Case Doctrines in Legal Ethics (part II)

CASE DOCTRINES IN LEGAL ETHICS (part II)

Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino

Plus Builders, Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr., 501 SCRA 615 , September 13, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession; While lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected, nor should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse judicial processes.— Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession. Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath.

Attorneys; Unauthorized Practice of Law; A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law; Silence or failure of respondent to challenge the allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an admission of the truth of the accusation.—We agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to challenge the allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an admission of the truth of the accusation. We note that complainants successfully substantiated their claim that respondent, who held himself out as a law partner of the “KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates,” was rendering legal services together with persons not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it. Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus: “Canon 9—A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. ‘Rule 9.01—A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.’ ”

Same; Same; The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy—public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.—The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 434 SCRA 288 (2004) which we quote: “The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.”

Maligaya vs. Doronilla, Jr., 502 SCRA 1 , September 15, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.—There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality. To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state: CANON 10—A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court,” of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer’s duty to “never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

Same; Same; The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, cannot absolve him—if anything, it leads the Court to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts; There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true.—The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was “to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,” perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer’s duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.

Same; Same; Disbarment; The suspension referred to in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, means only suspension from the practice of law—it would be improper for the Court, as a penalty for a lawyer’s breach of legal ethics and the lawyer’s oath, his suspension from his employment in the Judge Advocate General’s Service.—Atty. Doronilla’s offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x. The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP’s recommendation for Atty. Doronilla’s suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla’s liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer’s oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General’s Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP’s recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.

Same; Same; Same; The absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.—At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP’s recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla’s suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway’s courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla’s first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.

Same; Same; Same; Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.—The unrepentant attitude of respondent lawyer throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court. [Maligaya vs. Doronilla, Jr., 502 SCRA 1(2006)]

Sebastian vs. Bajar, 532 SCRA 435 , September 07, 2007

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Words and Phrases; The term “noted” means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter—it does not imply agreement or approval.—As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which recommended respondent’s indefinite suspension. “The term ‘noted’ means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter—it does not imply agreement or approval.” Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139B provides: Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.—x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their own—they are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officer, and they involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance; Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings.—Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their own. They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officer. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence. “Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor—or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.” Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; A respondent-lawyer’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution—such conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility.—The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Court’s lawful orders in two instances: x x x These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders “not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.”

Same; Same; Same; Misconduct; Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes; A respondent-lawyer’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross misconduct.—Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. Respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as “any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause.” It is a “conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose.”

Same; Same; Same; Parties; The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases—in fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.”—The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.” “A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer.” In Heck v. Santos, the Court held that “any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law.—Respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v. Tiamson, 471 SCRA 129 (2005), the Court enunciated that “while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s rights, they should not forget that they are first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.” Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. “To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state—the administration of justice.”

Same; Same; Same; Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.—Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that “an important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Indeed, “while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice.” Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the proscription in Canon 19.

Same; Same; Same; While respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession, the Court will not, however, disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.—The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is consequently warranted. [Sebastian vs. Bajar, 532 SCRA 435(2007)]

Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342 , June 10, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Practice of law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience; To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.—In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Same; Same; Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.—Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Same; Same; The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.—The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

Same; Same; Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.—The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

Same; Same; It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-pledged lawyer; Fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.—True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342(2003)]

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 , January 30, 1971

This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents’ counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents’ counsel have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge’s decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge’s decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court’s decision, i.e., that “[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer’s right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer’s interest.”

Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court’s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal’s decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,” are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al (77 Phil. 1066) that “[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.” Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court’s decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.

Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents’ counsel there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court’s particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. [The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244(1971)]

Re: Request of (Ref) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Recomputation of His Creditable Service for the Purpose of Recomputing His Retirement Benefits, 690 SCRA 242 , February 12, 2013

Administrative Law; Judges; Retirement; The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement claims of judges and justices.―The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of disability or death while in actual service or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal counselling work for a government body or institution as creditable government service.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 910; Under the beneficient provisions of Rep. Act 910, as amended, a Justice who reaches age 70 is entitled to full retirement benefits with no length of service required.―The generous extent of the Court’s liberality in granting retirement benefits is obvious in Re: Justice Efren I. Plana: It may also be stressed that under the beneficient provisions of Rep. Act 910, as amended, a Justice who reaches age 70 is entitled to full retirement benefits with no length of service required. Thus, a 69 year old lawyer appointed to the bench will get full retirement benefits for the rest of his life upon reaching age 70, even if he served in the government for only one year. Justice Plana served the government with distinction for 33 years, 5 months, and 11 days, more than 5 years of which were served as a Justice of the Court of Appeals of this Court.

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO VS. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAYO 31 SCRA 562 , February 18, 1970

Same; Legal ethics; Criticism of courts and judges.—A lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, may criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the act of courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Same; Same; Same; Acts as lawyer and citizen.—In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the lawyer to disciplinary action.

Same; Same; Same; Post-litigation utterances and publications of lawyer critical of courts may be the basis of disciplinary action.—Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Same; Special civil action; Contempt; Termination of case is no defense.—The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People Vo Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265, the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59, a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expresed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. More than this however, is the fact that the pendency or non-pendency of a proceeding is immaterial in a disciplinary action against a lawyer as an officer of the court and to preserve the purity of the legal profession.

Same; Legal ethics; Disciplinary proceedings; Nature; Supreme Court does not sit as judge, prosecutor and investigator in administrative proceeding against lawyers.—Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the ltgal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Same; Same; Same; Indefinite suspension may be ordered.—Where the demonstrated persistence of the misconduct of the lawyer leaves the court unable to assess or determine how long that suspension should last and that disbarment should not be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, the erring lawyer was merely suspended indefinitely. In such a case at any time after the suspension becomes effective, the lawyer may prove to the Court that’he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

Asean Pacific Planners vs. City of Urdaneta, 566 SCRA 219 , September 23, 2008

Same; Local Government Units; Attorneys; The city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party, but where the position is as yet vacant, the City Prosecutor remains the city’s legal adviser and officer for civil cases.—Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 34 (1997), we cited that under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185, city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter was enacted way back in 1998. Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor’s appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the city’s legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the city’s Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the city’s pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was raised against the City Prosecutor’s actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.

Same; Same; Same; A local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers.—The appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers. Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.

Same; Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their pleadings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.—Notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a “court of technicalities” for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, “an incompetent judge.” In explaining the “concededly strong language,” Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the case shows its “impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity” and such dismissal “smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court.” Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,000 each payable to this Court within ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial officers; abstain from offensive language before the courts; and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record. Similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Vda. de Espino vs. Presquito, 432 SCRA 609 , June 28, 2004

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A respondent lawyer’s failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, especially in light of the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed to prepare his evidence.—From the termination of complainant’s presentation of evidence on December 1998 until Commissioner Dulay’s report on November 12, 2002, the records show that respondent was unable to present evidence—either testimonial or documentary—to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondent’s own statements—which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations—fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or for clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than his own allegations. Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, especially in the light of the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare his evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December 14, 1998. Two years—five resettings, and three orders submitting the case for resolution—later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary evidence.

Same; Same; Gross Misconduct; Bouncing Checks; The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar.—It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel, that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. He not only sets himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.—It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x x x x x x x Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. [Vda. de Espino vs. Presquito, 432 SCRA 609(2004)]

Angeles vs. Gutierrez, 668 SCRA 803 , March 21, 2012

Attorneys; Practice of Law; Respondent’s isolated act of filing a pleading did not necessarily constitute private practice of law.—The Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not engaged in private practice when he filed two Petitions for the reopening of the child abuse cases against petitioner on the ground that respondent was acting in his capacity as the investigating prosecutor of the said cases. Again, this Court takes judicial notice of the CA’s finding in G.R. No. 187596, adverted to earlier, that respondent’s isolated act of filing a pleading did not necessarily constitute private practice of law. We have, in fact, said so in Maderada v. Mediodea, 413 SCRA 313 (2003), citing People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 (1965): Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: “Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.

Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from filing multiple actions arising from the same cause and from misusing court process.—Considering that petitioner as judge and respondent as prosecutor should have been well-cognizant of our clogged court dockets and should have thus exercised more restraint in filing cases against each other. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from filing multiple actions arising from the same cause and from misusing court process. Judging from the number of cases and the vengeful tone of the charges that the parties have hurled against each other in their pleadings, they seem more bent on settling what has become a personal score between them, rather than on achieving the ends of justice. [Angeles vs. Gutierrez, 668 SCRA 803(2012)]

Vaflor-Fabroa vs. Paguinto, 615 SCRA 223 , March 15, 2010

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid or consent to the same.—When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall “not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same.”

Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Respondent violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall not, often obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.”—When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that “A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.” [Vaflor-Fabroa vs. Paguinto, 615 SCRA 223(2010)]

Bugaring vs. Español, 349 SCRA 687 , January 19, 2001

Courts; Contempt; The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice; Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, and can be punished summarily without hearing.—Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court’s system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent Judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defen himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.

Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s cause—he should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.—Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client—by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge’s contrary order—he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. The Court of Appeals aptly stated: But “a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s cause” (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid.).

Same; Same; Same; Same; A judge errs if, in citing a person in direct contempt of court, she imposes a fine which exceeds the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995.—Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended. [Bugaring vs. Español, 349 SCRA 687(2001)]

Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 25 SCRA 700 , October 29, 1968

Constitutional law; Due process; Acts showing no denial of.—Petitioner alleges that it was not officially furnished a copy of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission since the same was not delivered to its counsel but to another and hence it was denied due process to be heard. In the reply-memorandum of the Workmen's Compensation Commission it was shown that a copy of the decision was furnished to petitioners counsel but its counsel refused to received the same and instead instructed the server to deliver the same to another counsel. In view of the instruction the server proceeded to the law office of the named counsel where the said decision was received by a clerk of the said office, evidenced by a stamp pad bearing its name. Held: Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied the constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such ef f ort f ailed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. There is no reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there were no such misinformation, if there was no such attempt to mislead.

Malonso vs. Principe, 447 SCRA 1, December 16, 2004

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Requisites before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).—It is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigator’s report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote. Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Board’s resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01-848) is void and has no effect.

Same; Same; While the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered.—With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. It is but natural that he protect his interest, most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.

Same; Same; Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law; Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case.—The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party. [Malonso vs. Principe, 447 SCRA 1(2004)]

Sambajon vs. Suing, 503 SCRA 1 , September 26, 2006

Attorneys; A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar—by doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.—A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.

Same; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; Diligence is the “attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions.—Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client. The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x

Commission on Bar Discipline; While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.—As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.

Attorneys; Misconduct; In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. (478 SCRA 443 [2005]), the lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempt to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP—nonetheless, this court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him “the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.” While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This court finds that respondent’s suspension from the practice of law is in order—In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 478 SCRA 443 (2005), the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him “the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.” While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order. [Sambajon vs. Suing, 503 SCRA 1(2006)]

National Bank vs. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil., 337, October 21, 1932

Attorney and Client; Attorney as Witness.—Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm: Legal Ethics, p. 148.)

Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 , September 30, 1987

Courts; Supreme Court cannot be pressured to act one way or the other in any case pending before it; Apologies of respondents accepted—We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

Same; Same; Courts and juries immune from every extraneous influence.—The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.''

Same; Same; Same; Abuse of rights of free speech and of assembly not within the ambit of constitutional protection; Counsel of record and all members of the legal profession are reminded to apprise their clients on matters of docorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice—We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program f or their members. [Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542(1987)]

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada, 360 SCRA 248 , June 29, 2001

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It must also be conceded that “television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.”—Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness; of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that “television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.” Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Public Trial; An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.—An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Mauricio, Jr., 593 SCRA 367 , July 22, 2009

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; It is necessary for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.—The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest—to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

Same; Same; A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.—The respondent lawyer also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”

Same; Same; While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language—language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.—Respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz.: “CANON 8—A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01—A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,”—by using intemperate language. Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong, 551 SCRA 359 (2008): “To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.”

