Case Doctrines in Legal Ethics (part III)

CASE DOCTRINES IN LEGAL ETHICS (part III)

Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino

Soriano vs. Reyes, 489 SCRA 328 , May 04, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Affidavits of Desistance; The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent lawyer; Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.—As we have previously ruled, the affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case executed by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. Accordingly, notwithstanding the motion to withdraw evidence and testimony, the disbarment proceeding should proceed.

Same; Same; Same; Pre-Trials; A lawyer’s failure to file a pretrial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence; Since pre-trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact and of law cannot be overemphasized as an essential requirement for a pre-trial conference.— Respondent’s failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence. The importance of filing a pre-trial brief cannot be gainsaid. For one, the lawyers are compelled to prepare their cases in advance. They eliminate haphazard preparation. Since pre-trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact and of law cannot be overemphasized as an essential requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable both parties to view the documentary evidence of the other even before they are presented in court. They enable the parties to know the testimonies of each other’s witnesses. Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts of the additional points the parties are willing to stipulate upon, or the additional points which could be inquired into for the purpose of additional stipulations. They also apprise the court of the respective demands of the parties, thus, enabling the court to discuss more intelligently an amicable settlement between or among the parties. The failure to submit a pre-trial brief could very well, then, be fatal to the case of the client as in fact it is a ground for dismissal of the case. For this reason, respondent’s failure to submit the pre-trial brief to the court within the given period constitutes negligence which entails disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but to the court as well.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to, not just competent service, but also whole-hearted devotion to his client’s cause.—A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to, not just competent service, but also wholehearted devotion to his client’s cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for disciplinary action.

Same; Same; Same; There is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on developments affecting the case—the lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing to defend the client’s interests.—Respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his clients as he omitted to apprise complainants of the status of the two cases and even assured the complainants that he was diligently attending to said cases. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 395 SCRA 386 (2003), this Court found therein respondent lawyer in bad faith for failing to inform his client of the status of the case. In said decision, the court has adamantly stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary. There is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on developments affecting the case. The lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing to defend the client’s interests. In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such manners of professional employment.

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar; The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.—Time and again we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe—such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine—would accomplish the end desired. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and in grave cases, disbarment. In one case, the penalty for a lawyer’s failure to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings such as position papers leading to the dismissal of the case, is suspension of six months. Therefore, we find the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the IBP to be unduly harsh and we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension, taking into account that this appears to be his first offense. [Soriano vs. Reyes, 489 SCRA 328(2006)]

Somosot vs. Lara, 577 SCRA 158 , January 30, 2009

Attorneys; A counsel must reveal how he contacted his client during pendency of adverse party’s request for admission and answer to interrogatories.—The respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact the defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It appears that he really had not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in December 2001 and only to inform her of his government appointment and to collect his billings. It was only after the discovery of the closure of the defendant’s office did the respondent try to contact the complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could not be reached.

Same; A client must never be left in the dark even if he has not paid counsel’s billing.—The interrogatories/admission issue happened in August 2001, which tells us that the respondent at about that time was already very sensitive about his billing issue against his client as he had not been paid from May to August 2001. Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her. As the court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty. Edgardo Arias, 521 SCRA 1 (2007), a client must never be left in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer in particular and the legal profession in general.

Same; Effect of counsel’s failure to react on trial court’s adverse ruling.—We feel it safe to assume that the respondent did not move at all to question the trial court’s rulings; nowhere in the records, both from the complainant’s and the respondent’s end, is there any allegation that the respondent sought to review the trial court’s rulings. What intrigues us is that the respondent could have reacted to the trial court’s ruling on the interrogatories/request for admission; he was aware of the recourses open to him under the ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 607 (1992), that he cited in his objection to the interrogatories and request for admission.

Same; Effect of filing unconsented notice of withdrawal without stating specific valid reasons therefor.—On the matter of the respondent’s withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have had valid reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the respondent now states, he could withdraw under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility—i.e., deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or appointment or election to public office. However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his client’s unknown location and failure to communicate as reasons for his client’s lack of express consent to his withdrawal. It is undisputed that the trial court denied the respondent’s notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened with all the responsibilities that his representation carried.

Same; Effect of failure to appeal adverse decision of trial court.—The respondent never bothered to refuse this very damaging allegation; neither in his Position Paper before the IBP nor in the Comment filed with us did he offer an explanation. Thus, it appears that the respondent could not have really taken any instructions from his client on how to handle the trial court’s adverse decision. He simply took it upon himself to decide not to appeal the trial court’s decision and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

Same; Attorney’s Fees; Non-payment of attorney’s fee and appointment as government consultant mitigating circumstances and mishandled case.—What lightens the impact of the respondent’s mishandling of the case is the complainant’s own failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyer’s sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are understandable; lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their law practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondent’s appointment as a consultant should be considered although it is a matter that none of the parties have fully examined.

Same; Client has a duty to inform her counsel of change of address and contact her lawyer.—More than these reasons and as Commissioner Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant never made any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of her case, expecting instead the respondent to take full and complete initiative in this regard. While the respondent, as counsel, has the obligation to inform his client of the material developments in the case, particularly of the aspects of the case that would require the client’s instructions or participation, this obligation is balanced by a complementary duty on the part of a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in order to be informed of the progress of the case.

Same; Lawyer cannot be disbarred if his client is guilty of contributory faults.—In these lights, we hold that while the respondent is liable for a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects his standing and character as an officer of the Court and as a member of the Bar, this liability ought to be tempered by the mitigating circumstances we pointed out above. We therefore cannot impose disbarment as penalty. Given the mitigating circumstances and the extent of their effects on the respondent’s culpability, we hold that a three-month suspension from the practice of law is the penalty that is more in keeping with the damage the complainant suffered and the interests that the public, the bar and the administration of justice have to protect. [Somosot vs. Lara, 577 SCRA 158(2009)]

Pena vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444 , June 25, 2007

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; Certification against Forum Shopping; Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.—The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent.—In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or “action” is one that necessarily involves “the same issues” as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints.—It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided,i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either “taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.” Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, “should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.”

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate—and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics; Under this Rule 19.01, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.—The intrinsic merit of complainant’s case against respondent justifies the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.

