CASE
DOCTRINES IN LABOR LAW REVIEW
Compiled
by Glenn Rey D. Anino
Juris
Doctor
University
of Cebu
Labadan
vs. Forest Hills Academy, 575 SCRA 262 , December 23, 2008
Labor
Law; Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; While in cases of illegal
dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.—While
in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of
proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
dismissal. The records do not show that petitioner was dismissed from
the service. They in fact show that despite petitioner’s absence
from July 2001 to March 2002 which, by her own admission, exceeded
her approved leave, she was still considered a member of the Forest
Hills faculty which retained her in its payroll.
Same;
Labor Standards; Holiday Pay; The provision that a worker is entitled
to twice his regular rate if he is required to work on a holiday
implies that the provision entitling a worker to his regular rate on
holidays applies even if he does not work.—Respecting
petitioner’s claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills contends that
petitioner failed to prove that she actually worked during specific
holidays. Article 94 of the Labor Code provides, however, that (a)
Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly
employing less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an
employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a
compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate[.] The provision
that a worker is entitled to twice his regular rate if he is required
to work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to
his [Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy, 575 SCRA 262(2008)]
People
vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 664, July 11, 1986
Labor;
Recruitment and placement; Interpretation; Article 13(b) of P.D. 442,
interpreted; Presumption that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever two or more persons are involved;
Number of persons, not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers.—As
we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on
the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to
create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or
entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is
dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee,
an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the
“canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring (of) workers.” The number of persons dealt with
is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in
Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only
one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a
rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers,
the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be
engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words “shall
be deemed” create that presumption.
Same;
Same; Same; Same; Words “shall be deemed” in Art. 13(b) of P.D.
442, meaning of.—In
the instant case, the word “shall be deemed” should by the same
token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima
facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
C.F.
Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol, Jr., 533 SCRA 424 ,
September 14, 2007
Labor
Law; Labor Code, Judgment; Appeals; A judgment debtor who acquiesces
of and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking
an appeal therefrom.
Same;
Same; Illegal Recruitment; Definition of Recruitment and Placement;
The conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment
activity.—Article
13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as: any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the
basis of this definition—and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to
portray—the conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment
activity.
Same;
Same; Same; It is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not
the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity of LCL
unlawful.—The
fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the
interviews is of no moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the
act of recruitment may be “for profit or not.” Notably, it is the
lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment,
that renders the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.
Same;
Appeals; Due Process; The essence of due process lies in the
reasonable opportunity afforded a party to be heard and to submit any
evidence in support of its defense; What
is vital is not the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness,
but an opportunity to be heard.—The claim of denial of due process
on the part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity afforded a party to be
heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense. What is
vital is not the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, but
an opportunity to be heard. In this case, C.F. Sharp was given ample
opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence in support of its version
of the material occurrences, and to controvert Rizal’s allegation
and the Inspection Report. It submitted its position paper with
supporting affidavits and documents, and additionally pleaded its
causes on appeal before the Secretary of Labor. Under the
circumstances, a claim of denial of due process on C.F. Sharp’s
part is completely unavailing.
Same;
Same; Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor
officials’ findings rest.—C.F.
Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual veracity and probative
value of the evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp
may well be reminded that it is not our function to review, examine,
and evaluate or weigh the evidence adduced by the parties. Elementary
is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial
review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials’
findings rest. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor
tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the
same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this
Court. It is only when the findings of the labor agencies and the
appellate court are in conflict that this Court will review the
records to determine which findings should be upheld as being more in
conformity with the evidentiary facts. Where the CA affirms the labor
agencies on review and there is no showing whatsoever that said
findings are patently erroneous, this Court is bound by the said
findings. [C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol, Jr., 533
SCRA 424(2007)]
Santiago
vs. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., 527 SCRA 165 , July 10, 2007
Labor
Law; Employer-Employee Relationships; Seafarers; Considering that
petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the
point of hire, the employment contract
did not commence and no employer-employee relationship was created
between the parties.—There is no question that the parties entered
into an employment contract on 3 February 1998, whereby petitioner
was contracted by respondent to render services on board “MSV
Seaspread” for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for nine
(9) months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy
petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that
petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the
point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no
employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.
