People vs. Estrada

People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Estrada

[G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010]

Doctrine:

          In order to charge properly an uncle of a rape-victim for qualified rape, the circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in the information.

Facts:

          On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against appellant Edgardo Estrada charging him with two counts of Rape committed as follows:

That on or about the month of July 1997, at Barangay x x x, in the Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of the offended party, with lewd design, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA, a minor, 12 years of age, against her will.

On August 16, 2002, the trial court found the accused guilty of qualified rape on two counts and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification finding the appellant guilty of simple rape. The Court of Appeals opined that mere allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victim’s uncle would not suffice to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not appellant should be held liable for qualified rape.

Held: No. Appellant is guilty only of two counts of simple rape. In the instant case, it was clearly established by the prosecution that on two occasions in July 1997, the victim was sexually abused by appellant through force and intimidation, against her will and without her consent.

          However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant that AAA testified that appellant is her uncle.

          The circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape.

          

Spouses Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Samban

Spouses Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Samban

[G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010]

Doctrines:

In order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owners duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.

The supposed vendor's signature having been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

Facts:

          Julian Sambaan, married to Guillerma Saarenas-Sambaan, was the registered owner of a property located at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. The lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14202. The respondents and the petitioner Myrna Bernales (Myrna) are the children of Julian and Guillerma. Myrna, who is the eldest of the siblings, is the present owner and possessor of the property in question.

          Sometime in 1975, Julian was ambushed and was hospitalized due to a gunshot wound. On April 11, 1975, Julian allegedly requested his children to gather so that he could make his last two wishes. Julians first wish was for the children to redeem the subject property which was mortgaged to Myrna and her husband Patricio Bernales. Thus, in 1982, respondent Absalon Sambaan, one of Julians children, offered to redeem the property but the petitioners refused because they were allegedly using the property as tethering place for their cattle.

          In January 1991, respondents received information that the property covered by TCT No. T-14202 was already transferred to petitioners name. Whereupon, they secured a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 which bore the signatures of their parents and had it examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The result of the examination revealed that the signatures of their parents, Julian and Guillerma, were forged.

          On April 1993, the respondents, together with their mother Guillerma, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and cancellation of TCT No. T-14204 alleging that their parent’s signatures were forged. The trial court rendered a decision on August 2, 2001 cancelling the TCT and ordering another title to be issued in the name of the late Julian Sambaan.

Petitioners went to the CA and appealed the decision. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. A motion for reconsideration of the decision was, likewise, denied in 2004. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1.   Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is authentic as to prove the ownership of the petitioners over the subject property.

2.   Whether or not the forged Deed of Absolute Sale is null and conveys no title.

3.   Whether or not prescription bars respondents’ action to recover ownership of the subject property.

Held:

1.       No. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.  Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.s  It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. But to erase any doubt on the correctness of the assailed ruling, the Court has carefully perused the records and, nonetheless, arrived at the same conclusion.  The Court finds that there is substantial evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial court’s conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged.

         

          The examination conducted by the NBI disclosed that Julian and Guillermas signatures were forged. Moreover, petitioners failed to present any evidence to rebut the findings of the NBI handwriting expert.

          2.       The forged Deed of Absolute Sale is null and conveys no title. In order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith and for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. Indubitably, therefore, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale did not convey any title to herein petitioners. Consequently, they cannot take refuge in the protection accorded by the Torrens system on titled lands.

         

          Thus, the Supreme Court holds that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if accompanied by the owners duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property.

          3.       Prescription did not bar respondents’ action to recover ownership of the subject property. The supposed vendor's signature having been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent as “absolutely simulated or fictitious” under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. According to Article 1410, “the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable which cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription.”

People vs. Noque

People of the Philippines vs. Joselito Noque y Gomez

[G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010]

Doctrines:

Elements of an Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.- The prosecution successfully proved that appellant violated Section 15, Article III of RA 6425. The prosecution’s evidence established the concurrence of the elements of an illegal sale of a dangerous drug, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

Elements of an Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.- The prosecution was also successful in proving that appellant violated Section 16, Article III of RA 6425. It adduced evidence that established the presence of the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug. It showed that (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellant was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

Minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, accused’s right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

Facts:

Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto Murillo on January 30, 2001. SPO4 Murillo frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust money. He also confiscated the pranela bag that contained a large quantity of crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of a regulated drug.

The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from the appellant, the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of chemical reaction could change into methamphetamine. The trial court further held that under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a variance in the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved shall result in the conviction for the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.

Hence, the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1.   Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

2.   Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

3.   Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations was not violated.