Same; Same; Same; Demand Letters; Blackmail; Extortion; Words and Phrases; The act of a lawyer in sending a demand letter threatening someone that should the latter fail to pay the amounts he and his client propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws, is not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but also amounts to blackmail; Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints, obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.—In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail. Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is quite obvious that the respondent lawyer’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands, not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantly claims; The writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, however, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay—it even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay.—Respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes. Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principalagent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The privileged nature of a demand letter is removed when a lawyer uses it to blackmail someone and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.—Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client. [Pena vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444(2007)]

Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472 , February 24, 2010

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Quantum of Proof; Administrative Cases; In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge.—In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge. We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalad’s negligence.

Same; Same; Negligence; The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.—Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.

Same; Same; Same; The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case.—The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform his client of the status of the case. Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seriña, 458 SCRA 12 (2005) in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 471 SCRA 111 (2005) and in Villaflores v. Limos, 538 SCRA 140 (2007) were of the same tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter has more control in handling the case.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.—All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. [Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472(2010)]

Ramos vs. Ngaseo, 445 SCRA 529 , December 09, 2004

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibiting lawyers from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property.—Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

Same; Same; Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.—In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent’s act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.

Same; Same; Disbarment; The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution—only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty.—We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.

Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 , September 21, 1949

1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIBNT, WHEN EXISTS.—"To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion * * *. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established * * *."

2.ID. ; ATTORNEY Is INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES.—There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.

3.ID. ; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT Is SACRED.—Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client.

4.ID.; ID.—The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.

5.ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT Is FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC PoLiCY.—The relation of attorney and client is fbunded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the chent's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice

6.ID ; RETAINING FEE, WHAT Is.—"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is mtended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."

7.ID. ; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM.—An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm.

8.ID. ; PROPESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF.—Prof essional confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.

9.ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY.—The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration.

10.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS.—Attorneys are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients. [Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569(1949)]

Bun Siong Yao vs. Aurelio, 485 SCRA 553 , March 30, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.—It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Respondent’s act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum shopping. He has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainant’s companies for his own end.—Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondent’s act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum shopping, as correctly found by the investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainant’s companies for his own end.

Same; Same; Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a client or former client.—Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a client or former client.

Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 , July 14, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyer-client Relationship; An attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents.—Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

Same; Same; Same; The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer; It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.—It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach.—Be that as it may, respondent’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent’s professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. [Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75(2003)]

Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525 , December 18, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter’s interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.—Respondent’s liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter’s interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case, respondent’s liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan “because circumstances . . . did not allow it” and that, because of the passage of time, “he somehow forgot about his obligation” only underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor. A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationship; If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.—Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the property of complainant’s parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship between them. This contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David, To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established  [Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525(2001)]

Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422, March 30, 2004

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant—disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.—Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case. Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that: . . . . No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. This is because: A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationships; Words and Phrases; Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.—Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance; There is no attorney-client relationship between a lawyer and another person where the preparation and the proposed filing of a petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.—As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for “Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents” filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondent’s immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Same; Same; Same; Violation of Confidentiality; There is no violation of the duty of a lawyer to preserve the confidence and secrets of another where the facts alleged in a complaint for estafa filed by the lawyer against such person were not obtained by the lawyer in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son, and to hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.—The alleged “secrets” of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests. [Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422(2004)]

Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472 , April 29, 1971

Remedial law; Change of counsel; Court should be informed.—Atty. Unson continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the estate as appellant therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.

Same; Completeness of service by registered mail.—Service by registered mail of the appellate court’s decision upon the petitioner’s counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee’s failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. This has ever since been the prevailing rule in the interests of public policy and sound administration of justice, as most recently affirmed in Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, citing a long line of applicable precedents.

Same; Counsel of estate, not of administrator.—The party in the subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr., in his (Luis’) official capacity as administrator, did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding Luis’ removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services which she never did.

Same; Court’s admonition to counsel; Cooperation of litigants and their attorneys needed.—The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provided that “the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay” and expressly admonishes that “for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.” [Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472(1971)]

Montano vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 358 SCRA 1 , May 21, 2001

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances; A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.—We find Atty. Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.—The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.

Venterez vs. Cosme, 535 SCRA 378 , October 10, 2007

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination that is until the case becomes final and executory.—No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

Same; Same; Same; The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted; A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.—The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party.—A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.

Same; Same; Same; The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.—Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.—All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondent’s failure to protect the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. [Venterez vs. Cosme, 535 SCRA 378(2007)]

In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1 , August 15, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Speedy Disposition of Cases; The failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action; The accused in a criminal case has the right to a swift and just disposition of his case, and lawyers are obliged to protect, not defeat, such right.—The failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. The pernicious effect of Atty. Briones’ omission cannot be gainsaid. His failure to file an appellant’s brief in G.R. No. 130965 has caused the appeal to remain inactive for more than a year, to the prejudice of his client, the accused himself, who continues to languish in jail pending the resolution of his case. The accused in a criminal case has the right to a swift and just disposition of his case. Lawyers are obliged to protect, not defeat, such right.

Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar is expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of his profession; Cessation of his law practice is not an excuse for a lawyer in not filing the required brief.—We have considered the explanation of Atty. Briones for his failure to comply with the Court’s directive and we find the same unsatisfactory. Such omission can be attributed to pure negligence on the part of Atty. Briones which we deem inexcusable. He cannot deny that his office received a copy of the Court’s resolution ordering him to submit an appellant’s brief. The registry return card shows that the notice to file appellant’s brief was received by the addressee on August 6, 1998. To exonerate himself from liability, Atty. Briones claims that his secretary did not forward to him the mail matters received in his office. He, however, cannot pass the blame to his secretary as he is personally responsible for his own communications. As a member of the Bar, he is expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of his profession. He should not have passively waited for his secretary to inform him about the letters and communications received in his law office, especially those coming from the courts. He should have taken the initiative to check with her if there are important matters requiring his action or attention. Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for his failure to file the required brief. Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore the directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from the records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and he is expected to comply with all its orders and directives.