Same;
Same; Distinction must be made between the perfection of the
employment contract and the commencement of the employer employee
relationship; Even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment
contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach
of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring
party.—A
distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment
contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship.
The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the
date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms
and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had
petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even
before the start of any employer-employee relationship,
contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was
the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may
give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the
reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be
deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Same;
Same; Seafarers; Neither the manning agent nor the employer can
simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason;
Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to
deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he
suffered.—While
the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither
the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from
being deployed without a valid reason. Respondent’s act of
preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding
“MSV Seaspread” constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to
petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and
unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must
therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules are silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same.—We take exception to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules are silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.
Same;
Same; Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint.—Despite
the absence of an employer employee relationship between petitioner
and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over
petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not
limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:
Sec.10.Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied] Since
the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by
petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the
labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Same;
Same; Seafarers; Respondent liable to pay petitioner actual damages
in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as
provided in the contract, petitioner is not entitled to overtime
pay.—Respondent
is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the
loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as provided in the
contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the
contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that
he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he rendered
overtime work. Even though petitioner was “prevented without valid
reason from rendering regular much less overtime service,” the fact
remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform
overtime work had he been allowed to board the vessel. The amount of
US$286.00 stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when
the employee rendered overtime work. This has been the tenor of our
rulings in the case of Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 258 SCRA 643 (1996), where we
discussed the matter in this light: The contract provision means that
the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the
overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply
stated, the rendition of overtime. work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions
to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay
which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly
salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to
overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be
established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of
his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular
eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay
for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his
personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely
unfair and unreasonable.
Same;
Same; Attorney’s Fees; Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner
is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the
suit below; Award of attorney’s fees is thus warranted.—The
Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in
the concept of damages and expenses of litigation. Attorney’s fees
are recoverable when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest. We note that
respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that
he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is
based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were
not even confirmed. Time and again, this Court has upheld management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements. Respondent’s failure to deploy
petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to
institute the suit below. The award of attorney’s fees is thus
warranted.
Same;
Same; Seafarers; Nature of Employment; Seafarers are considered
contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular employees
under the Labor Code.—We
likewise do not see respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner as an
act designed to prevent the latter from attaining the status of a
regular employee. Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of
Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular employee, regardless
of his previous contracts of employment with respondent. In Millares
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 385 SCRA 306 (2002), the
Court ruled that seafarers are considered contractual employees and
cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor Code. Their
employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are
rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires.
The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a
contractual basis.
Ambraque
International Placement & Services vs. NLRC, 157 SCRA 431,
January 28, 1988
Labor;
NLRC; Overseas Employment; Illegal Dismissal; Dismissal of worker
that he allegedly exhibited disagreeable conduct when he was abroad,
is a sweeping statement and without any elaboration by the employer;
Absence of details surrounding the charge of disagreeable conduct of
the worker casts veracity on the charge.—The
allegation that the private respondent exhibited disagreeable conduct
when he was abroad thus paving the way for his dismissal is a
sweeping statement. The allegation is not even accompanied by any
elaboration on the matter. If the said allegation were true, then the
petitioner would have discussed in detail the circumstances
surrounding such disagreeable conduct in order to support its stand.
The absence of such vital information casts suspicion on the veracity
of the allegation of the petitioner. As observed by the Solicitor
General, the telex messages relied upon by the petitioner do not
establish that the private respondent was dismissed from his
employment for just cause. Both telex messages are general
statements. There is no record that the principal gave additional
information on the dismissal. At the most, the second telex message
implies that the previous employment experience of the private
respondent in Saudi Arabia causes problems to the principal.
Same;
Same; Same; Same; Recruitment agency, jointly and solidarity liable
with its principal to the worker corresponding to the entire
remuneration covered by the employment contract.—Finally,
the petitioner recruitment agency should be jointly and solidarity
liable with its principal as far as this case is concerned. Pursuant
to Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Regulations of the Labor
Code, a recruitment agency can be sued solidarity with its principal.
