Tarcila Tabasondra.

The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate .. their pro indiviso shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in the common property. According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners as the successors-in-interest of Cornelio could not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares in favor of the respondents.

The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that there is no denying that the RTC erred in granting the complaint and ordering a partition without qualifying that such should not include the shares previously pertaining to Valeria and Valentina. Simply put, since the aggregate area of the subject property is one hundred thousand three hundred fifty-two (100,352) sq.m., it follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana each has a share equivalent to thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq. m. portion thereof. Accordingly, when Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the Defendants-Appellants became co-owners with Cornelio. Perforce, upon Cornelia's death, the only area that his heirs, that is, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, are entitled to and which may be made subject of partition is only a thirty three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso shares in the three lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio). In effect, Sebastian and Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third pro indiviso share in the three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and the petitioners.

Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the several co-owners.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-,, third; the heirs of Sebastian, one-third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of Sebastian (collectively), one-third. That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon remand, therefore, the R TC should comply with the express terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the R TC will be to appoint not more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the property as directed in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 30, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 92920 in that the accounting is to be made only with respect to the fruits of the one-third portion of the property still under the co-ownership of all the parties; REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, in Tarlac City for further proceedings in accordance with •this decision, and to determine the technical metes and bounds and description of the proper share of each co-owner of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10612, including the improvements thereon, in accordance with the Civil Code and Rule 69 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman Case Digest

Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Richard A. Cambe Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./John Raymund De Asis Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Ronald John Lim Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Janet Lim Napoles Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Mario L. Relampagos, et al. Vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-78/G.R. Nos. 213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6, 2016

Facts

Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and ( 6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla -with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator. Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.

Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in tum, would expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost. Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him.

Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule.

Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Napoles's

Issues:

1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct.

Rulings

1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter.

2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.

Probable Cause against Revilla.

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla -directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators -may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus -have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery) should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all evei;its, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy: Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation -the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.

In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cambe at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits .of his co-respondents.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the PDAF scam.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.  

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Case Digest

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016

Facts

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, including related accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.

From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a family member was once a partner.

xx xx

Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering Act is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.

Issues:

1. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.
2. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.
3. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

Rulings

1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage.

In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.

2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during trial.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:

1. The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;
2. The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;
3. A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and
4. The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.