Garcia vs. Molina Case Digest

Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina

G.R. No. 165223. January 11, 2016

Doctrines:

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis.

Gloria vs. CA has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.

Facts:

For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his capacity as the President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), had charged the respondent, an Attorney V in the Litigation Department of the Legal Service Group of the GSIS, with grave misconduct and preventively suspended him for 60 days.

In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion came to point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively investigated for grave misconduct. After the investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated September 1, 2003 to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act.

Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt.

The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and requested the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of the GSIS to impose disciplinary action on the respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987; that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave misconduct was not arbitrary because the latter had intentionally passed on or caused the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby transgressing "some established and definite rule of action" that sufficiently established a prima facie case for an administrative charge; that the respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty to defend and assist the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral or social duty" to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation of the letter. He submits that the respondent's preventive suspension was done in accordance with the Civil Service Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on record.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had sufficient basis to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct and impose preventive suspension as a consequence.
2. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is applicable.

Rulings:

1. To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of handing over the letter to Caretero constituted grave misconduct. The CA concluded that the act of the respondent of handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct because the act did not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.

The Court concurs with the CA.

Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Moreover, it is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” It becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.”

The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The passing of the letter to Caretero did not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was handed only to a single individual who just happened to be curious about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other employees or passengers were on board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of the letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with the letter, to wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the widespread dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred.

To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a direct connection to the performance of his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis. The formal charge against the respondent was for grave misconduct, an administrative offense that justifies the imposition of the preventive suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal basis, he was not entitled to backwages.

2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the option either of filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive suspension order by the disciplining authority, or of elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 days from the receipt thereof.

We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. His failure to file the motion for reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain exceptional circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration. Among the exceptional circumstances are the following, namely: when the issue involved is purely a legal question.

Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the filing of the formal charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending investigation — was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing the motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated on April 29, 2004 and the resolution promulgated on September 6, 2004 insofar as the Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge for grave misconduct against respondent Mario I. Molina, but REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they nullified the respondent's preventive suspension and awarded backwages to him corresponding to the period of his preventive suspension; and MAKES NO PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.

MCIAA vs. Heirs of Ijordan, et al.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al.

G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.

Facts:

On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its name.

After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; and that the tax declaration had no probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.

In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner.
2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve prescription.

Rulings:

1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.

Ladines vs. People Case Digest

Pedro Ladines vs. People of the Philippines and Edwin De Ramon

G.R. No. 167333. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

Facts:

While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed by them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he succumbed.

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested that the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of two distinct weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like a sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed instrument like a knife.

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they did not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their way home from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his having lodged a complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno and Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School, together with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching the dance, a quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved.

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman Licup with homicide.

On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, sans any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that the CA committed reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.

Issues:

1. Whether the res gestae statement of Licup constitutes newly-discovered evidence that would create a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
2. Whether the RTC imposed the proper penalty.
3. Whether the lower court's limitation of the civil liability to civil indemnity of only P50,000.00 is correct.

Rulings:

1. No, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court.

Furthermore, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. (Emphasis is mine).

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.

2. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

3. The limitation was a plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs. The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO LADINES is 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.

Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Case Digest

Jennifer C. Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Container Lines/Monete Cuenca

G.R. No. 177680. January 13, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrines Involved:

Every resignation presupposes the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there can be no valid resignation after the fact of termination of the employment simply because the employee had no employer-employee relationship to relinquish.

There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the managerial employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.

Facts:

Respondent Pacific Concord Container Lines (Pacific Concord), a domestic corporation engaged in cargo forwarding, hired the petitioner as an Account Executive/Marketing Assistant. In January 2002, Pacific Concord promoted her as a sales manager with the monthly salary rate of P25,000.00, and provided her with a brand new Toyota Altis plus gasoline allowance. On November 8, 2002, she reported for work at 9:00 a.m. and left the company premises at around 10:30 a.m. to make client calls. At 1:14 p.m. of that day, she received the following text message from respondent Monette Cuenca, to wit:

TODAY U R OFFICIALY NT CONNECTED WITH US.

Sender: MONETTE

+639173215330

Sent: 8-Nov-2002

13:14:01

Cuenca also sent a text message to Roy Lagahit, the petitioner's husband, as follows:

IBALIK KARON DAYON ANG AUTO OG PALIHUG LANG KO OG KUHA SA NYONG BUTANG OG DI NAKO MO STORY A NI JENIFER. IL WAIT

Sender: MONETTE

+639173215330

Sent: 8-Nov-2002

12:50:54

The petitioner immediately tried to contact Cuenca, but the latter refused to take her calls. On the same day, the petitioner learned from clients and friends that the respondents had disseminated notices, flyers and memos informing all clients of Pacific Concord that she was no longer connected with the company as of November 8, 2002. Pacific Concord also caused the publication of the notice to the public in the Sunstar Daily issue of December 15, 2002.

On November 13, 2002, the petitioner sent a letter to Pacific Concord contending that she was deprived of the due process that would have given her the chance to formally present her side. Despite this, she have accepted her fate and asked Cuenca to arrange and expedite settlement of all benefits due to her under the law.

On November 26, 2002, the petitioner filed her complaint for constructive dismissal in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in'Cebu City.

