De Guzman, et al. vs. Chico Case Digest

Angelina De Guzman, et al. vs. Gloria A. Chico

G.R. No. 195445. December 7, 2016

Facts

The subject of this case is a property situated at 7-A 32 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City, previously registered under the name of petitioners, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 164900.

On May 24, 2006, the property was sold at a public auction of tax delinquent properties conducted by the City Government of Makati City. Respondent was the winning bidder at the public auction, and the City Government of Makati executed a Certificate of Sale in her favor on even date. Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year period. Thus, on July 12, 2007, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati City an application for new certificate of title (LRC Case No. M-4992). On December 28, 2007, after hearing, the RTC ordered that the title over the property be consolidated and transferred in the name of respondent. The Register of Deeds of Makati consequently cancelled TCT No. 164900 and issued a new order, TCT No. T-224923, in favor of respondent. Afterwards, in the same court, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of possession. The motion was, however, denied by the court for failure to set the motion for hearing.

On January 14, 2009, respondent filed (for the same property), an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession (LRC Case No. M-5188) with the RTC of Makati City. This ex parte petition was raffled to Branch 59 (court a quo ).

On April 1, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order granting respondent's ex parte petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. The writ was subsequently issued on August 7, 2009. On August 28, 2009, petitioners filed an urgent motion to cite respondent in contempt, and to nullify the proceedings on the ground that LRC Case No. M-5188 contained a defective/false verification/certification of non-forum shopping.

On September 11, 2009, respondent filed her comment/opposition. She alleged that petitioner's objection to the certification against forum shopping was deemed waived for failure to timely object thereto. She also claimed that forum shopping does not exist.

RTC Ruling

Denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by respondent in LRC Case No. M-5188, although denominated as a petition, is not an initiatory pleading, and, thus, does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping.

CA Ruling

The CA ruled that there is no forum shopping. Prior to the filing of the ex parte petition in LRC Case No. M-5188, RTC Branch 62 has already denied respondent's motion for issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. M-4992. The CA added that there can be no forum shopping because the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function and is summary in nature, thus, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title.

Issues

1. Whether a certificate against forum shopping is required in a petition or motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
2. Whether the issuance of a writ of position is warranted.

SC Rulings

No certificate against forum shopping

is required in a petition or motion for

issuance of a writ of possession.

We affirm the ruling of the CA that a certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident or consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum shopping certification is dispelled.

We also cannot subscribe to petitioners' narrow view that only cases covered by foreclosure sales under Act No. 3135 are excused from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping.

Based on jurisprudence, a writ of possession may be issued in the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration Act; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; ( c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales.

We note that there is no law or jurisprudence which provides that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession depends on the nature of the proceeding in which it is filed. Thus, we find no logical reason for petitioners' contention that only cases covered by Act No. 3135 are exempt from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping. As explained in the previous paragraphs, by its very nature, a writ of possession is a mere incident in the transfer of title. It is an incident of ownership, and not a separate judgment. It would thus be absurd to require that a petition for the issuance of this writ to be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The issuance of a writ of possession is

warranted.

Contrary therefore, to petitioners' contentions, the CA did not err in upholding the writ of possession in this case. In St. Raphael Montessori School, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, an action involving the application of Act No. 3135, this Court recognized that the writ of possession was warranted not merely on the basis of the law, but ultimately on the right to possess as an incident of ownership. The right to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession. Precisely, the basis for the grant of the writ of possession in this case is respondent's ownership of the property by virtue of a tax delinquency sale in her favor, and by virtue of her absolute right of ownership arising from the expiration of the period within which to redeem the property.

More, respondent's ownership over the property is affirmed by the final and executory judgment in LRC Case No. M-4992. To be clear, a writ of possession is defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land, commanding the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114103 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman Case Digest

Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Richard A. Cambe Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./John Raymund De Asis Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Ronald John Lim Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Janet Lim Napoles Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Mario L. Relampagos, et al. Vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-78/G.R. Nos. 213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6, 2016

Facts

Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and ( 6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla -with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator. Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.

Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in tum, would expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost. Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him.

Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule.

Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Napoles's

Issues:

1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct.

Rulings

1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter.

2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.

Probable Cause against Revilla.

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla -directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators -may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus -have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery) should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all evei;its, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy: Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation -the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.

In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cambe at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits .of his co-respondents.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the PDAF scam.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.  

Dimson vs. Chua Case Digest

Reyno C. Dimson vs. Gerry T. Chua

G.R. No. 192318. December 5, 2016

Facts

The instant case filed by the petitioner, representing the other 14 complainants, against the respondent, is an offshoot of the labor case entitled "Reyno Dimson, et al. v. SEASUMCO, MAC, United Coconut Planters Bank (UPCB), and Cotabato Sugar Central Co., Inc. (COSUCECO)." On September 22, 2003, the said labor case for illegal dismissal with monetary claims was decided in favor of the complainants. Hence, SEASUMCO and MAC, as well as the members of their board of directors, were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of Three Million Eight Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos and Fifty-One Centavos (P3,827,470.51).

The LA's decision became final and executory but the judgment remained unsatisfied. Consequently, the petitioner filed an Ex-parte Motion for the issuance of an amended alias writ of execution asking for the inclusion of the board of directors arid corporate officers of SEASUMCO and MAC to hold them liable for satisfaction of the said decision.

In an Order dated August 16, 2007, the LA granted the motion; hence, an amended alias writ of execution was issued which now included the respondent. Aggrieved, the respondent elevated the matter to the NLRC by filing a Memorandum of Appeal arguing that he was denied due process.

In a Resolution dated January 11, 2008, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and sustained the findings of the LA. The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC Resolution dated July 31, 2008 denied his motion.

Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)/preliminary injunction before the CA. He maintained that the labor tribunals violated his right to due process when the LA authorized the issuance of the amended alias writ of execution against him for the corporation's judgment debt, although he has never been a party to the underlying suit.

Issue

Whether the respondent can be held solidarily liable with the corporation, of which he was an officer and a stockholder, when he was not served with summons and was never impleaded as a party to the case.

Ruling

No. Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, notices or summons shall be served on the parties to the case personally. The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. The service of summons in cases before the LAs shall be served on the parties personally or by registered mail, provided that in special circumstances, service of summons ,.nay be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

It is basic that the LA cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. However, if there is no valid service of summons, court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. In this case, since the respondent is one of the officers of SEASUMCO, service of summons must be made to him personally or by registered mail. However, as borne by the records, it is evident that no service of summons and notices were served on the respondent and he was not impleaded in NLRC RAB Case No. 12-01-00005-03. He was hauled to the case after he reacted to the improper execution of his properties and was actually dragged to court by mere motion of the petitioner with whom he has no privity of contract and after the decision in the main case had already become final and executory.

The Court scanned the records but found nothing to indicate that summons with respect to the said complaints were ever served upon the respondent. The petitioner in fact does not even dispute· the respondent's claim that no summons or notices were ever issued and served on him either personally or through registered mail. True to his claim, the respondent, indeed, was never summoned by the LA. Besides, even assuming that the respondent has knowledge of a labor case against SEASUMCO, this will not serve the same purpose as summons to him.

More so, the respondent did not voluntarily appear before the LA as to submit himself to its jurisdiction. Contrary to the petitioner's position, the validity of a judgment or order of a court or quasi-judicial tribunal which has become final and executory may be attacked when the records show that it lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment. For a judgment rendered against one in a case where jurisdiction over his person was not acquired is void, and a void judgment maybe assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally by means of a petition filed in the same or separate case, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.

Guided by the foregoing norms, the CA properly concluded that the proceedings before the LA deprived the respondent of due process. Considering that the respondent was never impleaded as a party respondent and was never validly served with summons, the LA never acquired jurisdiction over his person. Perforce, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered are nugatory and without effect. This utter lack of jurisdiction voids any liability of the respondent for any monetary award or judgment in favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 2009 and Resolution dated April 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02575-MIN are AFFIRMED.

