Case Doctrines in Civil Law I

CASE DOCTRINES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Compiled by Glenn Rey D. Anino
Juris Doctor
University of Cebu

Umali vs. Estanislao, 209 SCRA 446(1992)

Constitutional Law; Taxation; Statute; Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 which is after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya".—Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya."

Same; Same; Same; Same; The court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.—Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; These increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.—And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for shall be available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become effective. In other words, these exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, as aforestated, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO

Definition of waiver.––Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What rights and privileges may be waived.––As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: “x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. x x x Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.––We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL LICERA

Civil law; Stare Decisis; Court interpretation of law has also the effect of law.—Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees the judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

Constitutional law; Ex post facto law; New ruling disallowing special agents to carry firearms without permit does not apply to acts committed prior to promulgation of such ruling.—At the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule—the Court’s interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code—formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

ALBINO S. CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal.—“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,” according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided” declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.

Same; Same; Same; Prospectivity principle has been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars.—The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

Same; Same; Same; Principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions.—The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, “although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, ** (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, ‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.

Same; Same; Same; Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que vs. People xxx should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated.—It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)—i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22—should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Same; Same; Same; Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity.—This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as hereinabove set out and discussed, negativing criminal liability.

National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson

Civil law; Application of laws; Article 18 of Civil Code explained; Term "year" as used in our laws is limited to 365 days.—Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 80, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "'natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of 'express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of said Code, "whenever months are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "'natural," "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have." This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days."

Same; Same; Same; Article 18 defining "years" to mean 365 days is unrealistic; Remedy is not judicial legislation.—Although some justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code defining "years" to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy is not judicial legislation. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree. [National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson, 29 SCRA 70(1969)]

FEDERICO QUIZON and PROFITISA QUIZON vs. HON. JOSE L. BALTAZAR

Criminal law; Prescription; Statutory Construction; For purposes of determining whether or not a crime has prescribed pursuant to the provisions of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “month” shall be understood as a 30-day month and not a calendar month.—In the case of People vs. del Rosario, supra, which was properly brought to the attention of the court in petitioners’ motion to quash, this Court held very clearly that: x x x “The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of the month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that month shall be understood as containing 30 days; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that a month means the civil or calendar month and not the regular 30-day month (Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334). With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). This provision of the new Civil Code has been intended for general application in the interpretation of the laws. As the offense charged in the information in the case at bar took place on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil Code had come into effect, this new provision should apply, and in accordance therewith the month in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month.

Same; Certiorari; Appeal is not an adequate remedy where the facts show that the information filed against the accused is patently defective or the offense therein charged has already prescribed. In such a case the remedy of certiorari may be availed of.—As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari or prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust, for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. [Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 560(1977)

Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358, June 06, 1967

Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in the Philippines.

Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the same as our local conflicts rule.

Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeed—The decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.

Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article 16.—The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the second paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is governed by the decedent's national law.

Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.—Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congres has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate would be governed by law other than his national law is void.—A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article 16 of the New Civil Code.

Same; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen of Texas.—Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law. [Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358(1967)]

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 , August 25, 1989

Torts and Damages; Human Relations; Labor Law; Dismissal; The employer is liable for damages to the employee if the dismissal is done abusively.—The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107]. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Malicious Prosecution; The right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.—While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 587]. Hence, in Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia v. CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 536, the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

Same; Same; Same; Mere dismissal of a criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution in the absence of competent evidence showing bad faith on the part of complainant.—To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit, by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60].

Same; Same; Same; The fact that the 6 criminal cases were filed notwithstanding the police reports exculpating private respondent from the anomalies, and the eventual dismissal of all such criminal cases, lead to the conclusion that petitioner was motivated by malicious intent in filing the criminal cases.—In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

Same; Same; Quasi Delict; The principle of damnum absque injuria does not apply in the instant case considering the abusive manner in which petitioner exercised its right to dismiss private respondent, and the several other quasi-delictual acts committed by the former.—According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Award of exemplary damages is proper when the act performed is deliberate, malicious, and tainted with bad faith.—Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence,” the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. [Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778(1989)]

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 , April 29, 1988

Constitutional Law; Freedom of speech and of expression; Freedom includes freedom to film, produce and exhibit motion pictures in theaters and television.—Considering first petitioners’ claim to freedom of speech and of expression, the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information, education and entertainment.