Held:

1.       The prosecution successfully proved that appellant violated Section 15, Article III of RA 6425. The prosecution’s evidence established the concurrence of the elements of an illegal sale of a dangerous drug, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

In the instant case, the police officers conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving confirmed surveillance reports that the appellant was engaged in the illicit sale of dangerous drugs at No. 630 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. PO1 Balais, the designated poseur-buyer of the buy-bust team, personally identified the appellant as the person who volunteered to sell to him P1,000.00 worth of white crystalline substance alleged to be shabu. The police officer received this illegal merchandise after giving the appellant the marked money as payment. Undoubtedly, the appellant is guilty of selling a dangerous drug.

2.       The prosecution was also successful in proving that appellant violated Section 16, Article III of RA 6425. It adduced evidence that established the presence of the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug. It showed that (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellant was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

The police buy-bust team apprehended the appellant for the sale of a white crystalline substance then proceeded to search the premises. They found a large quantity of the same substance inside the bag that contained the two sachets of the regulated drug sold to PO1 Balais. Appellant did not offer any explanation why he is in custody of the said substance. Neither did the appellant present any authorization to possess the same. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. With the burden of evidence shifted to the appellant, it was his duty to explain his innocence on the regulated drug seized from his person. However, as already mentioned, he did not offer any excuse or explanation regarding his possession thereof.

3.       Appellants right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations was not violated. The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the CA and the trial court, as well as the testimony of the forensic chemical officer, that the drug known as ephedrine has a central nervous stimulating effect similar to that of methamphetamine. In fact, ephedrine is an important precursor used in the clandestine synthesis of methamphetamine, which in crystallized form is methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

[G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010]

Doctrines:

         Cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their members.

    To encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

    Although the tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this should be construed to include the members. It must be emphasized that cooperatives exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary objective of every cooperative is to provide goods and services to its members to enable them to attain increased income, savings, investments, and productivity. Therefore, limiting the application of the tax exemption to cooperatives would go against the very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the exemption to members of cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of the legislature.

Facts:

Petitioner Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) is a credit cooperative duly registered with and regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). On November 27, 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Operations Group Deputy Commissioner, Lilian B. Hefti, issued Letters of Authority Nos. 63222 and 63223, authorizing BIR officers to examine petitioners books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the taxable years 1999 and 2000.

On October 16, 2002, petitioner received two other Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes also for taxable years 1999 and 2000.[10] The deficiency withholding taxes cover the payments of the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees, and interest on savings and time deposits of its members.

On October 22, 2002, petitioner informed BIR Regional Director Sonia L. Flores that it would only pay the deficiency withholding taxes corresponding to the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees for the year 1999 in the amount of P87,977.86, excluding penalties and interest.

On November 29, 2002, petitioner availed of the VAAP and paid the amounts of P105,574.62 and P143,867.24. corresponding to the withholding taxes on the payments for the compensation, honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, and legal and professional services, for the years 1999 and 2000, respectively.

On April 24, 2003, petitioner received from the BIR Regional Director Flores, Letters of Demand ordering petitioner to pay the deficiency withholding taxes, inclusive of penalties, for the years 1999 and 2000 in the amounts of P1,489,065.30 and P1,462,644.90, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not it is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum.

Held: Petitioners invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-888, reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], is proper. On November 16, 1988, the BIR declared in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their members.

According to the CTA En Banc, the BIR Ruling was based on the premise that the savings and time deposits were placed by the members of the cooperative in the bank. Consequently, it ruled that the BIR Ruling does not apply when the deposits are maintained in the cooperative such as the instant case.

There is nothing in the ruling to suggest that it applies only when deposits are maintained in a bank. Rather, the ruling clearly states, without any qualification, that since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks, cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members.

In BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] dated October 5, 2006 the BIR opined that:

x x x x

3. Exemption of interest income on members deposit (over and above the share capital holdings) from the 20% Final Withholding Tax.

The National Internal Revenue Code states that a final tax at the rate of twenty percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from the deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangement x x x for individuals under Section 24(B)(1) and for domestic corporations under Section 27(D)(1). Considering the members deposits with the cooperatives are not currency bank deposits nor deposit substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1), therefore, do not apply to members of cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations, respectively.

In this case, BIR Ruling No. 551-888 and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] are in perfect harmony with the Constitution and the laws they seek to implement. Accordingly, the interpretation in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members, which was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], applies to the instant case.

Members of cooperatives deserve a preferential tax treatment pursuant to RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520.

Given that petitioner is a credit cooperative duly registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC must be read together with RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520. Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, Thus, to encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

         

The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is apparent in Articles 61 and 62 of RA 6938, which read:

ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. Duly registered cooperatives under this Code which do not transact any business with non-members or the general public shall not be subject to any government taxes and fees imposed under the Internal Revenue Laws and other tax laws. Cooperatives not falling under this article shall be governed by the succeeding section.

ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with both members and nonmembers shall not be subject to tax on their transactions to members. Notwithstanding the provision of any law or regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax exemptions; x x x.

This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized that cooperatives exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary objective of every cooperative is to provide goods and services to its members to enable them to attain increased income, savings, investments and productivity. Therefore, limiting the application of the tax exemption to cooperatives would go against the very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the exemption to members of cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of the legislature. Thus, although the tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this should be construed to include the members, pursuant to Article 126 of RA 6938, which provides:

ART. 126. Interpretation and Construction. In case of doubt as to the meaning of any provision of this Code or the regulations issued in pursuance thereof, the same shall be resolved liberally in favor of the cooperatives and their members.

All told, we hold that petitioner is not liable to pay the assessed deficiency withholding taxes on interest from the savings and time deposits of its members, as well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum.

In closing, cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the vital role they play in the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the States power to tax must give way to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani A. Cruz: The power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be subordinated to the demands of social justice.

Buada vs. Cement Center Inc.

Bienvenido Buada et. al., vs. Cement Center, Inc.

[G.R. No. 180374, January 22, 2010]

Doctrines:

In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any court authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. The voluntary surrender of the landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.

Facts:

          Petitioners were tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Cement Center, Inc.

          On March 13, 1998, respondent filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages against petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Pangasinan. It claimed that on June 28, 1995, petitioners entered into a Compromise Agreement with respondent whereby the former, for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000.00 each, voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite respondents repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.

          In their Answer, petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. They claimed that sometime in 1995, respondent induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that the subject landholdings are no longer viable for agricultural purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondent assured them that they would only apply for the conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the land only upon the approval of said application and that thereafter, they will be paid a disturbance compensation of P3,000.00 each. Petitioners also claimed that respondent promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. But, should the application for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants and could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Issue: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement constitute the voluntary surrender contemplated by law.

Held: Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any court authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. To protect the tenant's right to security of tenure, voluntary surrender, as contemplated by law, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant farmer to security of tenure becomes an illusory one. Moreover, RA 3844 provides that the voluntary surrender of the landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.

          Respondent asserts that petitioners voluntarily surrendered their landholdings. Petitioners, however, deny this claim and instead maintain that they did not execute the Compromise Agreement with a view to absolutely sell and surrender their tenancy rights in exchange for P3,000.00 for each of them. They assert that such agreement was subject to suspensive conditions, i.e., the approval of respondents application for conversion of the land to non-agricultural and their subsequent absorption as laborers in the business that respondent will put up on said land, or, if the application will not be approved, petitioners will continue to be tenants of the land and could later on qualify as beneficiaries of the CARP. Petitioners assert that they were not aware that these conditions were not incorporated in the Compromise Agreement because they were not literate in the English language used. Neither were they represented by counsel nor were the contents of the agreement explained to them. Petitioners thus claim that the Compromise Agreement should be interpreted in accordance with the real intention of the parties pursuant to Articles 1370 and 1371 of the Civil Code. Petitioners likewise claim that as they were illiterate in the English language, they could not have given their valid consent to the Compromise Agreement.

          A perusal of the subject Compromise Agreement reveals that the parties considered the amount of P3,000.00 together with the income from a single cropping as comprising the disturbance compensation package, viz:

“The aforeindicated income derived from the properties and the financial assistance of P3,000.00 shall be considered as the disturbance compensation package in favor of the SECOND PARTY by reason or as a result of their vacating the premises in accordance with Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990 of the Department of Agrarian Reform.”

Moreover, it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their sole source of livelihood. There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed advantageous to petitioners families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood.

Thus, the Court finds the evidence on record and respondent's arguments insufficient to overcome the rights of petitioners as provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes. The alleged voluntary surrender of petitioners of their tenancy rights for the sum of P3,000.00 each could not constitute as voluntary surrender within the contemplation of law.

Cacao vs. People

Julius Cacao y Prieto vs. People of the Philippines

[G.R. No. 180870, 610 SCRA 636, January 22, 2010]

Doctrines:

Essential in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession.

The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.

Facts:

On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.

Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.

The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look inside.

PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.

 PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing shabu.

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

 The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu.

On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit and Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City.

Both RTC and CA convicted petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to review the same. In this case, the Court finds it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points.

A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.

In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). However, the foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu.

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, The Court is of the considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses. 

B.   The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item confiscated from Cacao.

          The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the same.

          The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, the Court cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.

          Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case.