Maglasang vs. People, 190 SCRA 306 , October 04, 1990

Lawyers; Legal Ethics; A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.—It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo."

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Contempt of Court; Criticisms towards the Court should be bona fide, and should not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.—To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts."

Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court is supreme—no other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust", not even the President of the Philippines.—We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system—the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches—has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme—the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. [Maglasang vs. People, 190 SCRA 306(1990)]

Francisco vs. Portugal, 484 SCRA 571 , March 14, 2006

Administrative Law; Attorneys; In a criminal case, the lawyer for the accused has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused.—In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty.

Same; Same; It is the counsel, not his client, who has the duty to file the Notice of Withdrawal.—Respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondent’s withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondent’s naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; A client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause.—The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.

Same; Same; The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.—Even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.

Same; Same; Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter.—The Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: “the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the ‘salvage’ of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.” Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that “salvaged” the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so. [Francisco vs. Portugal, 484 SCRA 571(2006)]

People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106, February 27, 1969

Attorneys; Counsel de officio; Lawyer is bound to exert effort in behalf of indigent client.—The Supreme Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned “to render the required service”, A lawyer so appointed “as counsel for an indigent prisoner”, our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, “should always exert his best efforts” in the indigent’s behalf.

Same; Same; Lawyer must observe and maintain due respect.—An attorney’s duty of prime importance is “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers”. The f irst Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer “to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance”. By his oath of office, the lawyer undertook to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities”. [People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106(1969)]

Perez vs. De la Torre, 485 SCRA 547 , March 30, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.—There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.

Same; Same; Same; The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste—it behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.—The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [Perez vs. De la Torre, 485 SCRA 547(2006)]

Canoy vs. Ortiz, 453 SCRA 410 , March 16, 2005

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income litigants; The efforts of private practitioners who assist in the goal of providing legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers are especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward; The problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of non-representation.—The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the Public Attorney’s Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward. Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortiz’s legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latter’s illegal dismissal case leaves much to be desired.

Same; Same; Same; Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.—Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

Same; Same; Same; The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended.—If indeed Atty. Ortiz’s schedule, work load, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended.

Same; Same; Labor Law; That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing the complainant to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of his counsel, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.—There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided. That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.

Same; Same; The Court is not mollified by the circumstance of respondent-lawyer’s election as a City Councilor, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior.—Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz’s election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office. Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, and in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated. However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case. In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services. Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.

Same; Same; The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprimand considering that respondent-lawyer’s undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform his client of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.—The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases. Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz’s undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

Same; Same; Pauper Litigants; It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation—they deserve quality representation as well.—Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well.

Lim, Jr. vs. Villarosa, 490 SCRA 494 , June 15, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta.—Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP.

Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Interests; It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client, otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible.—Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides: Rule 15.03—A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner: There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.

Same; Same; Same; The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used—the rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases.—The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy. (emphasis ours) The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties’ connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.

Same; Same; Withdrawal of Appearance; The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted—an attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.—The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows: The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer. Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads: Canon 22—A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a “mere scrap of paper.” Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Lien; Retainer Lien; The right of an attorney to retain possession of a client’s documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.—The records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a client’s documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established. [Lim, Jr. vs. Villarosa, 490 SCRA 494(2006)]

Hornilla vs. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 , July 01, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties; Test to determine conflict of interest.—There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them.—In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate officials. The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.—In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled “Philippine Public School Teacher’s Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School Teacher’s Assn. (PPSTA), et al.,” was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.

Gonzales vs. Cabucana, Jr., 479 SCRA 320 , January 23, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interest; It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts; One test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.—It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.

Same; Same; Same; The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action; The representation of opposing clients, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interest or, at the very least, invites suspicion of doubledealing which the Court cannot allow.—As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba, the proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.

Same; Same; Same; When the same law firm handles the civil case of the present client and a prospective client, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.—Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies. As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David: . . . [W]e . . . can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondent’s conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, “into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.” The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.

