Winston F. Garcia vs.
Mario I. Molina
G.R. No. 165223.
January 11, 2016
Doctrines:
The fact that the charge
against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and
legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension
without legal basis.
Gloria vs. CA has
clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees
charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be
considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed
so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.
Facts:
For review is the
decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) nullified the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 by which the
petitioner, in his capacity as the President of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), had charged the respondent, an
Attorney V in the Litigation Department of the Legal Service Group of
the GSIS, with grave misconduct and preventively suspended him for 60
days.
In his affidavit, Elino
F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to
him on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True
supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous and
libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that
Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion came
to point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively
investigated for grave misconduct. After the investigation, the
Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated September 1, 2003
to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and
publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative
sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he
denied the imputed act.
Thereafter, the
petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally
charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively
suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt.
The respondent sought
the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and
requested the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body.
The respondent also instituted in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari to challenge the legality of the Memorandum dated
September 8, 2003.
On April 29, 2004, the
CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's
Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.
Hence, this appeal by
petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner argues
that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of the
GSIS to impose disciplinary action on the respondent, pursuant to
Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987; that the
characterization of the respondent's act as grave misconduct was not
arbitrary because the latter had intentionally passed on or caused
the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby transgressing "some
established and definite rule of action" that sufficiently
established a prima facie case for an administrative charge; that the
respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty to defend and assist
the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral or social duty"
to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation of the
letter. He submits that the respondent's preventive suspension was
done in accordance with the Civil Service Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on
record.
Issues:
- Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had sufficient basis to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct and impose preventive suspension as a consequence.
- Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is applicable.
Rulings:
1. To resolve
this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of handing
over the letter to Caretero constituted grave misconduct. The CA
concluded that the act of the respondent of handing over the letter
to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct because the act did
not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.
The Court concurs with
the CA.
Misconduct in office, by
uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his
performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects
his character as a private individual. To warrant removal from
office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration
or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties
of the office. Moreover, it is “a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer.” It becomes grave if it
“involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence.”
The record contains
nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The
passing of the letter to Caretero did not equate to any
"transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it
was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule
pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as
"circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was
handed only to a single individual who just happened to be curious
about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The
handing of the letter occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances
on board the elevator in which other employees or passengers were on
board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in
order to publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of
the letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero
categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent
what he had wanted to do with the letter, to wit: Do you want me
to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply
replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that
intent to cause the widespread dissemination of the letter in order
to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred.
To be sure, the
respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a
direct connection to the performance of his official duties as a
litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection was essential to a
finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct would
not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.
The fact that the
charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack
factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive
suspension without legal basis. The formal charge against the
respondent was for grave misconduct, an administrative offense that
justifies the imposition of the preventive suspension of the
respondent. Gloria has clarified that the preventive suspension of
civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service
Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are
ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the
employee concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive
suspension had legal basis, he was not entitled to backwages.
2. Anent the
petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his
administrative remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the option either
of filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive
suspension order by the disciplining authority, or of elevating the
preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service Commission
within 15 days from the receipt thereof.
We find and hold that
the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. His failure to file the motion for
reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain exceptional
circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Among the exceptional circumstances are the
following, namely: when the issue involved is purely a legal
question.
Considering that the
matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against
justified the filing of the formal charge for grave misconduct and
the imposition of preventive suspension pending investigation —
was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the
case not being in dispute. Hence, the respondent had no need to
exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing the motion for
reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the
Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated on April 29, 2004
and the resolution promulgated on September 6, 2004 insofar as the
Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge for grave misconduct
against respondent Mario I. Molina, but REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they nullified
the respondent's preventive suspension and awarded backwages to him
corresponding to the period of his preventive suspension; and MAKES
NO PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.
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