Same; Same; Same; Freedom available to locally-owned and foreign-owned motion picture companies; Expectancy of yielding mone-tary profit in the production of motion pictures is not a disqualification for availing freedom of speech and expression.—This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. In our community as in many other coun-tries, media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in whole or in part to revenue producing activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression and only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.

Same; Same; Right of privacy; Right of privacy like right of free expression is not an absolute right; The right cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest.—The counter-balancing claim of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cort&s that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. It is left to caselaw, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or “the right to be let alone,” like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from “unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent’s right ofprivacy.—Whether the “balancing of interests test” or the “clear and present danger test” be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent’s “right of privacy.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No clear and present danger of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.—It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioner from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restraint of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” is one of public interest and concern and does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.—The subject matter of The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners’ argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical state in the history of this country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. “The Four Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent is a public figure: Definition of ‘a public figure.—At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a “public figure:” “A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public personage.’ He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” is one of public interest and concern and does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.—The subject matter of The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which led up to that d&nouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners’ argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical state in the history of this country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. “The Four Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent is a public figure: Definition of ‘a public figure.—At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a “public figure:” “A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public personage.’ He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of [Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861(1988)]

Mendoza vs. Alcala, 2 SCRA 1032 , August 29, 1961

Civil Action; When extinguished by extinction of criminal action.—Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. (Section 1, subsec. (d), Rule 107).

Same; Acquittal based on reasonable doubt; Effect on civil liability of accused.—Where the decision in the criminal case does not expressly declare that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist, nor state that acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, but it may be inferred from the test thereof that acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, the acquittal does not preclude a suit to enforce the civil liability arising from the same transaction., The conclusion that “the guilt of the defendant has not been satisfactorily established” is equivalent to one on reasonable doubt. (Philippine National Bank vs. Catipon, 52 O.G. 3589).

Same; Declaration amounting to reservation of civil action in favor of offended party.—Although the offended party did not reserve his right to file a separate civil action, the declaration in the decision in the criminal case that any obligation which defendant therein may have incurred in favor of the offended party is purely civil, amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party.

Same; Civil action that may be filed independently of criminal action.—Where the offense charged in the criminal action is estafa, which is fraud, the civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action. (Art. 33, New Civil Code; Dianeta vs. Makasiar, 55 O.G. 10273; People vs. Balagtas, 51 O.G. 5714). [Mendoza vs. Alcala, 2 SCRA 1032(1961)]

Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 , June 29, 1979

Res Judicata; Judgment; Requisites of the rule of prior judgment as a bar to a subsequent case.—Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action.

Same; Action; Quasi-delict; Damages; The owner of a car which was bumped by a jeep after the latter was bumped from behind by a truck may still file a civil action for damages against the truck driver and its owner even after the truck driver was adjudged guilty in the criminal case filed by the jeepney driver against said truck driver and the jeepney driver, in the case filed by the car owner was acquitted in the criminal case for negligence filed by the car owner against the jeepney driver. Reason: There is no identity of cause of action between the civil case in question and the criminal case against the truck driver for damage to the jeep.—It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no identity of case of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228”. And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 

Same; Same; Failure to make a reservation in the criminal action for negligence of the right to file an independent civil action does not bar the filing of the latter. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court cannot amend the substantive provision of Art. 31 of the Civil Code on quasidelict.—Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florido, said: “As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the Civil Action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.’ x x x”.

Same; Same; Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. No reservation need be made in the criminal case.—In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch articles for these articles were drafted x x x and are intended to conas Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the Civil Action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, “it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.”

Same; Same; Where the owner of a car hit by a jeep actively intervened in the prosecution of the criminal case against the jeepney driver-owner, an independent civil action will no longer lie after the latter’s acquittal where it is clear from the judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.—The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana, as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter’s civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.