Interorient
Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 757 , September 16,
1996
Actions;
Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Petitioners act prematurely when
they immediately bring a petition for certiorari without having filed
any motion for reconsideration with the respondent agency.
Same;
Same; Same; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court will lie only in cases where a grave abuse of discretion or an
act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown to have
been committed by the respondent Commission, and the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review decisions or resolutions of the respondent
NLRC does not include a correction of its evaluation of the
evidence.—But
even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be overlooked, the
instant petition nevertheless suffers from serious substantive flaws.
The petition assails the Resolution of the respondent Commission as
lacking factual and legal bases to support the same. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in cases
where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction is clearly shown to have been committed by the
respondent Commission, and this Court’s jurisdiction to review
decisions or resolutions of the respondent NLRC does not include a
correction of its evaluation of the evidence. Moreover, it is a
fundamental rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like the respondent NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is able to clearly
demonstrate that respondent Commission had arbitrarily disregarded
evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent
as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly
appreciated.
Labor
Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice;
Claims of overseas workers against their foreign employers should not
be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts
usually apply to other complainants who have more facility in
obtaining the required evidence to prove their demands.—First,
a word about the evidence supporting the findings of the POEA
Administrator. We have held that claims of overseas workers against
their foreign employers should not be subjected to the rules of
evidence and procedure that courts usually apply to other
complainants who have more facility in obtaining the required
evidence to prove their demands. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.
Same;
Same; Insanity; The mental disorder of a Filipino overseas contract
worker became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to
Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok
airport’s immigration area on his own, there being no sane and
sufficient reason for him to want to while away his time in a foreign
land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with its native tongue, with
nothing to do and no source of income, and after having been absent
from kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year.—The
circumstances prior to and surrounding his death, however, provide
substantial evidence of the existence of such mental defect or
disorder. Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to join
his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover
wandered out of the Bangkok airport’s immigration area on his own.
We can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas
contract worker or seaman to want to while away his time in a foreign
land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with its native tongue, with
nothing to do and no source of income, and after having been absent
from kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year. Nor can
we find any plausible reason for him to be wielding a knife and
scaring away passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman,
unless he is no longer in full possession of his sanity. To our mind,
these circumstances are sufficient in themselves to produce a firm
conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was no longer in
full control of his senses when he left his work. To reiterate, in
this case, no more than substantial evidence is required.
Same;
Same; Same; Where an overseas contract worker attacked a Thai
policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental
faculties, the provisions of the Standard Format Contract of
Employment exempting the employer from liability does not apply.—The
POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda
attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control
of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard
Format Contract of Employment exempting the employer from liability
should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the
deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his
repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of
his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at
the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be
characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part.
Same;
Same; Same; The failure of a foreign employer to observe some
precautionary measures and in allowing an overseas worker with mental
disorder to travel home alone render it liable for the death of said
worker.—Secondly,
and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s
mental condition, petitioners “should have observed some
precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to
travel home alone,” and their failure to do so rendered them liable
for the death of Pineda. Indeed, “the obligations and liabilities
of the (herein petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the
contracted period as (petitioners are) duty bound to repatriate the
seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of
employment.”