Same; Same; Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.—It should be stressed that every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of the law the interest of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. [In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1(2001)]

Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441 , March 20, 2012

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.—With regard to the jewelry and watch entrusted to him, Casuga alleged that Nevada pawned them and thereafter instructed Casuga’s wife to redeem them with the latter’s money. He added that Nevada then instructed his wife to sell the valuables and use the proceeds to reimburse herself for the redemption price. Again, however, Casuga’s allegations are unsupported by a single shred of evidence. Pawnshop receipts would have provided the best evidence under the circumstances. But they were not presented, too. Moreover, Casuga’s admission that the valuables are indeed in his possession, without any adequate reason, supports Nevada’s version of the story. Casuga’s failure to return such property or remit the proceeds of the sale is a blatant violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). The Code’s Canon 16 and Rule 16.3 state: CANON 16—A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his profession. Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Respondent’s act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of Rule IV, Section 3(a) of the Notarial Rules, and it likewise partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct.—None of the requirements contained in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a notary signing in behalf of a contracting party, was complied with in this case. Moreover, Casuga’s act of affixing his signature above the printed name “Edwin T. Nevada,” without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the contract of lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of the aforequoted Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules, for which he can be disciplinarily sanctioned provided under Rule XI, Sec. 1(b)(10) of the Notarial Rules, which provides: SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions.—x x x (b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who: (10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; Aside from being a violation of the Notarial Rules, Casuga’s aforementioned act partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct punishable under the ensuing Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Notary Public; A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.—In Dela Cruz v. Zabala, 442 SCRA 407 (2004), the Court adjudged the respondent notary public guilty of gross negligence for failing to require the parties to be physically present before him. In revoking the erring notary’s commission, the Court, in Dela Cruz, stressed the significance of notarization and proceeded to define the heavy burden that goes when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary public. The Court wrote: x x x A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. [Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441(2012)]

Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 , September 19, 2007

Administrative Law; Judges; Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct.—Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is because a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.

Same; Same; Clemency; Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.—Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.

Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.—In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation. 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

Same; Same; Same; Judge Diaz’s 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution.—In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him. [Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534(2007)]

Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467 , March 06, 2012

judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.—Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides: “SEC. 5. Disqualification.—The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and 3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.”

Same; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.—In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), 533 SCRA 539 (2007), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: “1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform; 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.” [Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467(2012)]

Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572 , August 21, 1996

Courts; Judges; Extortion; The intention of a judge in meeting with complainant and in giving him advise is, to say the least, far from the behavior of a member of judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly and corruption.—Our minds can not sit easy with regard to the charge of extortion. Respondent admitted having met complainant in the early morning of August 1, 1994, for the purpose of informing complainant that he could participate in the habeas corpus proceeding. During said meeting, respondent also admitted having told complainant of the “potency” of Mamangon’s motion for reconsideration and the amount of money which complainant would spend to hire a good lawyer to represent him in the proceeding. Respondent’s seemingly benign conduct of advising complainant on matters pending before respondent puzzle our minds since we are not told of any special circumstance which would justify respondent’s special interest over complainant’s concern. Respondent, however, gives no other reason for meeting and advising complainant that could dispel ill thoughts in reference to respondent’s motives. Any person with a reasonable mind would deduce that respondent’s actuation meant something much more than what he explicitly suggested, for what could be respondent’s reason, in mentioning the “potency” of Mamangon’s motion for reconsideration and the amount of money which complainant might spend in resisting the same, than to insinuate that complainant could save on expenses and be certain of the result by spending the same amount for the judge. Certainly, it is simply naïve to say that a proposal to that effect could be done only through the use of direct words expressing respondent’s intention to be willing and able to decide the case in complainant’s favor for a consideration. Respondent’s pretended innocence over the perceived meaning of his insinuation is unpersuasive considering his long years in the practice of law. Thus, the intention of respondent in meeting with complain-ant and in giving him advice is, to say the least, far from the behavior of a member of judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly and corruption.

Same; Same; Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity.—Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Criminal Proceedings; An accused against whom the information has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may no longer be detained.—Clear as the basis may be, its application is, however, erroneous. Even assuming that Mamangon was lawfully imprisoned at the outset, at the time he filed his motion for reconsideration, the decision of Judge Macapagal declaring his court to be without jurisdiction had already become final and considering that no information had been re-filed, the detention of Mamangon was untenable and illegal. An accused against whom the information has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may no longer be detained; the information under which the accused is being held for trial loses its force and effect. There is simply nothing to hold the accused answerable for. Section 14 of Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court speaks of a person lawfully imprisoned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; When the court where the criminal case was filed is without jurisdiction, the authority of the court to hold the accused in confinement pending trial is a valid subject of a petition for habeas corpus.—The accused Mamangon was no longer lawfully imprisoned at the time the motion for reconsideration was filed. Thus, respondent should not have applied Section 12 of Rule 114 but instead reversed his former decision by granting the petition and ordering the release of the accused without requiring him to post bail. When the court where the criminal case was filed is without jurisdiction, the authority of the court to  the accused in confinement pending trial is a valid subject of a petition for habeas corpus.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ of habeas corpus will lie where the order is void where the court issuing it had no jurisdiction, but this remedy should not be secured before a court of equal rank in order to avoid undue interference upon the functions of another branch unless the former court has declared itself to be without jurisdiction.— Where the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ will lie where the order is void because the court issuing it had no jurisdiction over the crime charged or over the person accused where the latter had challenged on time, the jurisdiction of the court over his person (Francisco, p. 665, Rules of Court in the Philippines Vol. V-B; citing the case of Banayo vs. President of San Pablo, 2 Phil. 413; Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil. 534; Malinao, et al. vs. Peterson, No. L-16464, July 26, 1960). But this remedy should not be secured before a court of equal rank in order to avoid undue interference upon the functions of another branch unless the former court has declared itself to be without jurisdiction, as in the instant case.

Same; Same; In order to discipline a judge, it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice.—The erroneous application of the rule by respondent nevertheless cannot be the sole basis for disciplining him. As we have ruled in the past, in order to discipline a judge, it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice (Re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107). Judges cannot be subjected to liability—civil, criminal or administrative—for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or administratively responsible (Valdez vs. Valera, 81 SCRA 246). Considering the circumstances of the case at bar, we cannot hold respondent liable for his erroneous action. An erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary.