Same; Same; Same; While there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation, they cannot be made to labor under the conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.—In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one. Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses’ case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.

Same; Same; Disciplinary Actions; Affidavits of Desistance; The Court’s exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession.—We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such desistance as the present case involves public interest. Indeed, the Court’s exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession.

Same; Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; The Court considers as mitigating circumstance the fact that the lawyer represented the other client pro bono and it was his firm and not he personally that handled the case of the adverse party.—We shall consider however as mitigating circumstance the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only with his name, without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondent’s acceptance of the Gatchecos’ cases as shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.

Rollon vs. Naraval, 452 SCRA 675 , March 04, 2005

Attorneys; Duties; Once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.—Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.

Same; Same; Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.—Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.

Same; Same; Practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle.—Practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyer’s oath.

Same; Same; Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers.—Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible. The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to “observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.”

Same; Same; Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client’s money and property that may come into their possession.—Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client’s money and property that may come into their possession. As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given—as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office—was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him. His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

Same; Same; The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts, but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.—The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts, but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession.

Yu vs. Bondal, 448 SCRA 273 , January 17, 2005

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Attorneys Fees; An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is not an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation.—If, admittedly, the only payment given to complainant by respondent is the amount of P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or “magicians” who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause.

Same; Same; Respondent obliged under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his successor.—Since respondent had been advised by complainant through counsel Chavez Laureta and Associates, by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his services, as of said date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, x x x to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his successor.

Reddi vs. Sebrio, Jr., 577 SCRA 175 , January 30, 2009

Legal Ethics; When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him, he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.—Respondent’s culpability is further highlighted by his utter lack of regard for the seriousness of the charges against him. His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. This, respondent miserably failed to do.

Same; Disbarment; The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.—The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. [Reddi vs. Sebrio, Jr., 577 SCRA 175(2009)]

Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol vs. Florido, 621 SCRA 182 , June 18, 2010

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law—he must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.—The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is the lawyer’s duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.

Same; Same; Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.—A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. [Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol vs. Florido, 621 SCRA 182(2010)]

Gamilla vs. Mariño, Jr., 399 SCRA 308, March 20, 2003

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; Conflict of Interests; Labor Law; A lawyer failed to avoid conflict of interests where he negotiated for a compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney, and interested party, being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorney’s fees without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the union; The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is “whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.”—In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr. in the manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney’s fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of agreements with the management of UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mariño failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorney’s fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union. As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is “whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.” In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the client’s consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments.—Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the client’s consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; In regard to the receipt of attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,200,000.00 by the union president who also acted as counsel, the record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation his legal services and his tasks as union president comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union—indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorney’s fees by spelling out the terms and bases for the claim of P4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as president of the union should have otherwise covered his legal services as well.—Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in respondent’s dual role as lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union when he obtained P4,200,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Without ruling on the validity of the collection of attorney’s fees so as not to preempt the decision in G.R. No. 149763 on this issue, the record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks as union president comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. The situation of Atty. Mariño is not any different from that of an executor or administrator of an estate who may not charge against the estate any professional fee for legal services rendered by him because his efforts as such are already paid for in his capacity as executor or administrator. Indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorney’s fees by spelling out the terms and bases for the claim of P4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as president of the union should have otherwise covered his legal services as well.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest.—Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise agreement or demanding the inexplicable attorney’s fees, his actions were not transparent enough to allow the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely and intelligently. Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer to “observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.” Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest. As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics—a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyer’s vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.

Same; Same; Same; Restorative justice not retribution is the goal in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers.—We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action in accordance with our ruling in Sumangil v. Sta. Romana. Hence, Atty. Mariño is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client. [Gamilla vs. Mariño, Jr., 399 SCRA 308(2003)]

Salomon, Jr. vs. Frial, 565 SCRA 10 , September 12, 2008

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Grave Misconduct; Attachments; A writ of Attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached property, thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party; Money or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.—A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached property, thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. When the objects of the attachment are destroyed, then the attached properties would necessarily be of no value and the attachment would be for naught. From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics that states: 11. Dealing with trust property. The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; For his negligence and unauthorized possession of attached cars, respondent lawyer is guilty of infidelity in the custody of said cars and grave misconduct.—A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the court’s order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued. Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority. For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, we find Atty. Frial guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without legal recourse in recovering the Volvo’s value from Atty. Frial should they desire to do so.