Same;
Same; Even if the termination of the employment contract is duly
effected in a foreign country, still the responsibility of the
foreign employer to see to it that the worker is duly repatriated to
the point of hiring subsists.—Petitioner’s
reliance on De Jesus is misplaced, as the death and burial benefits
being claimed in this case are not payable by the Employees’
Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance
Fund. These claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign
employer together with the local agency for the safety of the
employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this
country, i.e., the point of hire. Though the termination of the
employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the
responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was
duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule
VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment
clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident
and life insurance covering accidental death, dismemberment and
disability of overseas workers: “Section 4. Duration of Insurance
Coverage.—The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of
the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for
the duration of the worker’s contract plus sixty (60) calendar days
after termination of the contract of employment; provided that in no
case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less than one
year.” (Italics supplied)
Same;
Same; The foreign employer may not be obligated by its contract to
provide a companion for a returning employee but it cannot deny that
it is expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of
said worker.—The
foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to
provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that
it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of
said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who,
knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone,
is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another
time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed
of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their
usefulness. [Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC, 261
SCRA 757(1996)]
De
Jesus vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 530 SCRA 489 , August
17, 2007
Labor
Law; Appeals; Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a
re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper labor tribunal has based its determination—firm is the
doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies
with greater force in labor cases.—It
is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised before this Court. Judicial review by
this Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of
facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. However,
factual issues may be considered and resolved when the findings of
facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent
with those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, as in this case.
Same;
Disease; The rule is that an ailment contracted by a worker even
prior to his employment, does not detract from the compensability of
the disease.—The
evidence shows that De Jesus previously suffered from ulcer but he
ticked “NO” in his medical history. De Jesus, therefore,
committed misrepresentation. Nonetheless, he passed the
pre-employment medical examination, was reported fit to work, and was
suffered to work on board M/V Author for more than two (2) months,
until his repatriation on June 19, 1997. The rule is that an ailment
contracted even prior to his employment, does not detract from the
compensability of the disease. It is not required that the employment
be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the
illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits incident thereto. It
is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small
measure, to the development of the disease.
Same;
Same; A worker’s misrepresentation cannot be made the basis by his
employer for the denial of his claims under the contract where he
passed the required pre-medical examination and was declared fit to
work.—In
OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 449 SCRA 525 (2005),
this Court, in granting similar claims, held: Labor contracts are
impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably and
liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels. Despite his
misrepresentation, Arbit underwent and passed the required
pre-medical examination, was declared fit to work, and was suffered
to work by petitioner. Upon repatriation, he complied with the
required post-employment medical examination. Under the beneficent
provisions of the Contract, it is enough that the work has
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the
disease and in bringing about his death. Strict proof of causation is
not required. De Jesus’ misrepresentation cannot, therefore, be
made basis by POMI for the denial of his claims under the contract.
Same;
Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; Settled is the rule that in
termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause.—Settled
is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause. The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits
and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense. In this case, no
convincing proof was offered to prove POMI’s allegation. All that
we have is its self-serving assertion that De Jesus violated his
employment contract. There is no proof that the prescribed
disciplinary procedure was followed. We, therefore, agree with the
Labor Arbiter’s finding that POMI utterly failed to establish its
claim of valid dismissal. Accordingly, the NLRC and Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the said finding. [De Jesus vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 530 SCRA 489(2007)]
Seagull
Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. vs. NLRC, 333 SCRA 236 , June 08,
2000
Remedial
Law; Certiorari; The filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action
for certiorari, subject to well-recognized exceptions; Certiorari
cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of
petitioners’ own omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration.
Labor
Law; Death Benefits; Under the contract, compensability of the
illness or death of seamen need not depend on whether the illness was
work connected or not; It is sufficient that the illness occurred
during the term of the employment contract.—It
will be noted that the claim for sickness and permanent disability
benefits of the private respondent arose from the stipulations on the
standard format contract of employment between him and petitioner
Seagull per Circular No. 2, Series of 1984 of POEA. This circular was
intended for all parties involved in the employment of Filipino
seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. Significantly, under the
contract, compensability of the illness or death of seamen need not
depend on whether the illness was work connected or not. It is
sufficient that the illness occurred during the term of the
employment contract. It will also be recalled that petitioners
admitted that private respondent’s work as a radio officer exposed
him to different climates and unpredictable weather, which could
trigger a heart attack or heart failure.