In their position paper, the respondents denied having terminated the petitioner despite the fact that there were valid grounds to do so. They insisted that the petitioner had betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in her when she: (a) used the company-issued vehicle for her own personal interest; (b) failed to achieve her sales quota, and to enhance and develop the Sales Department; (c) enticed her marketing assistant, Jo Ann Otrera, to resign and join her in transferring to another forwarding company; (d) applied for other employment during office hours and using company resources; (e) solicited and offered the services of Seajet International, Inc. during her employment with Pacific Concord; (f) received a personal commission from Wesport Line, Inc. for container shipments; and (g) illegally manipulated and diverted several containers to Seajet International.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on June 9, 2003, declaring that the respondents were not able to prove that the petitioner had committed acts constituting betrayal of trust; that they had not informed her prior to her dismissal of the offenses she had supposedly committed; and that owing to the illegality of the dismissal, they were liable for backwages and separation pay.

Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter finding that the respondents are guilty of illegally dismissing the complainant from her employment, but MODIFYING his award for separation pay computed at one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered one (1) year from the complainant's first day of employment in February 2000 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION; and backwages starting November 8, 2002 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION.

Decision of the CA

On May 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision granting the respondents' petition for certiorari, and annulling the decision of the NLRC. It pronounced that there were sufficient justifications to terminate the petitioner's services for disloyalty and willful breach of trust.

Issues:

1. Whether Lagahit resigned from her employment.
2. Whether Lagahit breached her employer's trust.

Rulings of the Court:

1. Lagahit did not resign from her employment.

In cases of unlawful dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, but before the employer is expected to discharge its burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of her dismissal from employment. In this case, the petitioner proved the overt acts committed by the respondents in abruptly terminating her employment through the text messages sent by Cuenca to the petitioner and her husband, as well as the notices distributed to the clients and published in the Sun Star. It is notable that the respondents did not deny or controvert her evidence on the matter. Thereby, she showed Pacific Concord's resolve to terminate her employment effective November 8, 2002.

On the other hand, the respondents' insistence that the petitioner had resigned was bereft of factual support. As a rule, the employer who interposes the resignation of the employee as a defense should prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. A valid resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds herself in a situation where she believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and that she has no other choice but to disassociate herself from employment. The resignation must be unconditional and with a clear intention to relinquish the position.

The facts and circumstances before and after the petitioner's severance from her employment on November 8, 2002 did not show her resolute intention to relinquish her job. Indeed, it would be unfounded to infer the intention to relinquish from her November 13, 2002 letter, which, to us, was not a resignation letter due to the absence therefrom of anything evincing her desire to sever the employer-employee relationship. The letter instead presented her as a defenseless employee unjustly terminated for unknown reasons who had been made the subject of notices and flyers informing the public of her unexpected termination. It also depicted her as an employee meekly accepting her unexpected fate and requesting the payment of her backwages and accrued benefits just to be done with the employer.

For sure, to conclude that the petitioner resigned because of her letter of November 13, 2002 is absurd in light of the respondents having insisted that she had been terminated from her employment earlier on November 8, 2002. In that regard, every resignation presupposes the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there can be no valid resignation after the fact of termination of the employment simply because the employee had no employer-employee relationship to relinquish.

2. Lagahit did not breach her employer's trust; her dismissal was, therefore, illegal.

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to dismiss an employee for committing fraud, or for willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer. However, loss of confidence is never intended to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its employee. For this to be a valid ground for the termination of the employee, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the managerial employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Cashiers, auditors, and property custodians are some of the employees in the second class.

Petitioner's position as sales manager did not immediately make the petitioner a managerial employee. The actual work that she performed, not her job title, determined whether she was a managerial employee vested with trust and confidence. Her employment as sales manager was directly related with the sales of cargo forwarding services of Pacific Concord, and had nothing to do with the implementation of the management's rules and policies. As such, the position of sales manager came under the second class of employees vested with trust and confidence. Therein was the flaw in the CA's assailed decision. Although the mere existence of the basis for believing that the managerial employee breached the trust reposed by the employer would normally suffice to justify a dismissal, we should desist from applying this norm against the petitioner who was not a managerial employee.

At any rate, the employer must present clear and convincing proof of an actual breach of duty committed by the employee by establishing the facts and incidents upon which the loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest. The required amount of evidence for doing so is substantial proof. With these guidelines in mind, we cannot hold that the evidence submitted by the respondents (consisting of the three affidavits) sufficiently established the disloyalty of the petitioner. The affidavits did not show how she had betrayed her employer's trust. Specifically, the affidavit of Russell B. Noel only stated that she and her husband Roy had met over lunch with Garcia Imports and a certain Wilbur of Sea-Jet International Forwarder in the first week of November 2002. To conclude that such lunch caused Pacific Concord to lose its trust in the petitioner would be arbitrary.

In her affidavit, Jo Ann Otrera declared that the petitioner had called other forwarding companies to inquire about any vacant positions, and that the petitioner had enticed her to transfer to another company. However, such declarations did not provide the sufficient basis to warrant the respondents' loss of confidence in the petitioner.

Considering that the petitioner's duties related to the sales of forwarding services offered by Pacific Concord, her calling other forwarding companies to inquire for vacant positions did not breach the trust reposed in her as sales manager. Such act, being at worst a simple act of indiscretion, did not constitute the betrayal of trust that merited the extreme penalty of dismissal from employment. We remind that dismissal is a penalty of last resort, to be meted only after having appreciated and evaluated all the relevant circumstances with the goal of ensuring that the ground for dismissal was not only serious but true.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission rendered on December 15, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that the total monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full satisfaction; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc. Case Digest

Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc. 

G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

Facts:

From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.

However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an agreement whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.

Judgment of the RTC

At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings considering that the allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The Court, instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the Answer and the Reply, issues have been joined.

Judgment of the CA

On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent had admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

Ruling of the SC:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2, 2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines, and to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings by rendering the proper judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.