Same; Same; Same.—Crystal clear is the trial court’s pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner’s car. In other words, “the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.” Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same.—And even if petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code. [Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113(1979)]

Republic vs. Bello, 120 SCRA 203 , January 27, 1983

Criminal Procedure; Public Officers; Action; Judgment; A judgment of acquittal on the ground that accused had no criminal intent and that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused does not bar a civil action for recovery of government funds disbursed without prior approval by the auditor.—Even insofar as the amount of P6,619.34 which constituted the subject-matter of the criminal charge of malversation is concerned, the acquittal of the private respondent in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of Civil Case No. V-3339. The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and not for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations.

Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 , May 31, 1984

Criminal Procedure; Damages; Civil liability is not extinguished where acquittal is based on reasonable doubt that accused is guilty of the crime charged.—The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed, p. 623).

Same; Same; Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages in the same case. No separate civil action is necessary.—There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. 

Same; Same; Same.—We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

Same; Same; While civil damages may be awarded in the criminal case despite acquittal, this rule does not preclude the filing of a separate civil action under certain circumstances.—A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

Maximo vs. Gerochi, Jr., 144 SCRA 326 , September 24, 1986

Criminal Law; Estafa, Acquittal; Rule that when the court acquit an accused on reasonable doubt payment of damages already proved in the same case may be ordered without need of a separate civil action.—If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment. The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action. This ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where the accused formally admitted the amount of civil damages.

Same; Same; Same; Rationale behind the rule.—The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows: There appears to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Absence of denial of respondent of her debts or obligations to the petitioner; Waiver by respondent of her defenses to the petition for failure to file her answer.—The private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. Her defense was directed only towards proving the fact that the checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, not that the obligation is non-existent or paid in full. We further note that the private respondent failed to submit her answer to this petition despite several notices from this Court. She has waived her defenses to the petition. In his answer, the trial judge justified his refusal to award civil liability with a statement that the civil liability did not arise from any criminal act but only from a civil contract connected to the crime. He stated in his denial of the motion for reconsideration that the action for civil liability must be filed in a “civil court.

Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 370 , September 14, 1999

Actions; Damages; Criminal Procedure; The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.—The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.

Negotiable Instruments Law; Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser.—We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that despite the conflicting versions of the parties, it is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by de Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The Negotiable Instruments Law clearly provides—Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous.—Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x x (f) Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x x

Same; Damages; Criminal Law; Estafa; An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant—she may be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.—The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.

Criminal Law; Damages; Rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is sufficient to sustain the award.—The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of the Civil Code, to wit: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party x x x x It is just and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? [Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 370(1999)]

Escueta vs. Fandialan, 61 SCRA 278 , November 29, 1974

Civil law; Actions; Prescription of Actions; Cause of action for damages on account of physical injuries accrues on date the injury was inflicted when the offended party reserves the right to institute the civil action separately from the criminal suit.—Here, plaintiffs (offended party) civil action for recovery of civil liability and damages from defendant (accused) would have been implicitly instituted with the criminal action, but plaintiff expressly reserved his right to institute the civil action separately, x x x Such separate and independent civil action under the cited codal article proceeds to trial and final judgment irrespective of the result of the criminal action. Manifestly, then, plaintiffs civil action for damages does not fall under that category of civil actions based upon a criminal offense which are suspended to await the outcome of the criminal case under Rule 111, section 3 of the Rules of Court. Being a case of physical injuries under Article 33 of the Civil Code, plaintiffs civil action for damages did not arise from nor depend upon the result of the criminal action but from defendant’s act of infliction of physical injuries. Hence, plaintiffs cause of action clearly accrued from July 2, 1952 the date that the physical injuries were inflicted on him. As of that date, he had the right to file and maintain his civil action for damages and the period of prescription started to run.