Majestic Plus International, Inc. vs. Bullion Investment and Development Corporation Case Digest

Majestic Plus International, Inc. vs. Bullion Investment and Development Corporation/Majestic Plus International, Inc. Vs. Bullion Investment and Development Corporation, et al.

G.R. No. 201017/G.R. No. 215289. December 5, 2016

Facts

On June 30, 2003, the City of Manila, through then City Mayor Joselito Atienza, and Bullion, represented by its President Roland Lautachang, entered into a Contract for the lease of the said property for a period of twenty-five (25) years. Under the Contract, Bullion, as lessee, agreed to construct two 4-storey buildings, one of which shall be used as an extension office of the Manila City Hall for its institutional services, while the other shall be used for commercial purposes.

Bullion then commenced construction and was able to finish and turn over the City Hall extension building to the Manila City Government. However, Bullion was unable to finish the construction of the commercial building. Bullion then sought the help of and was able to convince petitioner corporation, Majestic Plus Holding International, Incorporation (Majestic), to invest in Bullion's business venture, particularly the completion of the construction of its commercial building which was intended to be used as a mall (Meisic Mall).

On September 7, 2004, Bullion, represented by its President, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement6 (MOA) with Majestic. Following the execution of the MOA, Majestic issued five (5) checks, on various dates, for an aggregate amount of Fifty-Seven Million Pesos (P57 ,000,000.00) in favor of Bullion, as partial payment of the 80% equity interest in the latter. Bullion acknowledged such payment. However, it alleged that an additional four ( 4) checks, representing a total amount of P31,000,000.00, which were subsequently issued by Majestic were dishonored because of "Stop Payment" orders. For Majestic's failure to heed Bullion's demands, the latter sent another letter to the former, dated June 24, 2005, informing it that Bullion had elected to rescind the MOA.

Meanwhile, Majestic took over the supervision and eventually finished the construction of the Meisic Mall, except with respect to some minor installations. Based on the Summary of Payments, Majestic claims that, aside from the P57,000,000.00 it had earlier paid to Bullion, it also incurred expenses for the purpose of sustaining the construction of Meisic Mall and the acquisition of various equipment for use inside the mall in the sum Pl34,522,803.22. Thus, the aggregate amount alleged to have been invested by Majestic is P191,522,803.22.

The Meisic Mall became operational as early as May 2005. Majestic conducted business therein by renting out the mall's leasable spaces to stallholders and by employing personnel for the security, maintenance and upkeep of the mall's premises. However, in the morning of June 25, 2005, respondent, aided by several police personnel and security guards, entered the premises and took physical possession and control of Meisic Mall.

This prompted Majestic to file a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Bullion, together with several other persons. Majestic alleged that it has become a majority shareholder of Bullion by reason of its P 191,522,803.22 investment, which comprises 95.76% of the agreed P200,000,000.00 authorized capital stock of Bullion. Majestic also claims that the subject MOA remains valid and binding and that Bullion failed to comply with its unde1iakings thereunder.

The executive judge assigned the same to Branch 46, RTC of Manila which is also a commercial court. The parties did not question the jurisdiction of Branch 46. In the ensuing proceedings before Branch 46, the parties jointly moved that the case be submitted for summary judgment, to which the RTC acceded. On July 28, 2011, Branch 46, RTC of Manila rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiff Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. and against the herein defendants.

On August 22, 2011, Majestic filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal which was granted by the RTC by vi11ue of a Special Order and two other related orders, all dated September 1, 2011. Consequently, a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal on even date was issued. Per Sheriffs Return dated September 2, 2011, the Writ was served on Bullion and was thereby immediately implemented. In accordance with the Writ, the Sheriff was able to completely and successfully remove the physical possession and control of Meisic Mall from Bullion and deliver the same to Majestic.