Same; Same; While the decision of a judge may be erroneous, its malicious intent, however, may not be presumed in the absence of any evidence to prove the same.—Complainant herein alleged that the order of respondent judge releasing the accused on bail was maliciously motivated for having been issued several days after the attempted extortion. We find the decision of respondent erroneous but its malicious intent, however, may not be presumed in the absence of any evidence to prove the same. It might be suggested that, respondent’s ill motives may be presumed considering his actuation prior to the issuance of the questioned erroneous order. We are, however, unable to find a clear and definite connection between an attempt at extortion and the subsequent erroneous orders. It would be unjust to presume wrong intentions considering that respondent’s questioned orders are not totally unjustifiable. [Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572(1996)]

Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 , January 09, 1987

Legal and Judicial Ethics; Both bench and bar to encourage respect for courts.—It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the people’s respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice, is to be avoided. And this, even if both have to restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.

Same; Same; Relation between counsel and judge based on mutual respect—The relations between counsel and judge should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of another. Thus, counsel is expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. Although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of causes, he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may properly be addressed by one gentleman to another. Certainly and most especially in our culture, raising one’s voice is a sign of disrespect, improper to one whose “investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior towards the courts.

Contempt; Powers of judicial officers to declare, lawyers in contempt based on preservative principle.—Judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 , September 12, 1986

Same; Public Officers; Judges; Loyalty of those in the public service must be to the Constitution and the people.—The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and Judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only by the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. [Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43(1986)]

Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546 , June 27, 1988

Judges; Appointment; It is the privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee with whom he will work; He cannot be held administratively liable if he did not choose to have complainant reappointed.—On the first charge of harassment, the respondent explained that he did not recommend the reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo because she was inefficient. Such reluctance of the respondent must be because she was a protegee of the respondent’s predecessor, former Judge Jose Parentela, Jr., who reportedly exposed the illegal issuance of the subpoena to Obosa by the respondent. Nevertheless, it is the privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee with whom he will work. If he did not choose to have said complainant reappointed, he cannot thereby be held administratively liable.

Same; Rule on inhibition of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Same; Same; Rule is explicit that the judge must secure the written consent of all the parties not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence; Failure of respondent to observe the elementary rules of conduct betrays his unusual personal interest in the case.—From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the record. The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct betrays his unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and above his sworn duty to administer the law impartially and without any fear or favor.

Same; Respondent guilty of the charge against him.—No doubt the respondent is guilty of the charge against him. There was no reason for him to require the appearance of Obosa in his court, even for a conference. The criminal case pending before him was not yet ready for trial as the accused was at large. If truly respondent was impelled with the desire to locate the whereabouts of accused Salamat so that he could be arrested, all that he could have done was to have a policeman or court employee go to Muntinlupa for the purpose, or he himself could have done so.

Same; Same; His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to appear before him is obvious.—Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena shall be signed by the clerk of court or by the judge, if the court has no clerk, under the seal of the court. The respondent had a clerk of court, Miss Gloria Lorenzo, and yet he himself issued and signed the subpoena. His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to appear before him is obvious.

Same; Same; Respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty.—The respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty. He demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as in fact by his behavior he has placed the judiciary in disrepute. He abused the great powers of his office so that he should not stay a moment longer as a member of the judiciary. [Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546(1988)]

Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411 , June 20, 2003

Court; Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Delay in Disposition of Cases; Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office.—It is not disputed that, it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300 after it was submitted for decision. The Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within ninety (90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court’s business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules. We have emphasized strict observance of this duty in order to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, may result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Delay ultimately affects the image of the judiciary. Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct, which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency, and warrants administrative sanction of the defaulting judge.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the people’s faith in our judicial system, and lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.—Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the people’s faith in our judicial system, and lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. In the event that judges cannot comply with the deadlines prescribed by law, they should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative sanctions. The Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them reasonable extensions of time to resolve cases upon proper application by the judges concerned and on meritorious grounds. At the very least, respondent judge should have requested for an extension of time to render judgment once he knew that he could not comply with the prescribed 90-day period to render a judgment. In so doing, he would have been able to apprise litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any. It would have shown his mindfulness of the deadlines.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.—Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. If found guilty thereof, the judge shall be suspended from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months; or imposed a fine of more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000, pursuant to Section 10, Rule 140.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held administratively accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his incumbency. Although he may no longer be dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his retirement benefits.—Except for the mitigating circumstance, we are in agreement with the OCA recommendations in this case. The record shows that this is not the first time that respondent has been called to account by this Court. In 1992, he was fined for gross partiality to a party. In 1996, he was admonished for delay in the disposition of a case. In 1999, he was reprimanded. Although respondent has retired on June 3, 2001, the recommendation of the OCA that a fine be imposed on him is still in order. Worth stressing, even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held administratively accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his incumbency. Although he may no longer be dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his retirement benefits. [Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411(2003)]

Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 , December 07, 1993

Judges; Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged for immorality prior to his appointment.—Respondent is not charged for immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor—his private and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety.

Same; Judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety.—In short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he encumbered to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that “[a] judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,” and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that “[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”

Same; Violation of rule regarding official court session hours amounts to neglect of duty.—It is, therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his office—if at all he did proceed to it—in time for the commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon, i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981). Thus, for purely personal reasons, he violated the rule regarding official session hours. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty.

Same; Immorality not confined to sexual matters.—Besides, immorality—for which the respondent is charged—is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that: “immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is wilful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751). [Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239(1993)]

Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 , July 12, 1991

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Administrative case for immorality; Effect of affidavit of desistance.—Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar. As held in People v. Obina: It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence.—It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.

Same; Same; Same.—The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. [Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75(1991)]

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court., 82 Phil. 595 , January 21, 1949

CONTEMPT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT is INHERENT IN ALL COURTS OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION.—That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special’ expression of statute, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this .jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.

2.ID.; CRITICISM OR COMMENT ON DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT, ExTENT AND SCOPE OF.—Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.

3.ID.; ID.—To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately “so many blunders and injustices,” that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice.

4.ID. ; ID.—The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court and believe that they can not expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

5.ID.; ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DUTIES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT.—As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Attorney V.S., like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

6.ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS; MAINTENANCE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—The constitional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.

7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of the constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.

In re Aguas, 1 Phil., 1 , August 08, 1901

CONTEMPT or COURT; TREATMENT OF WITNESS.—An attorney may rightfully protest against personal violence to a witness at the hands of the court, and such protest, if respectful, is not contempt of court.