Same;
Same; It is not necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the
employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted
the disease; If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee’s
death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical
condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for
said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.—Even
assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his
employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation
benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in
a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing
about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to
recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect
health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings with
him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while
the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he
takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the
disease is the proximate cause of the employee’s death for which
compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the
employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death,
independently of any pre-existing disease. [Seagull Shipmanagement
and Transport, Inc. vs. NLRC, 333 SCRA 236(2000)]
Prudential
Shipping and Management Corporation vs. Sta. Rita, 515 SCRA 157 ,
February 08, 2007
Labor
Law; Seamen; The death of a seaman during the term of employment
makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation
benefits, but if the seaman dies after the termination of his
contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the
death benefits.—The
death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer
liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is
established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his
employment contract, the employer is liable. However, if the seaman
dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his
beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits enumerated
above. [Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation vs. Sta. Rita,
515 SCRA 157(2007)]
People
vs. Turda, 233 SCRA 702, July 06, 1994
Labor
Law; Illegal Recruitment; Words and Phrases; Recruitment,
defined.—Article
13, par. (b), of the same Code defines recruitment as “any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”
Same;
Same; Conspiracy; The appellant, his wife, and Manera were
conspirators in the illegal recruitment business by contributing acts
in pursuance of the financial success of their joint venture for
their mutual benefit.—A
review of the testimonies of complainants leads us to no other
conclusion than that appellant, his wife, and Manera were
conspirators in the illegal recruitment business by contributing acts
in pursuance of the financial success of their joint venture for
their mutual benefit. All the complainants have testified that in
every recruitment transaction, appellant was always present with the
other accused. With respect to the recruitment of Rosales and Shirley
Cabalu, both testified that the three (3) accused went to their house
to induce them to apply for overseas work for a fee, and that
appellant was likewise around when the amount of P70,000.00 was
quoted by the other accused as the recruitment service fee. For her
part, complainant Celina Andan categorically testified that appellant
and his wife were together when the latter was paid the downpayment
in check for her trip to Canada. Celina further asserted that the
Turdas were always together in their recruitment transactions; in
fact, all the complainants confirmed that appellant even drove them
to the airport for the supposed trip abroad not only once but
thrice.
Same;
Same; Evidence; A self-serving negative evidence cannot prevail over
positive identification.—Appellant’s
explanation that his reason for driving the complainants to the
airport was because he himself was also scheduled to leave for
abroad, is weak and uncorroborated. It is a self-serving negative
evidence which cannot prevail over his positive identification by the
complaining witnesses as one of those who actively participated in
recruiting them. Besides, how could he be driving his Volkswagen to
the airport if he himself was leaving for abroad, unless he was ready
to abandon his car after taking off?
Same;
Same; Same; Witnesses; The findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
showing that said court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance.—The
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any showing that said court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which do not obtain in the present case. There is no doubt
that the acts of appellant and his wife conclusively established a
common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished
through coordinated moves. Such acts constitute enlisting,
contracting or procuring workers or promising them overseas
employment under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code. Since
appellant did not have the license or authority to recruit and yet
recruited at least three (3) persons, he is guilty of large-scale
illegal recruitment under Art. 38, penalized under Art. 39, of the
Labor Code.
Same;
Same; Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Ex Post Facto Laws; P.D.
2018, which increased the penalty for illegal recruitment
constitutive of economic sabotage, to life imprisonment, took effect
on 28 July 1986.—We
are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that the trial court
erred in imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment because
this was imposed by a new law not in force when the offense was
allegedly committed. P.D. No. 2018 has increased the penalty to life
imprisonment if the illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage. As defined in Art. 38, as amended, illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage if undertaken by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph of Art. 38. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2018,
promulgated on 26 January 1986, has provided for its immediate
effectivity. It was published on 10 February 1986 in Vol. 82, No. 6,
Page 922, of the Official Gazette. Hence, when appellant committed
the acts of illegal recruitment from August 1986 to September 1987,
the amendments to the law, which took effect on 28 July 1986, were
already in force and effect.
Same;
Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Where some other crimes or
felonies are committed in the process of illegal recruitment,
conviction under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under
other statutes.—The
rule is settled that the recruitment of persons for overseas
employment without the necessary recruiting permit or authority from
the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however, where some other
crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the
Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes.