Bullion filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which granted the aforesaid Petition and annulled and set aside the Special Order and the two (2) other assailed Orders. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether Branch 46, RTC of Manila, despite being designated as an SCC, has jurisdiction to hear and decide Majestic's suit for specific performance.
2. Whether RTC was correct in considering the case appropriate for summary judgment.
3. Whether the execution of such Decision pending appeal was proper.

Rulings:

1. Yes. The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.

Moreover, it should be noted that Special Commercial Courts (SCCs) are still considered courts of general jurisdiction. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, directs merely the Supreme Court's designation of RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The assignment of intra-corporate disputes to secs is only for the purpose of streamlining the workload of the RTCs so that certain branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject matter.

Nothing in the language of the law suggests the diminution of jurisdiction of those RTCs to be designated as SCCs. The RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute can be likened to an RTC exercising its probate jurisdiction or sitting as a special agrarian court. The designation of the SCCs as such has not in any way limited their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.

Hence, based on the foregoing, it is clear that Branch 46, RTC of Manila, despite being designated as an SCC, has jurisdiction to hear and decide Majestic's suit for specific performance.

2. No. Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.

In the present case, it is true that both parties moved for the rendition of a summary judgment. However, it is apparent that the RTC did not comply with the procedural guidelines when it ordered that the case be submitted for summary judgment without first conducting a hearing to determine if there are indeed no genuine issues of fact that would necessitate trial. The trial court merely required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, together with their affidavits and exhibits and, although the parties presented opposing claims, the RTC hastily rendered a summary judgment. Thus, the trial court erred in cursorily issuing the said judgment.

A careful examination of the pleadings will show that Majestic's causes of action in its Complaint are anchored on Bullion's supposed violations of the provision of the subject MOA. On the other hand, Majestic's allegations are controverted by Bullion who, in a like manner, asserts that by virtue of Majestic's failure to comply with the provisions of the said MOA, it decided to rescind the same. These diametrically opposed and conflicting claims present a factual dispute which can be resolved and settled only by means of evidence presented during trial. On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC erred in rendering its assailed summary judgment. Thus, the CA did not commit error in setting aside the said summary judgment.

3. No. In view of this Court's affirmance of the CA ruling which reversed and set aside the July 28, 2011 Decision of the RTC, there is no longer any RTC judgment that may be executed. Hence, the issue as to whether or not there are "good reasons" to execute the assailed Decision of the RTC has become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The November 2, 2011 Decision and March 14, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121072 are AFFIRMED. The October 23, 2013 Decision and November 4, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97537 are, likewise, AFFIRMED. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to PROMPTLY RE-RAFFLE the case among the non-commercial courts with a directive that the same be resolved with deliberate dispatch.  

24-K Property Ventures, Inc. vs. Young Builders Corporation Case Digest

24-K Property Ventures, Inc. Vs. Young Builders Corporation

G.R. No. 193371. December 5, 2016

Facts

On 7 August 1996, petitioner and respondent entered into a Construction Contract wherein respondent undertook to construct for petitioner a 20-storey office/residential building along Tomas Morato, Quezon City for the price of P165,000,000.00. In 1988, petitioner was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and it incurred arrearages. Respondent refused to continue with the construction unless petitioner issued securities for its unpaid obligations. Petitioner then executed in respondent's favor a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. N-164112 and No. N-164113. At that time, these lots were bare and without improvements. In 1999, respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner before the CIAC. Meanwhile, petitioner commenced the construction of another condominium project on the two parcels of land.

On 19 December 2005, the CIAC rendered a Final Award ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P91,084,206.43, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the final award, and 12% per annum from the date the award becomes final and executory until it is fully paid. This award became final and executory on 28 October 2008. In the meantime, while the case was on appeal, the CIAC, upon motion of respondent, issued a writ of execution dated 2 May 2006 for the award of P91,084,206.43, as well as for the amount of Pl,208,801.81 as arbitration costs.