Same; Same; Disbarment; The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar—disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired.—The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. With the view we take of the case, there is no compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended to pervert the administration of justice for some dishonest purpose. Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accom­plish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person. In the case of Atty. Frial, the Court finds that a year’s suspension from the practice of his legal profession will provide him with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct. [Salomon, Jr. vs. Frial, 565 SCRA 10(2008)]

Almendarez, Jr. vs. Langit, 496 SCRA 402 , July 25, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Attorney’s Lien; A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney’s fees.—Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court’s approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney’s fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money.

Same; Same; Contempt; A lawyer’s failure to turn over the money to his client despite the latter’s demands gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit, a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the legal profession, and which also renders the lawyer liable for contempt.—Respondent’s failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter’s demands gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the legal profession. More specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for violating the Code but also for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client’s funds; contempt.—When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Same; Same; The unjustified refusal of a lawyer to heed the orders of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference, exhibits a blatant disrespect for authority—a lawyer expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes.—The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.

Same; Same; Whenever a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, the Supreme Court has the right and duty to withdraw his privilege as officer of the Court and member of the Bar.—The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. Respondent miserably failed in this regard. Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and devotion required by the legal profession from its members. Whenever a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, this Court has the right and duty to withdraw his privilege as officer of the Court and member of the Bar. [Almendarez, Jr. vs. Langit, 496 SCRA 402(2006)]

ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR., respondent, 436 scra 149

Legal Profession; Attorneys; Disbarment; Advising clients to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, the lawyer violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law—what intended to, as defrauding not a private party but the government is aggravating.—By advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Same; Same; Same; When respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.—When respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.

Cerdan vs. Gomez, 668 SCRA 394 , March 19, 2012

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.—A lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and it requires a high standard of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness, and good faith. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.

Same; Same; Same; The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.—The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Section 16, provides: CANON 16—A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 —A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. x x x x The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his client.

Same; Same; Same; Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.—Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.

Same; Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years and even disbarment depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyer’s misconduct.—The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years and even disbarment depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyer’s misconduct. Considering that this is Atty. Gomez’s first offense, the penalty of suspension for one (1) year is a sufficient sanction.

Hernandez vs. Go, 450 SCRA 1 , January 31, 2005

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Code of Professional Responsibility; Gross Misconduct; The Code of Professional Responsibility is the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction; The act of a lawyer in acquiring for himself the lots of his client which were entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.—Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides: “A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainant’s lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Court’s mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.

Same; Same; Same; Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.—Respondent’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession.

Same; Same; Same; It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law—its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.—Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects his client’s cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct in office.—Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession; Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, he deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.—Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. [Hernandez vs. Go, 450 SCRA 1(2005)]

Tarog vs. Ricafort, 645 SCRA 320 , March 15, 2011

Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.—Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz.: Rule 16.01—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with the legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received from or held by him for them.

Same; Same; A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.—Rule 16.02—A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Atty. Ricafort’s act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. [Tarog vs. Ricafort, 645 SCRA 320(2011)]

Busiños vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 , December 22, 1997

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Dishonesty; It cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.— Respondent’s transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.

Same; Same; Same; By swearing the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice—a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.—This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier (A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-13), reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C. No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court declared: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer’s oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice—a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; Lawyer disbarred for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof.—WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. [Busiños vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407(1997)]

Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 , April 10, 1989

Legal Ethics; Lawyers; Atty. Robinol is guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct for having retained in his possession his clients’ funds intended for a specific purpose.—Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter’s funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients’ money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients’ funds intended for a specific purpose—the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; For having violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients, Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law.—Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.

Same; Same; It is the prerogative of clients to change their counsel in a pending case at any time, and thereafter to employ another lawyer.—There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative.