Same;
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Not all acts which constitute estafa
necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in
scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment
activities.—Applying
the foregoing principle, not all acts which constitute estafa
necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in
scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment
activities. More importantly, the element of damage, which is
essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment; and,
while estafa is malum in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum.
[People vs. Turda, 233 SCRA 702(1994)]
Prieto
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 226 SCRA 232 , September 10,
1993
Labor
Law; Appeal; Factual findings of administrative bodies are as a rule
binding on the Court unless they come under the established
exceptions.—The
factual findings of administrative bodies are as a rule binding on
this Court, but this is true only when they do not come under the
established exceptions. One of these is where the findings of the
POEA and the NLRC are contrary to each other, as in this case, and
there is a necessity to determine which of them should be preferred
as more conformable to the established facts.
Same;
The claims of our overseas workers should be received with sympathy
and allowed if warranted conformably to the constitutional mandate
for the protection of the working class.—The
private respondents point to the petitioners’ allegation in their
complaint that they were mere assistant cooks and argue that this
belies their representation that they did not apply for these
positions. The argument has no merit. The petitioners were not
assisted by lawyers when they filed their complaint and must have had
in mind the positions stipulated in the second contract. In the
amended complaint, this statement was rectified. At any rate, the
slight error must not be taken against the petitioners. As we held in
Cuadra v. NLRC, “our overseas workers are mostly ordinary laborers
not conversant with legal principles and with the manner they can
assert and protect rights. They have no compatriot lawyers to consult
and no labor unions to support them in the foreign land. x x x The
claims of our overseas workers should therefore be received with
sympathy and allowed, if warranted, conformably to the constitutional
mandate for the protection of the working class.”
Same;
Same; Where the employer-employee relationship has been established,
the burden of proof in termination cases lies with the
employer.—Where
the employer-employee relationship has been established, the burden
of proof in termination cases lies with the employer. This burden was
not discharged by the private respondents.
Same;
Labor Code; A private employment agency can be sued jointly and
severally with the principal or foreign-based employer for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of
employment.—Rule
V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code defines
the duties and obligations of a duly licensed placement and
recruitment agency. Section 2(e) requires a private employment agency
to assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract
of employment of an overseas worker. Section 10(a)(2) provides that a
private employment agency can be sued jointly and severally with the
principal or foreign-based employer for any violation of the
recruitment agreement or the contract of employment.
Same;
Same; Same; Book II, Rule II, Section 1(f) (3) of the New Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, promulgated by the
Governing Board of the POEA substantially reiterates Rule II of Book
II, Section 1(d) (3) of 1985 POEA Rules.—Book
II, Rule II, Section I(f) (3) of the new Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment promulgated by the Governing Board of
the POEA substantially reiterates Rule II of Book II, Section 1(d)
(3) of 1985 POEA Rules, which governs this case. It provides that a
private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary liability
with the employer for all claims and liabilities that may arise in
connection with the implementation of the contracts including but not
limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and
repatriation. There is no doubt that, under the facts established in
this case, AR and Sons is jointly and solidarily liable with overseas
employer SAM for the claims of the petitioners.
JMM
Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319 ,
August 05, 1996
Same;
Same; Police power concerns government enactments which precisely
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good.—Thus,
police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a
presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners
to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Same;
Same; The Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned
Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary
of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.—A
thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the
issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist
Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related
to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a
valid exercise of the police power.
Same;
Same; The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No.
3.—Clearly,
the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women
was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists
to “high-risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive
recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be
gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation
by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Same;
Same; Apart from the State’s police power, the Constitution itself
mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas
workers.—In
any event, apart from the State’s police power, the Constitution
itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our
overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor,
embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.
It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987
Constitution in its first paragraph states: The State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
Same;
Same; Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment
alone.—Obviously,
protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.
Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution,
the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a
backseat to the government’s constitutional duty to provide
mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
Same;
Same; A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
meaning of our constitutional guarantees.—A
profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning
of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right
to work and the right to make a living because these rights are
property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which
normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Same;
Same; No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the
state.—
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the
state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of
legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim,
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the
legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner
in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.