2.ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT.—A finding that an attorney's attitude toward the court was "menacing" is a mere conclusion and will not support a judgment of contempt. [In re Aguas, 1 Phil., 1(1901)]

Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 , July 25, 1989

Judges; Inhibition of Judges; The rule on inhibition of judges is under paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.—Rule 137, Section 1 of the new Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Disqualification of Judges—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Same; Same; Same; Denial of the Motion for inhibition done in the valid and judicious exercise of the function and duty of the judge.—It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated by Judge Andal in his orders denying the same, cited no valid ground, which fact was confirmed by the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for the accused in the criminal cases and the defendants in the civil cases. There is, therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said motion was not whimsical or capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite the petitioner, as the petitioner would want this Court to believe, but was done in the valid and judicious exercise of his function and duty as judge.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary.—We agree with the Solicitor General that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary. Indeed the petitioner had not presented any evidence to support his conclusion that the filing of the petition for certiorari docketed as UDK 8748 and UDK 8822 and the administrative cases adverted to, caused the displeasure of Judge Andal as to affect his impartiality in trying petitioner’s cases. In fact, such allegations were refuted by Judge Andal when he categorically stated that he does not normally resent the filing of certiorari cases before this Court where he is impleaded as a mere nominal party, after all, when still a practitioner he too filed certiorari cases. Moreover, as a judge, he knows he has neither the reason nor luxury of time to entertain such a feeling, preoccupied as he is with the many cases assigned to him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Analysis of the assailed orders belies petitioner’s charge of bias or prejudice and hostilities.—A circumspective analysis of the assailed orders belies the petitioner’s charge of bias or prejudice and hostility, as all of the said orders appear to have been issued in accordance with law and nowhere was there a showing of any outward manifestation of the supposed state of hostility between Judge Andal and petitioner as to warrant the inhibition or disqualification of the former. And having denied the Motion for Inhibition, Judge Andal acted within his jurisdiction when he continued to take cognizance of all the cases pending before him, there being no writ of injunction or a restraining order issued, enjoining him to cease and desist from acting on the said cases.

Same; Same; Same; Mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower Court will not interrupt the course of the latter; Mere filing of an administrative case against respondent judge not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case.—The Court has held that mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. Likewise, “the mere filing of an administrative case against respondent judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial, and on this regard the petitioner failed.

Same; Same; Damages; Acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with the trial were done in a regular manner and considered as his official acts thus he is not answerable for damages.—In Aberca v. Ver, we postulated thus: “The purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.” Under said article judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. As we have earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with the trial of the different criminal and civil cases pending before his court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is not answerable for damages.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner reminded of his basic duty with the Court and its judicial officers.—An important point that should not be overlooked in this case is petitioner’s audacious propensity of filing certiorari and administrative cases against the respondent judge based on flimsy and unfounded charges he can conceive. Thus, it behooves us to remind the petitioner of his basic duty “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;” to conduct himself with “all good fidelity to the courts;” to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance; that his duty to render respectful civility, without fawning, to the courts is indeed essential to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, he should be courteous, fair, and circumspect, not petulant, combative, or bellicose in his dealings with the courts; and finally, that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements by an attorney in his pleading or motion is not only a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the canons of professional ethics, but also constitutes direct contempt of court for which a lawyer may be disciplined. [Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569(1989)]

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda, 155 SCRA 725 , November 27, 1987

Same; Disqualification of judges; Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between a judge and party’s counsel not a ground for disqualification.—Petitioner’s contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party’s counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge’s disposition of petitioner’s motions to be sound and well-taken. [Gandionco vs. Peñaranda, 155 SCRA 725(1987)]

Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 , July 25, 1996

Courts; Judges; People who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives.—The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.

Same; Same; A judge should not only possess proficiency in law, but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.—The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.

Same; Same; Respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary.—Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the people’s high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general. We need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed by respondent judge in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The audacity under which the same were committed and the seeming impunity with which they were perpetrated shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion that respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service.

Same; Same; Respondent judge took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.—The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.

Same; Same; Respondent judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.—Respondent may indeed be a legally competent person as evidenced by his published law books (translations from English to Tagalog) and his legal studies abroad, but he has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds without any hesitation, must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction—dismissal from the service.

Liwanag vs. Lustre, 306 SCRA 55 , April 21, 1999

Courts; Judges; Administrative Law; As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases—only substantial evidence is required.—As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence: “Sec. 5. Substantial evidence.—In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

Same; Same; Immorality; Evidence; Photographs; By their very nature, acts of sexual congress are not proper subjects of photographs.—It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.

Same; Same; Same; Serious Misconduct; The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary.—The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.

People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 , August 13, 1990

Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Nature of; Purpose of.—Besides, contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. And, while courts are inherently empowered to punish for contempt to the end that they may enforce their authority. preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the effectiveness of the administration of justice, nevertheless, such power should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, for the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

Same; Same; Judge; Rule that a judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just and valid reasons, from sitting in a case.—In the case at bar, the reason relied upon for the inhibition or disqualification of respondent Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to private respondent, is not based on any of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but on the second paragraph thereof. The settled rule is that the judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just or valid reasons, from sitting in a case, Respondent Judge has not as yet decided whether or not he will inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be premature for the Court at this stage to rule on the matter.

Javier vs. De Guzman, 192 SCRA 434 , December 19, 1990

Judges; Respondent judge took advantage of his position as Regional Trial Judge of Makati by filing the collection case against complainants in said court.—As to the second charge—that Respondent took advantage of his position as Makati Regional Trial Court Judge by filing the collection case against Complainants in said Court—we quote with approval Justice de la Fuente's observations thereon: "x x x The civil case was filed by respondent with the Makati RTC on September 8, 1988; and respondent admits that he was 'detailed indefinitely to Branch 142 of the same Court on June 30, 1988 and assumed office thereat on July 5, 1988.' Instead of filing the suit in Quezon City where the Javiers reside or in Manila where respondent resides, respondent—taking advantage of what he calls the waiver of venue stipulation in the Memorandum of Agreement (which states that 'in case of litigation, venue shall be in any court in Metro Manila, at the option of the Third Party,' i.e., the respondent)—chose to file the case in Makati. "True, considering the abovecited stipulation, it might be said that respondent was acting in the legal exercise of the option granted to him in the Agreement. Nonetheless, the undersigned submits that in thus acting, respondent had fallen short of what is expected of him as a Judge and officer of the court among whose duties it is to see to it that public confidence in the honor, dignity, integrity and independence of the judiciary is not eroded, pursuant to Canons 3 and 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, supra. It is reasonably to be expected, considering the peculiar Filipino psyche, personality and culture—of which a Judge like respondent is presumably aware—that the public, particularly respondent's adversary in this case, would naturally be apprehensive that respondent might exert influence to favor himself, to the detriment of his said adversary. And so it turned out, this was precisely the substance of complainant's second charge. Indeed, instead of promoting public confidence in the dignity, honor, integrity and independence of the Judiciary, as every Judge is urged to do by the Canons just cited, respondent's aforesaid behavior produced the opposite result."