Attorney’s Fees; Quantum Meruit; The principle of quantum meruit does not apply in the instant case there being an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation.—The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum meruit, therefore, is inapplicable. [Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768(1989)]

Barnachea vs. Quiocho, 399 SCRA 1 , March 11, 2003

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; An attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.—Respondent’s claim that complainant did not retain his legal services flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

Same; Same; Same; Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer for title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor.—A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyer’s failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

Same; Same; Same; The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character—he is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.—The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him.

Rubias vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120 , May 29, 1973

Sales; Prohibition against purchase by lawyer of property in litigation from his client; Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code construed.—Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; (5) judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others specially disqualified by law.

Same; Prohibited purchase void and produces no legal effect.—Castan's rationale for his conclusion that fundamental considerations of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchases (e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines) has been adopted in a new article of the Civil Code of the Philippines, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning."

Same; Nullity of such prohibited contracts cannot be cured by ratification.—The nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification.

Same; Nullity of such prohibited contracts differentiated from the nullity of contracts of purchase by the guardians, agents and administrators.—The permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions, its has been opined, may be "ratified" by means of and "in the form of a new contract, in which case its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time of execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract. [Rubias vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120(1973)]

Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246 , December 18, 1989

Legal Ethics; Attorneys: Duty of attorney to his client.—”Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client.”

Same; Same; Same; Poor preparation and writing of pleadings for his client; Lawyer milked the complainant dry.—This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. Having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently, respondent was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to “buy” the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s failure to exercise due diligence or abandonment of client’s cause renders him unworthy of the trust of his client.—When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client’s cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics. The court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client’s interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.

Same; Same; Same; Complainant suffered by losing all her cases due to the lawyer’s gross negligence.—His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. More so in this case, where by reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby suffered by losing all her cases.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney displayed lack of good faith as an advocate by his filing a civil case although he had already filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and failure to appear for complainant in said case.—The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had already filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good faith as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the complainant in said case. It was all a show to get more money from her. This adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with this evident irregularity, he lamely stated that while he did not physically appear for complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted the pleadings.

Same; Same; Same; Amount of P10,000.00 allegedly given to lawyer as fee for his services is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered.—The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was given to him as fee for his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered. And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court.

Same; Same; Same; Role of lawyers; Conduct to be displayed by lawyers.—Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one’s oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative. Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

Same; Same; Lawyer suspended from practice of law for indefinite period.—After considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law. [Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246(1989)]

Edquibal vs. Ferrer, Jr., 450 SCRA 406 , February 03, 2005

Administrative Law; Attorneys; The lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence; There is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.— It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.

Same; Same; Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence; It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.—Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.

Same; Same; Practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights; All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias.—The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights.” All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondent’s failure to attend to his client’s appeal is clearly wanting.

Same; Same; An attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence.—In People v. Cawili, we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr. characterized a lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals, we held that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban reiterated Ford v. Daitol and In re: Santiago F. Marcos in holding that an attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence. [Edquibal vs. Ferrer, Jr., 450 SCRA 406(2005)]

De Juan vs. Baria III, 429 SCRA 187, May 27, 2004

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory; A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.—No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the client. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

Same; Same; Negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable.—Again, the Court held in the case of Santos v. Lazaro, that “Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable.”

Same; Same; An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.—Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. Respondent did not comply with these obligations. [De Juan vs. Baria III, 429 SCRA 187(2004)]

Fernandez vs. Novero, Jr., 393 SCRA 240, December 02, 2002

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance would be binding on his client.—As this Court has held: A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights.—But respondent should bear in mind that while a lawyer owes utmost zeal and devotion to the interest of his client, he also has the responsibility of employing only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and he should not allow the latter to dictate the procedure in handling the case. As this Court said in another case: A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his client’s cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.