Sheriff Villegas serve the writ and the letter of request for compliance to petitioner's counsel who acknowledged receipt thereof. Sheriff Villegas also served notices of garnishment to the following banks: Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Philippine National Bank, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, United Coconut Planters Bank, and East West Banking Corporation. Sheriff Villegas subsequently levied on the real properties of petitioner, particularly on those covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. N-14163, No. N-14183 and No. N-14286, etc. and Transfer Certificate Title No. N-164112 and No. N-164113.13 The levy effected by Sheriff Villegas was on sixteen (16) condominium units of Lansbergh Place and on the two parcels of land upon which Torre Venezia, a 27-storey building with 302 condominium units, presently stands.

Petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion to Suspend Enforcement of Notice of Sale and Re-computation of Award but the auction sale proceeded and the subject properties were sold to respondent for Pl 10,504,888.05. A Certificate of Sale was consequently issued in respondent's favor.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale, claiming that the sale was violative of various provisions of the Rules of Court and that the subject properties were sold at a grossly inadequate price. The CIAC, however, denied said motion as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), contending that the CIAC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the execution sale. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the levy effected on the real properties of petitioner was proper.

Ruling

No. It is doctrinal that "a lawful levy of execution is a prerequisite to an execution sale, either of real estate or of personalty, to the conveyance executed in pursuant thereof, and to the title acquired thereby." A proper levy is indispensable to a valid execution sale, and an execution sale, unless preceded by a proper levy, is void and the purchaser in said sale acquires no title to the property sold thereunder. In the case at bar, we find that the levy effected on the real properties of petitioner was improper.

A valid demand for the immediate payment of the full

amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful

fees is necessary to a proper levy.

The first crucial step in the execution of money judgments is a valid demand on the judgment obligor, usually via a valid service of the writ of execution. In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Report/Return stated:

By virtue of the Writ of Execution, dated May 2, 2006 issued by Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, the undersigned sheriff tried to serve said writ upon officer of respondent corporation, however, despite [diligent] effort exerted by herein sheriff to serve to the officer of respondent corporation[,] [service] proved futile because they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof x x x.

Noticeably, the Sheriffs Report/Return failed to specifically indicate material information on the alleged attempted service on petitioner. It failed to state the name of the officer who allegedly refused to receive the writ and the circumstances surrounding such refusal, and even the date when said attempted service was allegedly made.

The CIAC and the CA unquestionably accepted Sheriff Villegas' ambiguous statements regarding the alleged attempted service on petitioner, relying on the presumption that the former performed his official duty regularly. The Court, however, holds that such presumption cannot be applied in the case at bar given the abstracted and vague declarations in the Sheriffs Report/Return.

A valid levy must first be effected on personal properties, if any,

and then on real properties if personal properties are insufficient

to answer for the judgment.

In case the judgment debtor fails to choose which of his properties should be levied upon, the sheriff must first levy on the judgment debtor's personal properties, if any, and should such properties be insufficient, then the sheriff may levy on the judgment debtor's real properties. In all of these cases, the sheriff may levy and sell only such properties as are sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt and the lawful fees.

The Sheriffs Report/Return, presumably in an effort to comply with the Rules, stated that a levy on petitioner's bank accounts was first attempted. The CA accepted the sheriffs statements as gospel truth. In its recital of facts, the CA stated that "on 05 May 2006, [Sheriff Villegas] served Notice of Garnishment to a number of banks but he was informed that the petitioner had no deposits, credits or money in those banks. On 9 May 2006, he levied on two real properties of the petitioner.

And yet, the levy on petitioner's real properties was made on 9 May 2006, clearly showing that petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to have his personal properties garnished or levied upon first before his real properties. All in all, it being shown that there was no proper levy in the case at bar, the consequent execution sale is thus declared invalid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The execution sale over the properties covered by TCT Nos. N-164112 and N-164113 in favor of respondent is declared NULL and VOID.