Same; Respondent judge was found guilty on three (3) counts of irresponsible, improper and dishonorable conduct, and was severely censured.—All told, traces of animosity and harassment on the part of Respondent Judge are all too evident, in sharp contrast to what a Judge should be—the embodiment of what is judicious, proper and fair. Wherefore, finding Respondent Judge, Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. guilty on three (3) counts of irresponsible, improper and dishonorable conduct in disregard of the Code of Judicial Ethics, he is hereby SEVERELY CENSURED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the said acts or similar acts in the future shall receive graver sanctions.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA 66 , March 31, 2006

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that “a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory”—a parallel proscription for lawyers is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.”—Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that “a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.” A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.” This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, “(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.”

Same; Same; In Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 233 SCRA 378, 408 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted—by including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.—In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card “may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.” In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.

Same; Same; Misconduct; The Supreme Court found the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.—We find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.

Same; Same; Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity.—As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice—confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

Civil Procedure; Judgments; No judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated.—As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals wherein we held that “no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation.” Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, “People v. Luisito Beltran,” “People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,” “People v. Rowena Camino,” and “People v. John Richie Villaluz.” From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.

Same; Same; Judge Floro committed three fundamental errors in handling probation cases.—We perceive three

fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.—Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Same; Same; One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.—One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise “would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments.” This rule, however, admits of an exception as “good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error.” Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.

Same; Same; Like Caesar’s wife a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion—his language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.—Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice “should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest” as well. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. “His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.”

Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.—SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment.—The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made “upon motion by the proper party.” Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.

Same; Same; Practice of Law; No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client.—Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: “No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client.” Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: “A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.”

Same; Same; Respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking.—Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a “judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.” By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.

Same; Same; Psychic Phenomena; Psychic Phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies.—Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr.sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a “fairytale” or a “fantastic story.” He then went to state that “psychic phenomena” was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.—The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This power—consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts—is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Same; Same; Suspension; The Supreme Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.—The rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. This is because—[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA 66(2006)]

Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177 , April 05, 1990

Same: Same; Same; Judicial Ethics; Judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.—Consequently, there being no other sufficient ground to dissolve the injunction in controversy, the grant of the writ must be upheld but without prejudice to the consequences of the conduct of respondent judge. The circumstances under which the writ was granted after a protracted delay, punctuated by dubious orders issued in the interim, certainly cannot be countenanced lest such conduct be replicated in circumvention of the rules. Specifically, respondent judge failed to observe Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, and Rule 3.05 which admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Definitely, this Court cannot gloss over the challenged actuations of respondent judge which are amply reflected in the records of this case. [Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177(1990)]

Umale vs. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84 , May 25, 1973

Judicial Ethics; When judge may inhibit himself from trying a case.—Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.

Same.—Before the rule was amended in 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds of extreme delicacy, or prejudice or bias or hostility, not even when he would be violating Sections 3, 26 and 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics because he is a paid professor of law in the college owned by one of the litigants. Neither was a judge disqualified from trying a prosecution for perjury of an accused, who was ordered investigated and prosecuted as a perjured witness by said judge; not even if the judge himself took great interest and an active part in the filing of the criminal case to the extent of appointing the fiscal when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file the proper information. But in 1961, We enunciated the rule that a judge can inhibit himself from trying a case on the ground that the opinion he expressed in a letter addressed by him as counsel might in some way or another influence his decision in the case at bar and expressed his fear of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment. In 1962, We also rule that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related to a counsel within the 4th civil degree (now expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because Rule 126 (the old rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned." (citing del Castillo vs. Javellona, L-16742, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 147, 151). And in 1967, We affirmed that a judge may voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds other than those mentioned in par. 1 of Section 1 of Rule 137, as amended, such as bias or prejudice engendered by the judge having "lost respect in the manner the prosecutor was handling the case xxx"; or when the lawyer for a litigant is his former associate.

Same; Judge should make a careful self- examination whether to disqualify himself or not in a case before him.—When a judge might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. (Citing Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, Sept. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160, 167).

Same; Nature of Judicial Office; Due Process; Judge must be impartial and disinterested.—A judge, sitting on a case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.

Same; A criminal circuit judge who inhibits himself from trying a case may transfer the case to the regular courts of first instance where he holds court.— Having thus voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the criminal case in which herein petitioner is the complainant, the respondent Judge has the discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts of first instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court, since the regular Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A. 5179). This transfer is all the more justified because there is no other judge sitting in the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal or in the 7th Judicial District which comprises the provinces of Rizal, Cavite and Palawan, as well as the cities of Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Cavite. Tagaytay, and Trece Martires as there is only one circuit criminal court for each of the 16 judicial districts of the court. Furthermore, under Section 3 of R.A. 5179, the "provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judges and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with" its provisions. The Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court do not prohibit the raffling or re-raffling among the Judges in the same station and in the same Judicial District of a case where the Judge to whom it was originally raffled or assigned is disqualified or voluntarily inhibiting himself for valid and just causes.

In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative functions, defined; Case at bar.—An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. It is evident that such Provincial/ City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black’s Law Dictionary).

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Members of the Supreme Court and other Courts shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.—Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.”

Same; Same; Same; Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said committees which may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.—This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fullfilment of their judicial duties. [In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246(1988)]

People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 , June 22, 1984

Criminal Procedure; It is quite unusual that one of the accused was allowed to leave the country while standing charged with the serious crime of homicide and to be arraigned ahead of his co-accused pending investigation for murder.—At the outset, it is important to note the very peculiar facts which had given rise to the first issue. First of all, we find quite unusual that the accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias “Intsik” was allowed to leave the country while standing charged with the serious crime of homicide. His claim of innocence did not preclude the possibility of his jumping bail while abroad and not returning to answer the charges against him. The accused was allowed to be arraigned earlier than his co-accused even as the circumstances of murder were being reinvestigated.