Attorneys; Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys; Unverified Letter-complaint.—As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, §1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint. “The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct—the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.” [Fernandez vs. Novero, Jr., 393 SCRA 240(2002)]

                                     Barbuco vs. Beltran, 436 SCRA 57 , August 11, 2004

Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of forty-three (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.—An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY-THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

Same; Same; The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer; As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him, or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.—The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of the Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.

Same; Same; Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free; The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.—Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

Endaya vs. Oca, 410 SCRA 244, September 03, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; From the lawyer’s oath springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action; The oath requires a lawyer to conduct himself “to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.”—The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action. Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself “to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.” This duty is further stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that “(A) lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.”

Same; Same; A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.—Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a client’s case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals, thus: It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.

Same; Same; Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.—Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas, “every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts if for a fee or for free.” In other words, whatever the lawyer’s reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.

Same; Same; Lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service.—On top of all these is respondent’s employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorney’s Office which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Against this backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig “lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service.” Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that “the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of official tasks.”

Dalisay vs. Mauricio, Jr., 456 SCRA 508 , April 22, 2005

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Attorney-Client Relationship; When a lawyer accepts the professional fee from the client, it is understood that he agrees to take up the latter’s case and that an attorney-client relationship between them is established.—When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latter’s case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. However, there is nothing in the records to show that respondent entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services.

Same; Same; Same; A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights—verily, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights.—A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to protect his client’s case, for his unwavering loyalty to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Indeed, the entrusted privilege of every lawyer to practice law carries with it his corresponding duties, not only to his client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. In Santos vs. Lazaro, we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-quoted, is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Verily, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; While, just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services, he should charge only a reasonable amount, however—charging P56,000.00 is improper where the lawyer did not take any step to assist his client.—Respondent insists that he is entitled to attorney’s fees since he gave legal advice and opinions to complainant on her problems and those of her family. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees. Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.” There is, however, no hard and fast rule which will serve as guide in determining what is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts of each case. The power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of a lawyer’s fee is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the Court. It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant in her case, charging P56,000.00 is improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant’s problems and those of her family constitutes legal service, however, the attorney’s fee must be reasonable. Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant. [Dalisay vs. Mauricio, Jr., 456 SCRA 508(2005)]

Ruiz vs. Delos Santos, 577 SCRA 29 , January 27, 2009

Same; Same; Since the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the perfection of appeal, the counsel of petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of court of the acceptance of the late payment of docket fees—as an officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the clerk of court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the rules.—It bears stressing that the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the perfection of appeal. The counsel of petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of court of the acceptance of the late payment of docket fees. As an officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the clerk of court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the rules. The rules of procedure are meant to be followed and not to be subjected to the whims and convenience of the parties and their counsels or by mere opinions of the clerk of court. Atty. Ang should not have presumed that the rules of procedure would be relaxed in favor of his clients. His reliance on jurisprudence that the application of the technical rules of procedure would be relaxed if the same was subsequently complied with is not justified. The liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice. Atty. Ang’s negligence in not paying the docket fees on time cannot be considered as excusable. The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules.

Same; Attorneys; It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.—The failure of petitioners’ counsel to perfect the appeal binds petitioners. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. While, exceptionally, the client may be excused from the failure of counsel, the factual circumstances in the present case do not give us sufficient reason to suspend the rules of the most mandatory character. Petitioners themselves may not be said to be entirely faultless.

Same; Same; No prudent party would leave the fate of his case completely to his lawyer—it is the duty of the client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case.—Atty. Ang, petitioners’ counsel, claims that as soon as he received the decision, he sent copies to petitioners. Records show that at that time, while some of the petitioners were already abroad, Dominga and Tomasa were still living in Cavite. Cornelia who lives abroad was able to receive a copy of the decision and was able to make an overseas call to Atty. Ang to express her desire to appeal the decision. However, neither Dominga nor Tomasa who only live in Cavite, took steps to call Atty. Ang at the earliest possible time to protect their interest. No prudent party would leave the fate of his case completely to his lawyer. It is the duty of the client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. Thus, we find that there was participatory negligence on the part of petitioners, which would not relieve them of the consequence of the negligence of their counsel. [Ruiz vs. Delos Santos, 577 SCRA 29(2009)]