Same;
Same; So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable
regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.—Locally,
the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require
previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken
continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their
licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process
clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable
regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Same;
Same; The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification for so long as such classification is based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation.—The
equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor
and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or
by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require
absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under
like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection
clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long
as such classification is based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and
future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal
protection guarantee. [JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319(1996)]
Cadalin
vs. POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721 , December 05, 1994
Conflict
of Laws; As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be
applied in the forum.
Same;
Same; Actions; Words and Phrases; “Borrowing Statute,” Explained;
One form of “borrowing statutes” provides that an action barred
by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in
the forum even though the local statute has not run against
it.—However,
the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive
law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing
statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A “borrowing statute” directs the state
of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts 183 [1975]).
While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form
provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of
Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is
of this kind. Said Section provides: “If by the laws of the state
or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it
is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
Same;
Same; Same; Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been
repealed or amended by the Civil Code.—Section
48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which were inconsistent with it.
There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is
inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, 104 [7th ed.]).
Same;
Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.—In
the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be
enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
to the forum’s public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v.
Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor.
Labor
Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Prescription; Article 291 of the
Labor Code applies to money claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those arising from application of foreign laws
providing for greater employee benefits.—Section
7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for
filing “actions to enforce any cause of action under said law.”
On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims arising
from employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases at bench
all arose from the employer employee relations, which is broader in
scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective
bargaining agreement. The contention of the POEA Administrator, that
the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code, does not find support in the plain
language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants
in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims
“arising from the employer’s violation of the employee’s
right,” as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial
reading of the provision.
Same;
Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; “Speedy disposition of
cases” is a relative term, a flexible concept consistent with
delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case.—It
is true that the constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of
cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to
a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice. However, as held in Caballero v.
Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), “speedy disposition of cases”
is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy
trial” accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, “speedy
disposition of cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory.
Same;
Same; Same; Even if the cases took seven years to be disposed of in
the administrative level there is no violation of the constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases where the cases are not of the
run-of-the-mill variety, involve a total of 1,767 claimants hired on
various dates, with claims totalling more than US$65 million.—The
cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that
their final disposition in the administrative level after seven years
from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional
rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of complainants. The
amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767
claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first
being on April 3, 1985. The claimants were hired on various dates
from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group
in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims
totalled more than US$65 million.
Same;
Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.—In
the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be
enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
to the forum’s public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v.
Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor.
Labor
Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Prescription; Article 291 of the
Labor Code applies to money claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those arising from application of foreign laws
providing for greater employee benefits.—Section
7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for
filing “actions to enforce any cause of action under said law.”
On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims arising
from employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases at bench
all arose from the employer- employee relations, which is broader in
scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective
bargaining agreement. The contention of the POEA Administrator, that
the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code, does not find support in the plain
language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants
in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims
“arising from the employer’s violation of the employee’s
right,” as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial
reading of the provision.
Nitto
Enterprises vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 248 SCRA 654 ,
September 29, 1995
Labor
Law; Apprenticeship Agreements; Prior approval by the Department of
Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is a
condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.—In
the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner
and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly
employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of “care
maker/molder.” On the same date, an apprenticeship program was
prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and
Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on
June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced the day it was signed. Based on the evidence before us,
petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer
and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment
of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition
sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into.
Same;
Same; Where the apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect, the
worker hired as apprentice should be considered as a regular
employee.—Hence,
since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid
apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private
respondent’s assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but
as a delivery boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves
credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of
petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Same;
Dismissals; Due Process; The twin requirements of due process,
substantive and procedural, must be complied with before valid
dismissal exists, otherwise the dismissal becomes void.—There
is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin
requirements of due process, substantive and procedural, must be
complied with, before valid dismissal exists. Without which, the
dismissal becomes void. The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means
that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every
kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable
him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal
representation. [Nitto Enterprises vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 248 SCRA 654(1995)].
Note: The above list of cases was obtained from NLRC Commissioner Rendoque's lecture.
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