Same; Trial judge erred in allowing an accused to be arraigned for homicide while fiscal investigating possibility of amending information to murder.—Second, it was error for the court to allow the advance arraignment of Intsik for homicide when the prosecution was still re-investigating the case to determine the possibility of amending the information to murder. Intsik should have been arraigned for murder and afterwards could have been convicted either of homicide or murder as may be proven, the former being an offense necessarily included in the crime charged.

Same; Evidence; Trial judge’s questions to the witnesses were clarificatory and did constitute undue interference.—Coming now to the appellants’ second assignment of error, we find the same to be without merit. It is not denied that the court had at certain points conducted its own questioning during the proceedings. The records, however, show that the court’s questions did not amount to interference as to make the case for the prosecution and deprive the accused of their defense. The questions of the judge addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and confirm certain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Judges; A judge should not allow personal prejudices to influence his refusal of defense request to call additional witnesses. No reversible error, however, appears as defense had other witnesses.—The emotional outburst of the presiding judge is rather unfortunate. Even if a judge sincerely believes that a counsel is deliberately exasperating or inciting him through the introduction of witnesses publicly known to be personal ly anathema to the judge and not because their testimony may prove or disprove matters in issue, the judge should avoid any unseemly display of shortness of temper or other unbecoming behaviour. A judge should not allow himself to be led by counsel or witnesses into showing that he can be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his official functions (Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247). It is precisely during such trying moments that a judge should be studiously careful about his conduct and in the measures he takes to uphold the court’s authority and dignity. However, the actuations of the trial judge showing some impatience against the appellants did not preclude them from adequately presenting their case. We have examined the records carefully and we find that the appealed decision was not based on any matters improperly elicited by the trial Judge during his examination of the witnesses nor has it been affected by the quoted remarks. Appellants were given all the opportunity to present their evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Refusal of judge to subpoena defense witness not reversible error as said witnesses could voluntarily testify without compulsory process.—Neither did the initial refusal of the trial judge to subpoena the two supposed witnesses prevent their being presented in court if they were really willing to testify for the defense. There are remedies available to parties for such situations. In fact, the records show that, later, the trial judge was amenable to their being present in court as witnesses and it was the defense which found no more need for the testimony.

Same; Judge’s statement to speed up trial, so innocent can be freed gave no false hopes on defense.—The statement shows no bias nor intention to give false hopes to either party. The judge merely expressed the need for a speedy trial. The statement should not be relied upon as a suggestion that the case for the defendants was stronger than the case for the prosecution.

Same; Judges; Judges should be sparing in intervening at the examination of witnesses.—The second assignment of error has no merit but nonetheless we take this opportunity to remind members of the bench that judges’ undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on the court’s part towards the witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause or ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196). Thus, a judge should exercise more care and patience in conducting a case, his right to intervene to be used sparingly, if at all. He must bear in mind that witnesses may be easily intimidated by an overly inquisitive judge considering the unusual circumstances which they find themselves in, especially when testifying in criminal cases. [People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695(1984)]

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lansang, 186 SCRA 646 , June 19, 1990

Judges; Resignation of judges is a prerogative of the President, not the Supreme Court. Erring judge, with several irregularities found against him considered retired with all benefits and gratuities forfeited.—Considering all the allegations, issues and arguments raised in the complaint and in the Comment and the resignation letter of respondent Judge dated January 26, 1990, the Court finds Judge Virgilio S. Lansang GUILTY of the charges complained of. His actuations, practices and conduct are unbecoming of a judicial officer; his acts of commission and omission having been committed through admitted negligence on his part, failure to report to the Supreme Court or to the Court Administrator, his grievances against his own Clerk of Court against whom he never filed any formal complaints regarding the latter’s alleged irregularities; his apparent acceptance of the accuracy of the reports submitted by his Clerk of Court; and unmitigated failure to ask for administrative remedies from the Supreme Court and Court Administrator and the existence up to now of 182 pending cases which according to the Court Administrator had been submitted for decision, and not merely pending trial. The Court likewise Resolved not to accept such resignation (acceptance of resignations from the judiciary being a prerogative of the President of the Philippines), but instead to consider him RETIRED, with all benefits and gratuities forfeited. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lansang, 186 SCRA 646(1990)]

Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 , June 14, 1990

Judges; Failure to reply to show-cause resolution of Supreme Court a serious misconduct.—After a careful perusal of the records of the instant administrative case coupled with painstaking deliberations, we are convinced that the respondent judge’s continued silence as to the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite repeated written queries from one of the parties, his failure to reply to the tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator, and his willful disobedience and disregard to our show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and the worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office.

Same; Loss of court records is chargeable against a judge.—In the instant case, respondent judge even impeded the speedy disposition of cases by his successor on account of missing records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and disorderly system in the recording of cases assigned to his sala. Although blame can also be conveniently laid on the court personnel’s mismanagement of the records of cases, proper and efficient court management is as much the judge’s responsibility for the Court personnel are not the guardians of a Judge’s responsibilities. (See Sec. of Justice v. Legaspi, 107 SCRA 233 [1981])

Same; Loss of eight court records a grave misconduct.—With respect to the inventoried four (4) criminal cases without prisoners and four (4) civil cases missing, we find no justification for the failure to present them to the Deputy Court Administrator when required and their absence from the place where court records are stored. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites attached to said office must be weeded out.

Same; Failure to decide a case within 90 days constitute gross inefficiency.—Lastly, the report on the physical inventory of the records of the cases in RTC, Branch 14, Lagawe, Ifugao, which was respondent judge’s last assignment before his suspension revealed that a total of 35 cases submitted for decision have remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period. We have consistently held that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Ubarra v. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4 [1985]; De Leon v. Castro, 104 SCRA 241 [1981]; and In re: Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]).

