Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Case Digest

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016

Facts

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, including related accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.

From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a family member was once a partner.

xx xx

Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering Act is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.

Issues:

1. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.
2. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.
3. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

Rulings

1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage.

In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.

2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during trial.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:

1. The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;
2. The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;
3. A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and
4. The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

Rama, et al. vs. Moises, et al. Case Digest

Hon. Michael L. Rama, et al. vs. Hon. Gilbert P. Moises, et al.

G.R. No. 197146. December 6, 2016

Synopsis

A law enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution, like a presidential decree, is presumed to be valid and constitutional on the theory that it was carefully studied by the Legislative and Executive Departments prior to its enactment, and determined to be in accord with the Fundamental Law. However, the presumption of validity and constitutionality is overturned and the law should be struck down once it becomes inconsistent with the present Constitution and the later laws.

Facts

On May 25, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973). By virtue of P. D. No. 198, Cebu City formed the Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) in 1974. Thereafter, the Cities of Mandaue, Lapu-Lapu and Talisay, and the Municipalities of Liloan, Compostela, Consolacion, and Cordova turned over their waterworks systems and services to the MCWD. From 1974 to 2002, the Cebu City Mayor appointed all the members of the MCWD Board of Directors in accordance with Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198, to wit:

(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service connections exists. (emphasis supplied)

In July 2002, Cebu Provincial Governor Pablo L. Garcia wrote to the MCWD to assert his authority and intention to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors.' He stated in his letter that since 1996, the active water service connections in Cebu City had been below 75% of the total active water service connection of the MCWD; that no other city or municipality under the MCWD had reached the required percentage of 75%; and that, accordingly, he, as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, was the appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors pursuant to Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198.

Later on, the MCWD commenced in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City (RTC) its action for declaratory relief seeking to declare Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 unconstitutional; or, should the provision be declared valid, it should be interpreted to mean that the authority to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors belonged solely to the Cebu City Mayor. The RTC (Branch 7) dismissed the action for declaratory relief.

To avoid a vacuum and in the exigency of the service, Provincial Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia and Cebu City Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña jointly appointed Atty. Adelino Sitoy and Leo Pacana to fill the vacancies. However, the position of Atty. Sitoy was deemed vacated upon his election as the Municipal Mayor of Cordova, Cebu in the 2007 elections.

Governor Garcia commenced an action for declaratory relief to seek the interpretation of Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 198 on the proper appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors.

On February 22, 2008, however, Mayor Osmeña appointed Yu as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors.7 Accordingly, on May 20, 2008, the RTC dismissed the action for declaratory relief on the ground that declaratory relief became improper once there was a breach or violation of the provision.

On June 13, 2008, Governor Garcia filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the appointment of Yu as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors (docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-34459), alleging that the appointment by Mayor Osmefia was illegal; that under Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198, it was she as the Provincial Governor of Cebu who was vested with the authority to appoint members of the MCWD Board of Directors because the total active water service connections of Cebu City and of the other cities and municipalities were below 75% of the total water service connections in the area of the MCWD.

On November 16, 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed judgment declaring the appointment of Yu as illegal and void and ruled that the court has not been able to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree No. 198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

Mayor Osmeña and Yu jointly moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion. Hence, the petitioners have instituted this special civil action for certiorari.

Issues

1. Whether Yu's expiration of term renders case moot and academic.
2. Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 was void on its face for violating the constitutional provision on local autonomy and independence of HUCs under Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Rulings

Yu's expiration of term did not

render case moot and academic

We note that respondent Yu's term as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors expired on December 31, 2012. However, this fact does not justify the dismissal of the petition on the ground of its being rendered moot and academic. The case should still be decided, despite the intervening developments that could have rendered the case moot and academic, because public interest is involved, and because the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.

For sure, the appointment by the proper official of the individuals to manage the system of water distribution and service for the consumers residing in the concerned cities and municipalities involves the interest of their populations and the general public affected by the services of the MCWD as a public utility. Moreover, the question on the proper appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors should none of the cities and municipalities have at least 75% of the water consumers will not be definitively resolved with finality if we dismiss the petition on the ground of mootness.

Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is already superseded

The Court opines that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially struck down for being repugnant to the local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to LGUs, and for being inconsistent with R.A. No. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code) and related laws on local governments.

The enactment of P.D. No. 198 on May 25, 1973 was prior to the enactment on December 22, 1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the Elective or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes) and antedated as well the effectivity of the 1991 Local Government Code on January 1, 1992. At the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 198, Cebu City was still a component city of Cebu Province. Section 328 of B.P. Blg. 51 reclassified the cities of the Philippines based on well-defined criteria. Cebu City thus became an HUC, which immediately meant that its inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the officials of Cebu Province. In accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province, but the voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. Later on, Cebu City, already an HUC, was further effectively rendered independent from Cebu Province pursuant to Section 29 of the 1991 Local Government Code.

Hence, all matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were exercised through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the President's retained power of general supervision over provinces, HUCs, and independent component cities pursuant to and in accordance with Section 252 of the 1991 Local Government Code, a law enacted for the purpose of strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in accordance with the 1987 Constitution.

Article X of the 1987 Constitution guarantees and promotes the administrative and fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The foregoing statutory enactments enunciate and implement the local autonomy provisions explicitly recognized under the 1987 Constitution. To conform with the guarantees of the Constitution in favor of the autonomy of the LGUs, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court to declare and pronounce Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 as already partially unconstitutional.

Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for

violating the Due Process Clause and

the Equal Protection Clause

We opine that although Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 provided for substantial distinction and was germane to the purpose of P.D. No. 198 when it was enacted in 1973, the intervening reclassification of the City of Cebu into an HUC and the subsequent enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code rendered the continued application of Section 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable and unfair. Clearly, the assailed provision no longer provided for substantial distinction because, firstly, it ignored that the MCWD was built without the participation of the provincial government; secondly, it failed to consider that the MCWD existed to serve the community that represents the needs of the majority of the active water service connections; and, thirdly, the main objective of the decree was to improve the water service while keeping up with the needs of the growing population.

Hence, we deem it to be inconsistent with the true. objectives of the decree to still leave to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the provincial governor had administrative supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for 16.92% of the active water service connection in the MCWD. In comparison, the City of Cebu had 61.28% of the active service water connections; Mandaue, another HUC, 16%; and Lapu Lapu City, another HUC, 6.8%. There is no denying that the MCWD has been primarily serving the needs of Cebu City. Although it is impermissible to inquire into why the decree set 75% as the marker for determining the proper appointing authority, the provision has meanwhile become unfair for ignoring the needs and circumstances of Cebu City as the LGU accounting for the majority of the active water service connections, and whose constituency stood to be the most affected by the decisions made by the MCWD's Board of Directors. Indeed, the classification has truly ceased to be germane or related to the main objective for the enactment of P.D. No. 198 in 1973.

Under the foregoing circumstances, therefore, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198. It thereby utterly disregarded the clear policies favoring local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and effected by the 1991 Local Government Code and related subsequent statutory enactments, and for being violative of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari; ANNUL and SET ASIDE the decision rendered in Civil Case No. CEB-34459 on November 16, 2010 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Cebu City; and DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 to the extent that it applies to highly urbanized cities like the City of Cebu and to component cities with charters expressly providing for their voters not to be eligible to vote for the officials of the provinces to which they belong for being in violation of the express policy of the 1987 Constitution on local autonomy, the 1991 Local Government Code and subsequent statutory enactments, and for being also in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.