Same; Same; Judgments; Where offended party reserves the right to file a separate action for damages arising from physical injuries, the cause of action prescribes in four years, not ten years.—Plaintiffs civil suit for damages arising from physical injuries is clearly one based upon an injury to his rights, for which Article 1146(1) provides a prescriptive period of four years. Plaintiffs contention that his prescriptive period should be ten years based upon the judgment of defendant’s conviction for physical injuries in the criminal case is untenable. No civil liability was adjudged in the criminal case since plaintiff expressly reserved the right of filing a separate civil action. Hence, he had no standing in the criminal action as an offended party and the verdict of conviction excluded any civil liability. [Escueta vs. Fandialan, 61 SCRA 278(1974)]

Madeja vs. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 , December 21, 1983

Civil Law; Damages; Article 33 of the Civil Code; Civil action allowed to be instituted is ex-delicto.—The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex delicto, This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions ''criminal action" and "criminal prosecution."

Same; Same; Same; Physical injuries, scope of.—The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

Same; Same; Same; Corpus vs. Paje (28 SCRA 1062) holding that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code, not authoritative; Reason.—Corpus vs. Paje, L26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.

Same; Same; Same; Civil action for damages may proceed independently of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence.—ln the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.

Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674 , February 20, 1996

Criminal Procedure; Civil Liability; Requirement of Preservation; The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crime (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.—After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged,” as originally provided in Rule 111 before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.

Same; Same; Same; Civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action; Exceptions.—The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved; or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought must first be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure.—Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.

Same; Same; Same; It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action—not its institution through the filing of a complaint—which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case.—Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action—not its institution through the filing of a complaint—which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case.

Same; Same; Same; Reason for requiring reservation is to avoid the filing of more that one action for the same act or omission against the same party.—There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. 

Same; Same; Same; The rule requiring reservation serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission.—In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia, the injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latter’s subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

Same; Same; Same; Policy against double recovery requires that only one (1) action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer.—Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer “not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee” is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals this Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer constituted an express reservation of the right to institute it separately. [Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674(1996)]

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People, 329 SCRA 600 , April 03, 2000

Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; In negligence cases, the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto but the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.—In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, “the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto” either of which “may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.

Same; Same; Same; Vicarious liability of the employee is founded in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code and on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; Under Article 2176 the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee; Enforcement of the judgment against the employer does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.—Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law. The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.

Same; Same; Same; Reservation of the right to file the separate civil action waives other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver.—Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Same; Same; Same; Award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer.—With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, “civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed.” The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truckdriver.

Criminal Law; Information; Penalty; No offense of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law under the Revised Penal Code; In reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.—Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136).” There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused “to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum.” This is erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes. [Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People, 329 SCRA 600(2000)]

Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et al., 109 Phil. 155 , August 26, 1960

MARRIAGES, ANNULMENT OF; BIGAMY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION DEFINED AND ITS ELEMENTS.—Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; that is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 50 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4863). [Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et al., 109 Phil. 155(1960)].

SECOND MARRIAGE SHOULD HAVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE.—In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF INVALIDITY TO BE DECIDED IN CIVIL ACTION.—One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, known as the Marriage Law.) ' But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the elements of a marriage must first be secured.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTION DISTINCT' FROM ITSELF WHEN TRYING BIGAMY.—In this jurisdiction, where the courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court, when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage, is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.

Landicho vs. Relova, 22 SCRA 731 , February 23, 1968

Certiorari and prohibition; Prejudicial question; Action for annulment of marriage brought by the wife in the second marriage not a prejudicial question.—O n Februa ry 27, 1 963, tioner was charged with the offense of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Batangas at the instance of his first wife Elvira Makatangay on contracting a second marriage with Fe Pasia without first legally dissolving his first marriage with the complainant. On March 15, 1963, the second wife, Fe Pasia filed an annulment case of her marriage with petitioner on the ground of force, threats, and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. In the latter case, petitioner, on June 15, 1963, filed a third party complaint against the third-party defendant, Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his first marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void on the ground that by means of threats, force, and intimidation, the latter compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the justice of the peace of Makati, Rizal. On October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Lower court denied the motion for lack of merit. Held: The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on Feb. 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court, therefore, has not abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.