Same; Penalty on Judge for grave misconduct and inefficiency.—ACCORDINGLY, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS RESPONDENT JUDGE from the service with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. [Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557(1990)]

People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 , July 29, 1986

Same; Same; Interpretation, Too literal reading of the law, not advisable; Judges, not bound by the language of the law but must discover the reason and rhyme for its enactment.—We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors That intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth,” which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision. [People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163(1986)]

Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485 SCRA 98 , March 21, 2006

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law.—This Court has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.

Same; Same; Same; Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of the Supreme Court is a commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar.—Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar. Comprehending the Court’s decisions is a different matter, however, for it is in this area where one’s competence may be tested and proven.

Same; Same; Same; The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence.—The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence. Those who accept this exalted position owe the public and this Court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory knowledge of statutes and procedural rules. Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing jurisprudence. Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and research from beginning to end.

Same; Same; Same; Judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.—Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and maintenance of professional competence. Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors “men forgive and time forgets.” For when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. [Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485 SCRA 98(2006)]

Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561 , August 21, 1996

Same; Same; Same; It is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor his resolution dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire records of the case.—Respondent judge’s failure to transmit the resolution and records of the cases disregards the clear mandate of Section 5 of Rule 112. Under this provision, it is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor his resolution dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire records of the case.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Preliminary Investigation,” Explained.—A preliminary investigation is conducted to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is an executive, not a judicial function. It falls under the authority of the prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control all criminal actions. However, since there are not enough fiscals and prosecutors to investigate the crimes committed in all the municipalities all over the country, the government was constrained to assign this function to judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Same; Same; Same; When a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties and his findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases.—Thus, when a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties. His findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases. Hence, the investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation, must perform his ministerial duty to transmit within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the provincial or city prosecutor.

Same; Same; Same; Even if the investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, he is still duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city prosecutor.—It is true that the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial function which is beyond the reviewing power of the prosecutor. However, distinction should be made between a preliminary inquiry for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether or not a person should be held for trial. The first is a judicial function while the second is an executive function. Even if the investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, he is still duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city prosecutor. The prosecutor’s reviewing power shall affect only his conclusion as to whether or not a criminal complaint or information should be filed against the respondent, but not his conclusion as to the propriety of issuing a warrant of arrest.

Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 , January 09, 1987

Legal and Judicial Ethics; Both bench and bar to encourage respect for courts.—It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the people’s respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice, is to be avoided. And this, even if both have to restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.

Same; Same; Relation between counsel and judge based on mutual respect—The relations between counsel and judge should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of another. Thus, counsel is expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. Although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of causes, he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may properly be addressed by one gentleman to another. Certainly and most especially in our culture, raising one’s voice is a sign of disrespect, improper to one whose “investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior towards the courts.

Contempt; Powers of judicial officers to declare, lawyers in contempt based on preservative principle.—Judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Go, 534 SCRA 156 , September 27, 2007

Courts; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Simple Neglect of Duty; For the infraction of failing to file the returns on time, respondent Sheriff is guilty of simple neglect of duty and should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.—In the instant case, Sheriff Mordeno failed to file the returns on time; in fact, the returns were filed only on January 15, 2007 or after the judicial audit was conducted. For this infraction, Sheriff Mordeno is guilty of simple neglect of duty and should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Same; Same; Clerks of Court; Manifest Negligence; Respondent Clerk of Court is guilty of manifest negligence for failing to take further action on the “summonses” and warrants issued, to supervise her subordinates particularly on the service of writs of execution, the stitching of all case records and the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases—as Clerk of Court, her duties include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are accounted for.—As regards Clerk of Court Rosales, we find her guilty of manifest negligence for failing to take further action on the “summonses” and warrants issued, to supervise her subordinates particularly on the service of writs of execution, the stitching of all case records and the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases. As Clerk of Court, her duties include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are accounted for. It is likewise her duty to initiate and cause the search of missing records. Her failure to perform her duties constitutes manifest negligence which cannot be countenanced. It is incumbent upon the Clerk of Court to ensure an orderly and efficient record management in the court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function effectively. Under the circumstances, Clerk of Court Rosales should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Same; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Gross Inefficiency; Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.—Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court has constantly reminded judges to decide cases promptly. Delay not only results in undermining the people’s faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, and worse, it invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the judge. Failure to decide cases on time constitutes inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

Same; Same; Disrespect; A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely—failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive.—We also note that Judge Go failed to comply with the Resolution of this Court dated January 27, 2007. His request for an extension of time to file comment was merely “relayed” by Clerk of Court Rosales. Even after his request was granted, Judge Go failed to file a comment. Instead, he sent a 3-liner letter curtly informing this Court that he is denying all the allegations in the judicial audit report and demanding a formal hearing. A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive. For displaying a manifest indifference to the Resolution of this Court, Judge Go should be fined in the amount of P10,000.00.

Same; Same; Office Hours; Being judge does not excuse one from complying with the eight-hour service requirement every working day—just like any ordinary government employee, judges are required to render at least eight-hours of service; Judges are reminded that circulars prescribing hours of work are not just empty pronouncements—they are there for the purpose of promoting efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and require prompt and faithful compliance by all concerned.—Judge Go likewise failed to satisfactorily rebut the audit findings that he leaves the court premises immediately after presiding over the hearings in the morning and would return only the following day. Judge Go erroneously believed that being a judge excuses him from complying with the eight-hour service requirement every working day. Just like any ordinary government employee, judges are required to render at least eight-hours of service. Circular No. 13 provides the following guidelines for all trial courts: 1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours.—Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirement of at least eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1988, pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129. Judges are duty bound to comply with the required working hours to insure the maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per working day of the week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as possible and to dispose with regular dispatch the increasing number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters needing the attention of the judge are to be attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial. Judges are reminded that circulars prescribing hours of work are not just empty pronouncements. They are there for the purpose of promoting efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and require prompt and faithful compliance by all concerned. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Go, 534 SCRA 156(2007)]

Office of the Court Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24 , April 10, 2012

Administrative Law; Judges; As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.—Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.

Same; Misconduct; “Simple Misconduct” and “Grave Misconduct,” Distinguished.—In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 639 SCRA 633 (2011), the Court explained the difference between simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus: The Court defines misconduct as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.

Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.—The Court defines dishonesty as: x x x a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge “perform official duties honestly.”

Administrative Cases; Judges; Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.—This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This Resolution entitled “Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,” provides: Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. [Office of the Court Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24(2012)]